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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF NATIONALIST ACTION
PARTY
IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE 
Emre Arslan
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor; Dr. Ash Çırakman
This thesis is an attempt to explain and explore the role and influence of 
Nationalist Action Party (МНР) in Turkish political life. This study examines 
the rise of МНР in recent years both as a political party and as a political 
movement. For this reason, MHP’s role and influence is evaluated in terms of 
its origins, history, strategies and ideologies. Fruthermore, the changing role 
and influence of the party is assesed within the context of changing historical 
conditions. In this period, a crises of dominant ideologies has influenced the 
rise of МНР and its ideology. Kemalism, which is deemed as the official 
ideology of Turkish state and society throughout the history of Republic, has 
been challenged by Islamist movements and Kurdish nationalism in 1990s. 
Furthermore, the New Right as the hegemonic ideology of 1980s has lost its 
appeal and employed an extreme nationalist discourse to a great extent in recent 
years. In the ideological climate of 1990s, which is strongly influenced by 
competing, intermixing and changing nationalisms, the МНР nationalism has 
become a rising and influential ideology by articulating the dominant 
ideologies. Within the framework of above argument, this study adresses the 
changing ideology and political strategies of the МНР.
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ÖZET
MİLLİYETÇİ HAREKET PARTİSİNİN TÜRK SİYASAL 
HAYATINDAKİ ROLÜ VE ETKİSİ
Emre Arslan
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Aslı Çırakman
Bu tez, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisinin (MHP) Türk siyasal hayatındaki rolünü ve 
etkisini anlamaya ve açıklamaya çalışacaktır. Bu çalışma hem bir siyasal parti 
hem de bir siyasal hareket olarak MHP’nin son yıllardaki yükselişini 
incelemektedir. Bu nedenle, MHP’nin rolü ve etkisi onun köklerine, tarihine, 
stratejilerine ve ideolojisine göre ele alınmaktadır. Ayrıca, partinin değişen rolü 
ve önemi, değişen tarihsel koşullar içinde değerlendirilmektedir.Bu dönemde 
egemen ideolojilerin yaşadığı kriz, MHP’nin ve ideolojisinin yükselmesinde 
etkili olmuştur. Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca sorgulanmadan Türk devletinin ve 
toplumunun temel ideolojisi addedilen Kemalizm 1990larda Siyasal İslam ve 
Kürt milliyetçiliği tarafından ciddi sorgulamalara maruz kalmıştır. Ayrıca, 
1980lerde hegemonik ideoloji konumuna ulaşan Yeni Sağ, 1990’larda 
çekiciliğini yitirmiş ve büyük ölçüde aşırı milliyetçi söylemi kullanma yoluna 
gitmiştir. Çatışan, içiçe geçen, ve form değiştiren farklı milliyetçiliklerin etkili 
olduğu 1990ların ideolojik ikliminde, MHP milliyetçiliği egemen ideolojileri 
eklemleme başarısı göstererek etkili bir ideoloji konumuna gelmiştir. Bu 
argüman çerçevesinde, çalışmada MHP’nin değişen ideolojisi ve stratejisi konu 
edilecektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, MHP, İdeoloji, Neo-faşizm, Hegemonya
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Turkish society has experienced a popularisation of ultra-nationalist 
ideology in the 1990s. Not only the state poUcies, but also media news, public 
protests and even football matches have been influenced and shaped by ultra­
nationalist ideology. One may observe that the Nationalist Action Party (МНР), 
which represents the ultra-nationalist ideology in Turkey for almost 30 years has 
been becoming the central power in Turkish politics in recent years. However, 
prior to late 1990s, it used to be a marginal party with little electoral support. 
Therefore, in order to understand the rising popularity of ultra-nationalism, one 
should focus on the МНР as a political movement as well as a political party. As 
a matter of fact, although its rise is a significant phenomenon, the МНР type 
politics was influential as in some cases in the critical Turkish politics long 
before its electoral success. Throughout the history of the party, its role and 
impact over the society has been drastically changed. In my view, investigating 
these changes in the political position of the МНР may uncover the various 
dimensions of Turkish political life.
The main problem of this study is to understand the changing role and 
influences of the МНР in Turkish political life. With such a goal in mind, I will 
try to answer the following questions: “How can we understand or evaluate the 
changing role of the party? Which theoretical tools and perspective may be the 
most useful in understanding its influence? How can we periodise the history of 
the МНР? How can one define the ideology of МНР? Is the ideology of the party
changing or not? What are its relations with dominant ideologies such as 
Kemalism, tslamism and New Right in Turkey? And finally, how can one 
interpret the rise of its ideology or what is the meaning of its rising in the 
Turkish context?”
In the first chapter, I will try to answer first two questions that are about 
the useful theoretical tools and comprehensive perspective in understanding the 
role and influence of the МНР. Naturally, different scholars adopt different 
approaches in their analyses of the party. Broadly speaking, one can classify 
these approaches to the МНР in three categories. In the first category, the 
scholars treat МНР as one of the political parties within the Turkish 
parliamentary system. In these kinds of analyses, the influence of the party is 
generally evaluated according to its success in the elections. In the second 
category, the scholars locate the МНР within the framework of centre and 
periphery relations, which takes different forms. In my view, this second 
perspective is more complex and comprehensive since it attempts to consider the 
conflicting power relations within the country. From this perspective, while for 
some scholars the concepts of centre and periphery imply the state and the 
society, for some others, they imply military and political parties. Within this 
second approach, the МНР is located in one or the other part of this duality. 
However, not all scholars agree upon the question of whether the МНР is in the 
sphere of state or society. It is quite an enigma within this approach whether the 
МНР is in the field of society, i,e, periphery, or with its unexpected election 
success whether it shows a victory of the center and its official ideology.
The third approach considers the role and influences of the МНР 
according to its position vis-à-vis the hegemonic relations and power bloc. 
Within this perspective, scholars are sensitive both to the social context and to 
the pohtical strategies of the party. From this perspective, the power relations 
within the society are more complex than a state and society distinction (or other 
forms of centre-periphery approach). This approach also takes into account the 
class relations that may cut across the spheres of state and society. Furthermore, 
its consideration of social context and class relations does not depend on an 
economist reductionism since it attaches great importance to the political 
strategies of the party. In fact, there are very few scholars who employ this 
approach in their evaluation of the МНР. Therefore, in this study, I will also use 
those sources, which are not directly related with the МНР. Although these 
sources deal with other ideologies such as New Right, Kemalism or Islam, their 
diagnoses about the Turkish political life from the point of view of hegemonic 
relations and power bloc formations are helpful to understand the position of the 
МНР.
In the second chapter, I will attempt to periodise the МНР history 
according to its changing political strategies and influence within Turkish 
political life. One of the most important features of the МНР ideology is its ultra­
nationalist and Turkist origin. In the first section of the chapter, I will focus on 
the beginning of the ultra-nationalism in Turkey in order to understand the 
origins of the МНР type politics. Thus, I deal with the political activities of first 
generation Turkists such as Ziya Gokalp, Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Agaoglu, 
who are viewed as the founders of Turkist ideology, at the very beginning of the
20'*' century. I also explore the second generation Turkists such as Nihal Atsız, 
Reha Oğuz Türkkan and Alparslan Türkeş (the first leader of the МНР), who 
started their pohtical activities in the middle of the century. Alparslan Türkeş 
engaged in different political projects that represent changing political strategies 
of МНР type politics in Turkish political life. The following sections of the 
second chapter attempt to examine these changing political strategies of Türkeş. 
In the second chapter, I will also focus on the outcomes or effectiveness of these 
strategies in order to understand the influence of the МНР.
Having periodised the МНР history, the third chapter addresses the 
question of how to identify the МНР ideology. In the first part of the chapter, the 
theoretical guidelines and concepts such as nationalism, ultra-nationalism and 
fascism, which are proposed for the definition of the МНР, will be introduced. In 
this chapter, the question of whether the ideology of МНР has been changed or 
not throughout its history will also be examined. The main argument in this 
chapter is that while the МНР can be defined as a fascist party before 1980, it 
has become a neo-fascist party in 1990s. Therefore, it is argued that fascism is a 
socio-political phenomenon that implies the phase in which the ultra-nationalism 
becomes widespread and mobilises the masses. In other words, all fascisms are 
ultra-nationalists, but not vice versa. Fascism requires more than an ultra­
nationalist ideology. In the second part of the third chapter, I will delineate these 
specific features of fascism and neo-fascism and argue that the МНР ideology 
complies with these features.
The final chapter will cover the neo-fascist period in the present time of 
the МНР. In 1990s, МНР could advance its influence by employing a new
strategy, which resembles to the neo-fascist parties in Europe. The party could 
popularise the ultra-nationalist ideology thanks to its new plurahst and 
conciliationist image. When I started my investigations on this topic, neo- 
fascism as the ideology of the МНР was already influential within the Turkish 
politics. However, during my studies, the unexpected success of the МНР in the 
April IS'** elections proved that the influence of the party is increasing. In this 
final chapter, the new position of the МНР will be located in the hegemonic 
relations within Turkey. In order to do this, the relations of the МНР with 
dominant ideologies within the society will be examined in a detailed manner. In 
my view, Kemalism, Islamism and the New Right have been the dominant 
ideologies in Turkey throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The success of the МНР is 
to articulate these different and sometimes conflicting ideologies within the 
framework of ultra-nationalism. It can be argued that all of these ideologies were 
in a crisis due to various developments and challenges to both national and 
international ideologies in the 1990s. The crisis of the dominant ideologies 
provided a fertile ground for the progression of the hegemonic attempt of the 
МНР.
Following the steps outlined above, the aim of this study is to understand 
the rising influence of the МНР type politics by employing an approach that is 
sensible to the hegemonic relations. From this perspective, it is suggested that 
the combination of a crisis in the dominant ideologies and the effective strategy 
of the МНР have advanced neo-fascism within the fields of hegemonic relations 
in Turkey. In 1993, one of the scholars who adopted hegemony and power bloc 
approach argued that there was no cementing ideology, which was necessary to
unite Turkish power bloc and society. This study proposes that, today, 
nationalism is the cementing ideology of Turkish power bloc. Furthermore, 
among competing and intermixing nationalisms, MHP-type nationalism has 
advanced itself in becoming hegemonic by articulating the dominant ideologies 
within the society. In this study, I attempt to establish a link between the 
hegemonic relations within Turkish society and the changing position of the 
МНР within the Turkish political life.
Chapter 2
Basic Approaches to МНР
Throughout the political life of the МНР, its influence and role in the 
Turkish political life has been changing. In this chapter, I will focus on the 
question how and with which theoretical tool one can grasp the meaning of these 
changes in the position of the party. In my opinion there are three basic 
approaches, which attempt to explore the political position and influence of the 
МНР.
The first approach treats the МНР as one of the parties in Turkish 
political spectrum. This approach is employed by various scholars such as Ergun 
Özbudun, Burak Arikan, Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, and Jacob Landau. The 
second approach assumes that there is a center and periphery relation between 
state and society in Turkey. Although there are important differences among 
them, scholars such as Hugh Poulton, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 
and Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, work within this framework. Both of these 
approaches reveal many important characteristics of the МНР, however, their 
analyses are not very sensitive to various implications of the politics of the МНР.
In my opinion, another approach that locates the politics of the МНР 
within the framework of hegemony and power bloc approach is the more 
explanatory because it uncovers the various dimensions of the rise of the МНР. 
Following Poulantzas’ analyses of fascism and power bloc. Çağlar Keyder
attempts to conceptualize the МНР politics in terms of its position vis-à-vis the 
Turkish power bloc. Tanil Bora, who has written numerous essays on the МНР 
politics, analizes it in terms of hegemonic relations. I think, although he does not 
employ the concepts of hegemony and power bloc, a very early analysis of 
Muammer Sencer is quite sensitive to the relation within power bloc and to the 
political strategies of the МНР and its former version, CKMP. In the following 
pages, after briefly mentioning the first two approaches, I will focus on the 
concepts of hegemony and power bloc, which seem to provide the most 
explanatory fi'amework for the analyses of the rise of the МНР.
2.1.MHP as a Political Party
The origin of Turkish ultra-nationalist thoughts goes back to earlier times 
before the foundation of the Nationalist Action Party. As I will focus on in the 
second chapter, Turkism and other forms of ultra-nationalism emerged at the 
very beginning of 20*'* century in Turkey. However, the foundation of the МНР 
implies a turning point in the history of ultra-nationalism. For the МНР has 
become the political centre that unite and control divergent and disorganised 
ultra-nationalist currents of thought. Over thirty years, МНР and its preceding 
party. Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) have been the central power, 
which represents the ultra-nationalism in Turkey.
From the above-mentioned perspective, I agree with Mehmet Ali 
Agaogullari’s definition of the МНР as the political organisation of ultra­
nationalism.* However, this definition may not provide us sufficient knowledge 
about the historical and sociological dimensions of the МНР type politics. The 
point is that МНР is not only a political party that represents ultra-nationalism 
but it also represents a political movement that implies a certain phase of 
historical and social conditions. In fact the political influence of the МНР also 
depends on its ability to mobilise the masses. Furthermore, МНР type of politics 
may also utilise other ideologies in order to advance its position within the power 
relations. If an analysis of the МНР takes the party only as a representative of a 
certain ideology, that analysis may ignore the fact that МНР is also a political 
movement, which pursue a progression within the power relations.
I think, Burak Arikan’s recent analysis of the МНР is one of the 
examples of such a deficiency that I mentioned above. In his analysis, he 
compares the МНР with ultra-nationalist parties of Europe. According to 
Arikan,
“If МНР successfully transforms its ideology towards a more centre- 
oriented one, as the Movimento Italiano- Destra Nazionale (Italian 
Social Movement- National Right, MSI-DN) in Italy has done, the party 
will have the chance to gain a more respectable and significant place in 
Turkish politics.”^
In fact, Arikan’s statement implies an important point in the rise of the 
МНР. If we follow Arikan’s argument, the unexpected electoral success of the 
МНР can be explained with reference to a transformation or a shift in its
' Mehmet Ali Agaogullari, 1987, ‘The Ultranationalist Right”, in Irwin Cemil Schick and E. 
Ahmet Tonak (Eds.), Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, Oxford University Press, New 
York and Oxford p: 188
■ Burak Ankan, October 1998, “The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party: An Iron Hand in 
a Velvet Glove?” Middle Eastern Studies. Volume: 34. (4) pp: 120-134 
 ^ ibidp: 132
ideology to the centre. However, in his analysis, one cannot see how and why 
such a shift of the МНР ideology has led to an increase in its popularity. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to talk about a simple shift or transformation of 
the МНР ideology to the centrism. In other words, the МНР has not simply 
changed his traditional ideological elements and adopted a neo-liberal position. 
Arikan’s statement should have explained the dramatic failure of the center right 
parties in the last elections, but it does not. Instead of a shift to the center, the 
МНР was able to advance its ideology by articulating dominant ideologies such 
as New Right, Islam and Kemalism. In fact, Arikan ignores the hegemonic 
attempt of the МНР since he takes the party only as a representative of a certain 
ideology.
In some version of these analyses, in which the МНР is presented as one 
of the parties within the framework of Turkish political spectrum, the role and 
influence of the party is restricted to the election results. For example, since the 
party’s electoral support was limited in 1970s, Ergun Özbudun ignores the 
importance of the political role of this party for this time period."* As a result of 
his account of the МНР as only a political party and his evaluation of the 
influence of a party according to its electoral success, he does not deal with the 
МНР because of its electoral failures in 1970s.
On the other side, Jacob Landau extensively deals with the ideology and 
politics of the МНР from this perspective.^ For him, the МНР represents a 
symmetrical contrast or mirror image of the extreme left party of that time, the 
Turkish Labour Party (TİP). Accordingly, he compares these parties from the
Ergun Ozbudun, 1976. Social Clmnge and Political Participation in Turkey. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. P:57
10
electoral, political and ideological point of view. However, in his analyses, 
while he talks about the history, organisation and ideology of the party, he 
ignores its relation with dominant classes and its meaning of political strategies 
of the party.
To sum up, it can be argued that scholars who see the МНР as solely a 
political organisation of a certain ideology miss two points: Firstly, they ignore 
the fact that МНР is also political movement which implies that МНР is more 
than a party in the political spectrum. Unlike centrist parties, the МНР type of 
politics cannot be evaluated without taking into account its relation with extra- 
parliamentary or non-parliamentary movements and organisations. As a matter 
of fact, one can use the terms '’'ulkiicii movement” and “МНР politics” 
interchangeably. Secondly, these scholars generally do not tend to locate the 
poUtical position of МНР within the power relations of Turkish politics. 
Furthermore, they tend to evaluate its role and influence in Turkish political life 
in terms of its electoral success. Therefore, their analyses are not sensitive to the 
changing influences of the party as result of its different positions within the 
power relations of the society. I think, the second approach which analyses the 
МНР within the framework of centre-periphery relation attempts to consider its 
positions within the power relations in Turkey. In the following section, I will try 
to answer the question that how successful this attempt of second approach is.
' Jacob Landau, 1974. Radical Politics in Modern Turkey. Leiden; E. J. Brill.
II
2.2.Center-Periphery Relations
Some scholars attempt to evaluate the role and influence of the political 
parties in a broader context that is sensitive to the conflicting power relations. 
The experience of Turkish démocratisation process, which has been full of extra- 
parliamentary interventions, demonstrates that political parties are not the sole 
actors within the political life of Turkey. The frequent and direct involvement of 
the military and the bureaucracy in the political life of the society led some 
scholars to consider these state institutions as important determinants in power 
relations. From this point of view, they adopt the concepts of center and 
periphery in their analyses of Turkish history. It is a fact that there are various 
ways of usages and expressions of these concepts. Whereas some writers identify 
the division in Turkey in terms of bureaucratic elites versus masses,^ some others 
put it in terms of the military versus political parties.^ Another group put it in
O
terms of state versus society (or sometimes civil society).
Hugh Poultan employs this framework of center and periphery in his 
extensive analyses of Turkish nationalism.^ In his view, Kemalism as the state 
ideology represents the centre of Turkish politics. Furthermore, he argues that 
Alevi sect can be defined as an important constituent of Kemalism. Hence, Sunni 
Islam is located into the periphery of Turkish politics in Poultan’s analyses. 
Another important element of periphery is Kurdish nationalism. Interestingly *
** Mardin, Şerif. 1962. The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of 
Turkish Political Ideas, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
’ Kayalı, Kurtuluş. 1994. Ordu ve Siyaset, İstanbul: İletişim yayınlan and Sakallıoğlu, Ümit 
Cizre. 1993. AP Ordu İlişkileri. İstanbul: İletişim yayınları.
® İnsel, Almıet, Siyasal Rejimin Bunalımımn Nedeni Olarak Devlet, March 1997, Birikim, and 
Laçiner, Ömer. June 1995. “Devlet’in Çok Güçlü Hale Gelişi ve Siyasetin Sonu”. Birikim.
 ^Hugh Poulton, \991Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, Hurst & Company, London
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enough, the МНР nationalism is also presented as an anti-systemic political 
periphery.
Poultan argues that Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, as ideologies of 
the periphery, have constituted the two greatest challenges to the Kemalist 
discourse. In his view, following the multi-party period and the process of rural 
migration to metropolitan cities, a double-sided process has begun. While the 
newcomers to the political arena of Turkey were subjected to the centre’s 
nationalist ideology, the political power of the centre has been forced to consider 
the Islamic ideas of the majority. ** As a knock on effect of the 1980 regime, 
Islam has become the important element of the nationalism of the centre.
In my view, Poultan’s analysis, which depends on center-periphery 
argumentation, is limited to see complex relations within the Turkish social 
formation. The basic problem with Poultan’s argument is that one cannot see the 
social classes in political arena. Since he tends to treat ideologies including 
Kemalism as a set of certain norms, his analyses is not sensitive to the power 
base (which may be changed according to social context) of these ideologies. 
Therefore, Poultan simply ignores changing nature and functions of ideologies.
As a result of his static understanding of Kemalism, he locates Alevis at 
the center and Sunni Islamism at periphery of Turkish political life.'^ However, 
such a view assumes that Kemalism and Alevis have unchanging and ahistorical 
ideological cores. In fact, there are various interpretations of Kemalism, some of 
which excludes Alevi identity from the power bloc. 1980 coup was a 
representative example of this process: The military regime of the 1980 coup
ibid p:161 
“ ibid p: 318
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excluded Kurdish and Alevi identity from the power bloc without abandoning 
Kemalism.*^
I think, locating the МНР nationalism at the periphery of Turkish politics 
is not less problematic than this above-mentioned argument. Historically, it is 
true that the МНР nationalism has not been the dominant ideology of Turkish 
State. Furthermore, there has always been a tense relation between Kemalist 
nationalism and the МНР nationalism. However, in the perspective of Poultan 
that depends on the center- periphery distinction, one cannot see the differences 
among periphery ideologies. How meaningful is it to locate socialist parties and 
ultra-nationalist parties in the same category just because they are weak, radical 
or radical? With which theoretical tools can such a perspective differentiate 
Kurdish nationalism from МНР nationalism? Poultan, as a result of his equation 
of all peripheral ideologies within his framework, cannot explain why Islamism 
and Kurdish nationalism do but МНР nationalism do not challenge Kemalism.
Another version of this claim depends on a distinction between the state 
and the civil society. Indeed, this sort of approach has become dominant in social 
sciences in the 1990s. Some scholars argue that the 1980s and the 1990s of 
Turkey represent a development of civil society, decentralisation of the statecraft 
and development of a certain form of pluralism and multiculturalism. As one of 
the most famous representatives of this view. Nilüfer Göle claims that
Once in power, the ANAP began dismantling the state by its policies of 
decentralisation of the government, privatization of the state economic 
enterprises, and reorientation toward a market economy. The liberal 
discourse, which was rediscovered and became fashionable after 1983,
‘ i^bid p:126
‘^Alev Ozkazanç, Spring 1999. Tiirkiyede Siyaset Tarzının Dönüşümü, Mürekkep\2\
14
developed simultaneously with a market economy. If the liberal 
movement represented the economic dimension of the autonomization of 
civil society, the Islamist movement represented the cultural dimension.*'^
Accordingly, such a perspective leads us to attach a democratic character 
to the recent rise of МНР nationalism since it may also take the character of a 
mass movement from time to time. But is it really possible to see ultra-nationalist 
demonstrations, such as public lynching and violent protests as a sign of 
democracy? Furthermore, to what extent is it possible to argue that the МНР type 
politics is far from the state and close to the civil society? With which theoretical 
tool can we draw a line between the MHP’s relation with the state and that of 
society?
As a more complicated example of this perspective, Ümit Cizre 
Sakallıoğlu argues that there is in fact a division determined by the state itself in 
Turkey. In her view, the most concrete form of this division stems from the 
conflict between the statist pole composed of military bureaucracy that forms the 
state itself and the CHP which set up the Republic and political parties that 
depend on political power and interests excluded from the state opportunities.’^  
From this perspective, except the CHP, all parties including liberal conservative 
parties (the DP, the AP, the ANAP...), fascist parties (the МНР, the MÇP...), 
Islamist parties (the MSP, the RP..) or socialist parties rely on the power of the 
society but not the state.Consequently, the МНР as a fascist party is located at 
the sphere of society. In this perspective, following the approximation of the
'“'Nilüfer Göle, ‘Toward an Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey” in Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin (ed.) Politics in the Third Turkish Republic. Boulder: Westview Press 
pp:213-222. quoted in Yael Navaro-Yashin, Uses and Abuses of ‘State and Civil Society’ in 
Contemporary Turkey.’, New Perspectives of Turkey, Spring 1998, p:3 
"’Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, AP Ordu İlişkileri.... p:20 
ibid., p:21
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CHP to the Left with its ‘center of left’ politics in 1965, the cooperation between 
the CHP and the military was shaken. According to Sakallıoğlu and to those who 
write within the statist (or state-centric) paradigm, the 1980 coup marked the 
complete exclusion of the CHP from the state power.
While Sakallıoğlu locates the МНР as a fascist party into the sphere of 
society, Ayşe Kadıoğlu interprets the rise of МНР as strengthening the state 
power by employing the same perspective. According to her, the distinction 
between the state sphere and political sphere is blurring in Tu r k e y . S h e  
explains the rise of the МНР in the following words:
‘Today, the agenda in Turkey is not National Socialism type-fascism, in 
which a political party dominates over the state and society, but a 
situation, in which the state absorbs political parties and the society, [my 
translation]” ®^
In my opinion, Navaro-Yashin convincingly shows the problems of the 
perspective that depends on a civil society-state distinction in the Turkish 
context. While he mentions the claim of Islamist circles about being a 
representative of civil society and democracy, he also exemplifies Atatiirkists’ 
counter-strategy that depends on the same argumentation. In his words.
“Secularists have had to employ the notion of ‘civil society’ in their 
attempts to defend a secularist establishment. They have wanted to 
illustrate that secularism is not about the state, but about the will of the 
people, that it is not the imposition from above, but a reflection of 
society.” '^
ibid
ibid
19 Ayşe Kadığlu, Haziran 1999. “Su Canavanmn Karaya Çıkışı: Devlet ve MHP.” Birikim. P: 24 
ibid
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Recently, some of the pro-MHP writers employ such kind of strategy by 
arguing that the МНР is representing the “deep Turkey” and “deep society” vis- 
à-vis “deep state”.^  ^ In their account, while the terms of “deep Turkey” and 
“deep Talley” implies the voice of the silent majority in the society, the term of 
“deep state” has a pejorative meaning, which signifies the authoritarian and the 
corrupt nature of the state.
How should one interpret these conflicting views about the position of 
the МНР? As I proposed earlier, since it is sensitive to the conflicting power 
relations, the conception of centre versus periphery (or its different forms) may 
be more complex and comprehensive than the first approach that evaluates the 
МНР solely as a political party. However, the situation of the МНР demonstrates 
the weaknesses of this conception. I think, the analysis of Hasan Biilent 
Kahraman, who adopts this approach is an example that provides s vagueness to 
the position of the МНР rather than clarity. In his analysis of the Turkish Right, 
Kahraman claims that the Turkish Right and bourgeoisie as its class is more 
conservative than Western Right since it is incorporated in the Turkish state.^  ^
Thus, in his argument, the degree of conservatism or radicalism of political 
parties depends on the degree of their proximity to the state. From this point of 
view, the position of the МНР is quite ambivalent. I think, Kahraman’s 
hesitation or reservation about the position of the МНР signifies this point: ‘The 
МНР, the RP and the DSP are the radical parties that interrogate the established
■■ In tlie cover of an academic pro-MHP magazine, Türkiye Günlüğü, tlie DSP is defined as the 
representative of “deep state” whereas the МНР is defined as a voice of “deep Turkey” See: 
Türkiye Günlüğü. July 1999
Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 1995. Sağ Türkiye ve Partileri, Ankara; İmge yayınevi, p; 19
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order (in fact, the МНР line complies with the government lines but its main 
themes oppose the order in many subjects).” '^^
If МНР is a radical party that interrogates the state order, how can we 
interpret its exaltation of the state? As 1 will focus on later, the main politics of 
the МНР has been the gaining the state power without changing the existing 
order. The centre-periphery approach is not sensitive to the differences among 
peripheral political parties or movements. While some peripheral political 
movements attempt to create counter-hegemony, the aim of the МНР has been 
the part of hegemonic relations without proposing a counter-hegemonic project. 
On the other hand, if the МНР represents the power of the state or centre, how 
can we explain its exclusion from the power bloc following the 1980 coup? 
Furthermore, at least formally, it is quite clear that the party has been emerged 
and developed in the sphere that is called as society (or civil society). In other 
words, as 1 argue in the third chapter, the power base of the МНР does not 
depend on the military or bureaucracy but mainly on lower classes.
In his analysis of uses of the concepts of “state” and “society” in Turkey, 
Navaro-Yashin’s conclusion is that in Turkey, as in other countries, where the 
state ends, and where society begins is not clear.^  ^ He follows Timothy 
Mitchell’s critique of the ‘state-society’ paradigm and rejects all forms of binary 
oppositions or dualities (state-society, power-resistance, meaning-reality...) 
since ‘these abstractions are the tools of a new form of governmentality.’^ ^
In my view, opposing all abstractions is meaningful but such a total 
rejection of dual concepts is itself a priori judgement and may lead us to an
ibid p: 30
Yael Navaro-Yashin, Uses and Abuses..., p:20
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impasse. As a result of total rejection, although Navaro-Yashin mentions the 
necessity of new analytical tools and concepts, he does not propose new 
concepts.^^ I agree with Navaro-Yashin that one cannot understand complex 
power relations from a perspective that depends solely on state and civil society 
distinction. For state-society paradigm is not very sensitive to the changing 
nature of different ideologies and to the class relations that exist in both spheres. 
On the other hand, a conception of power bloc and people is useful to uncover 
real influences of social classes and ideologies.
2.3.Hegemony and Power Bloc
1 have already mentioned that adopting a center- periphery dichotomy 
may open new horizons since it signifies the contradictory character of the 
political sphere. However, I believe that without considering the relations of 
social classes, the metaphor of center and periphery may remain static and 
ahistorical since both the center and periphery are continuously defined and 
redefined according to changes in power relations between social classes. 
Therefore, in my view, another framework, which includes both dimensions of 
unequal power relations (exclusion and exploitation) should be employed in the 
analysis of the МНР. To put it differently, not only center-periphery relations but 
also class relations should be taken into account.
In essence, one can infer such a framework from a certain kind of 
interpretation of Gramsci’s conception of politics. Gramsci defines politics as the
26 ibid p:6
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conscious action of human beings in pursuit of a common social goal. For 
Gramsci, politics as praxis indicates the activity for destroying the gap between 
the rulers and the ruled, the leaders and the common people or the high culture 
and the popular culture. In other words, it “is the process of including people 
who have been excluded and of merging the periphery with the center. The 
ultimate objective of the new politics is to include all people in the center,”^^  
This kind of politics aims at a new way of life that is against marginalisation and 
exploitation.
Nevertheless, exploitation and marginalisation can not be fully 
understood by ignoring the cultural and political aspects of oppression. To put it 
differently, Gramscian politics imply the complete inclusion of all oppressed and 
under-privileged people in any sphere of life. However, this process of inclusion 
and metaphor of center and periphery should not be understood in a
"inphilantrophic way. It also includes a total abolition of the unequal relationship 
of production. In this sense, his politics of inclusion does not imply an unequal 
inclusion of all people. In addition to the center-periphery relation, he also 
adopted the Marxist concepts of lower and upper classes (proletariat and 
bourgeoisie). From a certain point of view, these two approaches can be
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combined with reference to the dichotomy of the “power bloc” and the “people.” 
Although later Marxist scholars elaborate the concept of power bloc, its roots can 
be found in Gramsci’s concepts of “hegemony” and “historical bloc”.
2.3.1.Hegemony:
Gramsci was not the first Marxist who used the term hegemony. 
Hegemony was one of the most important political slogans in the Russian Social 
Democratic movement in the second half of the 19'*' century and at the beginning 
of the 20‘*' century. Lenin used the concept of hegemony to indicate the 
proletarian leadership over other classes^ \  Generally, scholars accept that 
Gramsci adds to this concept at least two crucial dimensions; one of which is that 
the extension of the concept from the working class to bourgeoisie and the other 
one is that the emphasis on the cultural, moral and intellectual parts of the 
struggle. It can be argued that in Gramsci’s thought, the function of hegemony 
is to transform heterogeneous and dispersed wills of individuals into a 
homogeneous and coherent whole.^^ Therefore, through hegemony, masses gain 
both an identity and a certain mode of existence. In this sense, it is the 
materialisation moment of ideology. In capitalist society where the hegemony of 
bourgeois class exists, the concept refers to the ability of bourgeoisie to maintain 
the status quo without resorting to coercion.
John Hoffman, 1986,r/ie Gramscian Challenge, Oxford;Basil Blackwell, p:52 
ibid 55
Esteve Morera, 1992, Gramsci’s Historicism, New York: Routledge, p:173
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If we compare the concepts of hegemony and ideology, it can be argued 
that hegemony is a latent notion whereas ideology is a visible one.^ '^  In a sense, 
ideology is the manifestation of hegemonic relations. To put it differently, when 
an ideology that aims at the maintenance of existing order and is accepted by the 
masses, it becomes hegemonic. Hegemony in a society naturalises the unequal 
relations between the dominant and the dominated groups and classes. The main 
purpose of hegemony in such a society is to show the existing order as neutral. 
Thus, a real counter-hegemonic project manifested by an ideology has to refract 
this process of taken for grantedness of status quo by showing possibility of 
alternative modes of existence. In this sense, this counter-hegemony is not just a 
set of ideas that criticises existing order, but it is also a practise or a praxis of a 
certain way of life, and a materialisation of alternative ways of thought. It is not 
an abstract critique of status quo, but a twofold process of rejection of the old 
relations and the construction of a new way of life.
As Stuart Hall puts it, three points of hegemony are particularly 
important. Firstly, it implies a historical and specific moment in the life of 
society. Secondly, it has a multi-dimensional character that includes different 
fronts of struggles simultaneously (not only economic struggle, but also political, 
cultural and other struggles). Finally, hegemonic leading is defined not according 
to a leading class in traditional sense, but according to a ‘historical bloc’
The first point can be related to the historicist perspective of Gramsci. In 
this perspective, there is no guarantee of persistency of any constituted
Kyong I. Kim, 1996, Caged in Our Own Signs: A Book About Semiotics, Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, p:160
Stuart Hall, 1996, “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity”, in Critical 
Dialogues, (ed.) David Morley, New York: Routledge, p: 430-1
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hegemony. Thus, an examination of a certain historical period should take into 
account both dominant hegemonic structure and counter-hegemonic formation of 
that historical condition because a historical moment generally includes a 
counter-hegemonic resistance, which may affect the political situation. At this 
point, it should be mentioned that a counter hegemonic resistance must employ a 
project that overcomes the existing oppressive relations. In this sense, МНР as a 
poUtical movement that aims at gaining state power without changing the 
existing order can not be seen as a constituent of counter-hegemonic resistance.
Although Gramsci takes the social relationship of production as a general 
context of a social formation, his understanding can not be equated with the 
empiricist essentialism^* ,^ which assumes a static and ahistoric essence. From his 
historicist point of view, each political event has to be considered according to 
specific social formation or to concrete historical conditions. Gramsci’s 
historicism is far from linear and mechanistic understandings of history. Rather, 
it implies the historicity of social relations and political agents.
Second point that Hall mentions is about the relation between base and 
superstructure. With the concept of hegemony, it is impossible to see an 
automatic relation between economy and politics; the political sphere is no more 
a simple mirror of economic relations. Nevertheless, political sphere is not 
independent from economic sphere, and vice versa. All aspects of social relations 
are interrelated with each other. At this point, in which ways they are related 
with each other stands as a question.
M. Fisk makes a distinction between ‘historical essentialism’ and ‘empiricist essentialism’ and 
argues that the latter assumes a principle essense over history. See, M. Fisk, 1993, ‘Post- 
Marxism: Laclau and Mouffe on Essentialism’ in Gottlieb, R. (ed.), ‘Radical Philosophy’, 
Temple, p: 155
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In my view, when we avoid constructing a mechanical relation between 
economy and politics, it is still useful to depict the economic relations as 
structure, which indicates limitations and possibilities of political subjects. 
Moreover, the structure itself is not a static and unchanging entity. It may have 
logic of its own, but this logic is both contradictory and provisional (or 
historical). In other words, the structure of economic relations does not occur by 
itself, it is permanently formed and re-formed by poUtical relations. At this point, 
Jonathan Joseph’s definition of hegemony may be helpful. He defines hegemony 
as a political moment in the process of reproduction and transformation^^ and, 
for him, the concept of hegemony is a vital tool for understanding the relations 
between structure and agency.
The third point of the concept of hegemony, according to Hall, is about 
the contradictory character of the bourgeois classes in itself in a specific 
historical bloc. That is to say, any analysis, which disregards these complex and 
uneven relations between bourgeois classes, cannot see the difference between 
ruling class and dominant class. Historically, fascism is a good example of this 
difference between ruling class and dominant class. In political sphere, Itahan 
and German fascism put an end to the activities of other parties in their heyday. 
However, their politics were not against the demands of big bourgeoisie. In a 
sense, petite bourgeoisie was able to be a part of power bloc and big bourgeoisie 
(and their various constituents) had to give a certain degree of concession at least 
in the beginning period of fascism. This complex and generally contradictory 
relations within the structure itself (and also complex relations between structure 
and superstructure) are characterised according to specificity of historical bloc.
37 Jonathan Joseph, Summer 1998, “In Defence of Critical Realism”, Capital & Class 65 p;74
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2.3.2. Historical Bloc
Gramsci rarely uses the , concept of ‘historical bloc’ in his works. 
However, in my view, along with the concept of ‘hegemony, it is another useful 
and important conceptual tool for analysing fascism. In fact, as Hall argues, there 
are close relations between these two concepts. For example, Hugues Portelli,^^ 
another important commentator of Gramsci who puts the term of historical bloc 
into Gramscian understanding, mentions three dimension of the term, which are 
hardly different than those claimed by Hall for the concept of hegemony.
According to Portelli, first appearance of the term of ‘historical bloc’ lies 
in the relation between structure and super-structure^^ (this point is mentioned as 
a feature of the concept of ‘hegemony’ by Hall). In his works, Gramsci defines 
this concept as ‘the unity between structure and superstructure in the system of 
social re la tions.A lthough  Gramsci sees structure and superstructure in a 
totality and relationality, the relation between these structures is not a 
mechanistic or deterministic one. Any of them can not be treated as a separate 
ontological entity. In other words, we can not examine one part of the reality 
without taking the other part into account since they are not external to each 
other. In Gramsci’s words:
“The conception of historical bloc in which precisely material forces are 
the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between
Hugues Portelli, 1982, Gramsci ve Tarihsel Blok, Savaş Yay., Ankara, p:3
’’ ibid p:4
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25
form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces 
would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies 
would be individual fancies without the material forces”.'**
Secondly, this term must be examined together with the concept of 
hegemony. For a conception of historical bloc forms the base of a conception of 
hegemony and intellectual bloc. Lastly, Gramsci examines the problem of the 
collapse of the hegemony of a dominant class and construction of a new one by 
locating it into the framework of historical bloc. For example, when Gramsci 
explores the success of working class in Russia and the defeat of it in Italy, he 
mentions the importance of strategy of constituting a ‘worker-peasant bloc’ and 
destroying ‘bourgeois-landlord bloc’.'*^  In the latter usage, the term connotes an 
alliance between classes and/or different fractions of a class. As it is easily seen, 
this last appearance of the concept of ‘historical bloc’ resembles Hall’s third 
point about the concept of ‘hegemony’. In my view, this third dimension of the 
concept of historical bloc (or, in Hall’s account, of hegemony) can be identified 
by the term of ‘power bloc’ as elaborated by Nicos Poulantzas.
2.3.3. Power Bloc
Poulantzas states that ‘political domination does not belong to only one 
class or a fraction of a class in a social formation composed of different social 
classes.’'*^ This is especially the case for capitalist social formation in which 
bourgeois class has diverse and various fractions. He likewise defines power
ibid p:377 
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bloc as ‘a specific alliance of various classes or their fractions.Generally, 
various classes or class fractions do not share power equally in a certain power 
bloc. Power bloc functions regularly as one class or a fraction may impose 
domination over the other members of power bloc. In other words, a class or a 
fraction unites other classes of power bloc under its hegemony in a regular power
bloc.'*^
According to Poulantzas, conjuncture of fascism requires a hegemonic 
crisis of power bloc. In such a condition, any class or class fraction cannot 
impose its hegemony over other classes in a power bloc. In other words, classes 
in a power bloc cannot overcome their internal contradictions by themselves.'*^ 
Politically, in conditions that creates a fertile ground for fascism, there emerge a 
representation crisis since connections between dominant classes and centrist 
political parties break. Furthermore, traditional intellectuals begin to attack 
existing bourgeois ideologies and tend to support the fascist party.'*’
Ernesto Laclau criticises Poulantzas’ understanding of fascism because of 
its class reductionism. According to him, while class conflict is dominant on the 
level of mode of production, the dominant conflict on the level of social 
formation is between the people and the power bloc.'*** While Poulantzas defines 
fascism as an ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, Laclau rejects the notion of 
ideology that directly reflects the view of a class.'*  ^ Accordingly, for him, petty 
bourgeoisie does not naturally tend to support fascist ideology. Furthermore,
ibid
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identity of people is more consequential than class identity from the point of 
view of middle classes since they have been dissolved from dominant mode of 
production in capitalist system. Therefore, Laclau thinks that terms of middle 
classes or intermediate segments are more meaningful than the term of petty 
bourgeoisie. Although Laclau’s reservations over Poulantzas’s understanding of 
fascism and people are significant, he affirms the value of the concept of power 
bloc. Although Laclau does not propose a different definition of this concept and 
accepts the priority of mode of production,^* one can infer that his conception of 
power bloc involves non-class domination relations. Lastly, like Poulantzas, he 
asserts that fascism finds a suitable condition in a crisis in the power bloc and a 
crisis of the working class.^^
In Turkish context, MuWrner Sencer employs this perspective in his 
very early analysis of the МНР in 1971. He argues that MHP’s party program 
resembled classical fascist parties.^^ He also mentions the weak position of this 
fascist party vis-a-vis dominant classes in Turkey. According to Sencer, the 
МНР was not able to be a strong party since the dominant forces did not support 
it.^ "* Furthermore, this party employed the political strategy of classical fascist 
parties by attempting to create a chaotic, teiroristic environment for gaining the 
power. If we take into account the date of his analysis (1971), it can be argued 
that Sencer's evaluation of the МНР is quite explanatory since he focused on its 
position vis-a-vis Turkish power bloc and its political strategies. However, one
ibid p: 124 
ibid p: 146
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should also focus on the hegemonic attempt of the МНР in order to understand 
the recent rise of the party.
On the other hand, Çağlar Keyder's analysis on fascist movement in 
Turkey before 1980 takes into account both hegemonic strategies of the МНР 
and its position vis-à-vis the Turkish power bloc.^  ^Keyder argues that Turkey of 
1970s has suitable conditions for the emergence of a fascist movement since 
fascism requires a relatively industrialised society rather than an agricultural 
society. In newly industrialised societies, dramatic dislocations within the old 
economic and social relations create a reactionary mass, which may provide 
grassroots for fascism. Furthermore, the crisis in the Turkish power bloc opened 
the path for the МНР in gaining power. However, the fascist movement could 
not impose its politics over the power bloc since it failed to propose an 
acceptable hegemonic project, which justifies capitalist transformations.^^ In my 
view, Keyder’s analysis of the pre-1980 fascist movement can explore the 
emergence and the failure of the МНР since it is sensible to both its hegemonic 
strategies and the changing relations within the power bloc.
In recent period, Tanil Bora is one of the most important writers who 
employ the concept of hegemony in his analyses. In the essay that he appraised 
the rise of the МНР, he mentions ‘three levels of fascism: the level of regime or 
state form, the level of organised fascism movement and the level of everyday, 
banal fascism.’ After the Second World War, totalistic fascism disappeared.
Çağlar Keyder. 1995. Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar. İstanbul: İletişim yayınları 
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Especially in the 1990s, a post-fascist or an electronic fascist^* era, which is 
extremely eclectic and ‘elastic’, has begun. However, this new fascism involves 
several elements of the totalistic fascist regime. Organised fascist movements, 
like neo-fascism, are not totally independent or autonomous. From the 
ideological point of view, both of them have close similarities with the official 
ideology and the conservative-nationalist ideology.^^ Everyday or banal fascism 
consists of spontaneous, fugitive and even carnavalistic forms in the post-modern
era.
In Turkey, we have experienced the various performances of post-fascism 
such as public lynching, violent protests, remorseless hitting or killing of others 
for ten years. However, the specificity of the success of МНР in the last elections 
is the synchronisation and articulation of these three levels of fascism. This 
process was not a kind of military takeover or a sharp break from earlier periods. 
There is rather continuity or a gradual development of fascism. In other words, 
the mode of fascist development in Turkey has been infiltration and spread rather 
than a sharp capture of the state.^ *^  In his earlier analysis, he argued that Turkey 
has experienced hegemonic competitions of various nationalisms.^* To sum up, 
in the analysis of Bora, one can see complex and complicated effects of the МНР 
nationalism since he locates it into the hegemonic relations of Turkey.
In this study, I will try to show the hegemonic attempt of МНР 
nationalism by relating its changing nature and position with dominant 
ideologies in Turkey. Since it is argued that there is a close relation between the
Richard Stoss. 1998, “The Problem of Right-wing Extremism in West Germany” in Klaus von 
Beyme Right-wing Extremism in Post War Europe (eds.) Frank Cass, London, p: 45 
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rise of its ideology and the crises in dominant ideologies, I will attempt to 
analyse the ideology of МНР in a detailed manner. However, for understanding
I
its ideological elements, one should have a general view about the history of 
MHP-kind politics. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will try to give a 
historical overview of the development of the party in Turkish political life. In 
order to periodise its history, I will mainly depend on its changing strategies as 
well as its political influence within Turkish political life.
61 Tanıl Bora. 1995. Milliyetçiliğin Kara Bahan. İstanbul: Birikim yayınlan p: 78
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Chapter 3
A Brief History of МНР
In the first chapter, I proposed that power bloc and hegemony approach is 
the most comprehensive one in order to understand the MHP-type politics. In the 
present chapter, I will try to evaluate the emergence and formation of МНР type 
politics. The role and influence of the МНР has changed throughout the years 
and this may be explained with reference to the effectiveness of its different 
political strategies in order to gain state power. I will first evaluate the pre-MHP 
period and the emergence of ultra-nationalist ideology in Turkey and then focus 
on different phases of the development of the party. This will also give us clues 
about identifying the ideology of МНР, which is assessed in the third chapter.
As I will focus on in the third chapter, the ultra-nationalism is the 
distinguishing feature of МНР ideology. Although its views on economy, 
democracy, or culture may change according to its political strategies, ultra­
nationalism has remained central element for the party. How can we distinguish 
the ultra-nationalist ideology? In my view, one can see the three steps of this 
ideology. The departure point of ultra-nationalist ideology is the idea that the 
history is a scene of struggles among the nations. For example, Türke § claims 
that
“There are hard struggles among the nations...Every nation struggles for 
its existence...We pursue the cause of Turkish nation... There is no 
foreigner among us. In this struggle, we depend on the power of our
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nation by saying that ‘the only comrade of Turks is also Turks, there is no 
friend of Turks other than Turks, [my translation]”'
After the collapse of Soviet Union, İrfan Ülkü, a pro-MHP writer argues 
that the historical developments proved that not Karl Marx, but Alparslan 
Türke Ş, who states that history is a struggle of nations was right.^
In the second step, it assumes identification between the nation and the 
state. In the mind of an ultra-nationalist, state and the nation are inseperable 
entities. From the point of view of the МНР, state is the most important feature 
of the Turkish nation:
“There is no nation other than Turks who have founded more than 100 
states throughout the hi story... State is the inseperable part of the Turkish 
nation in its history. Turks have always had three requirement of being a 
state: Country, nation and independence, [my translation]”^
In the third step, ultra-nationalist currents or parties identify themselves 
with the real representatives of the nation. In this sense, one can argue that ultra­
nationalism is a secterian ideology since it defines not only outer enemies but 
also inner enemies who do not aggre with their view:
“All nationalist must know this fact: while any nation and state does not 
make a concession from their territoriality and integrity, who seeks to 
prevent Turkish Muslims protecting their entity and spirit?: naturally our 
enemies. So, those who contradict with our understanding of nationalism 
are the members of anti-state and anti national treachery army who are 
manipulated and hired by our enemies, [my translation]”''
’ Alparslan Türkeş. Yeni Ufuklara Doğru...pp: 80-83
■ See, İrfan Ülkü, 1995, 12 Eylülde Ülkücüler, İstanbul: Kamer Yay ınlar ı, p:18 
’ Ömer Alparslan Aksu. 1996. “Türk Dünyas ı, Türkiye ve Süper Güçler”, in Parti İçi Eğilim 
Eaaliyetleri-1. Ankara: MHP Genel Merkezi. pp:56-7
' Enver Yaşarbaş. 1996. Ülkücünün El Kitab ı. İstanbul: Kamer yay ınlar ı pp: 39-40
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As a consequence of these assumptions, the main motive of the politics of 
ultra-nationalism is to gain state power. From the point of view of the МНР 
ideology, a nationalist must act for saving the nation and the state: “Since our 
nationalism includes the desire for make alive our nation and state until the 
doomsday, it can be seen as a matter of being existent or nonexistent...”  ^
Therefore, “Being a nationalist means that being on duty for the Turkish nation. 
Even if it is not assigned, each nationalist must regard himself as on duty for 
saving the Turkey and Turkish nation...Because a nationalist cannot exist without 
a duty.”  ^ In order to make their duty, nationalists aim at gaining the state power 
by employing various kinds of political strategy. In Turkish context, МНР type 
of politics has also depended on various political strategies including infiltration 
into the state cadres, organising military coup, creating civil war, and using 
democratic discourse. On the other hand, for liberal and centrist parties, there are 
some formal procedures of democracy, which mainly depend on parliamentary 
politics. For example, in Turkey, central right parties have always employed 
election-based strategy in their political history. In the following sections, I will 
try to explore various phases of ultra-nationalism that depends on various 
strategies in order to gain state power.
After the death of the Alparslan Türke ş in 1997, a journalist writes that 
there were more than one Türke ş. “First Türke ş is the ‘powerful colonel’ of the 
27 May 1960 coup, the second is the one who takes aside in the milieu of 
political polarisation in the 1970s, and the third is pluralist conciliationist
ibidp:39
ibidp:38
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Türke ş after 1985.”  ^ I think, these three periods of Türke ş represent three 
different political strategies of МНР type politics. However, the very beginning 
of 1980s were the years that the party could not employ any political strategy 
because of the 1980 military takeover. The military regime shut down the party 
and, ülkücü movement had been marginalised from the Turkish political life until 
the late 1980s. Hence, after presenting the origins of МНР type politics, I will 
focus on these four phases of the party.
The military interventions may be the most peculiar constituent of 
Turkish democratic process. The extreme influence of the military in Turkish 
political life has created a paradoxical situation about the place of the МНР in 
Turkish power bloc. The origins of МНР type politics lie in gaining political 
power by infiltrating into the military. In the emergence period of Turkish 
nationalism, ultra-nationalist, Turanist and Turkist ideologies were extremely 
influential in the politics of Committee of Union and Progress (ITC). Although 
the ITC and later Turanists and Turkists were heritage of the МНР type politics, 
the ultra-nationalist currents before the МНР can not be labelled as fascist, 
Throughout the Republican period, Turkish military, which has a long tradition 
of active political involvement, did not need an alliance with a fascist party. For 
example, from the point of 1980 military regime, МНР was not different from 
the extreme Left, which opposed and threatened the state authority.
The military coup strategy has its roots in Türkeş ’s involvement in 
politics. As a colonel, Alparslan Türke ş has tried to gain state power by 
organising military coups. Following his failure in gaining power, he joined a 
political party, the CKMP. In fact, capturing the state power by pursuing a
’ Yavuz Donat, 8.4.1997, Ba şbu ğ ’dan Sonra, Milliyet
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military coup is not the only strategy of the МНР. Throughout its history, the 
CKMP and its successor, the МНР followed two different strategies to capture 
the state power. Before 1980 period, its strategy was basically depending on 
extra-parliamentary ways. Its aim was to gain political power by creating a civil 
war condition. Therefore, its strategy can be defined as para-military and extra- 
parliamentary before 1980. However, the МНР basically employed a 
parliamentary strategy after late 1980s and during 1990s.
Nevertheless, the different strategies are not the strict divisions but rather 
tendencies. In fact, the party employed both election-strategy and civil war 
strategy before 1980. However, the election results were not promising about 
gaining power. Moreover, the political atmosphere of Turkey was more 
convenient for extra-parliamentary strategies. On the other hand, the 
authoritarian position of the military over the political parties including the МНР 
after 1980 coup made an extra-parliamentary violent strategy impossible. (In 
fact, in the early 1980s, even a parliamentary strategy was impossible because of 
the closure of the party and the trial of its leaders).
In the following sections, I will delineate different strategies of Türke § 
and the МНР for gaining the state power. However, before dealing with Türke § 
and МНР, 1 believe that mentioning the earlier ultra-nationalist currents of 
thought, which give some clues about the МНР type politics will be meaningful. 
Like other cases of fascism, the cult of the leader was a distinguishing feature of 
the МНР and thus Türke § ’ s ideas and political activities was much related with 
the political life of the МНР. Therefore, after briefly mentioning the emergence *
** İsmail Söylemiz. "Türkiye’de Sivil Fa şisi Hareketin Askeri Stratejisi” in Murat Belge (ed.) 
Sosyalizm ve TopluntsolMücadeleler Ansiklopedesi, İstanbul: İleti şim yay ınlar ı . pp: 2.3.38-9
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and development of Turanist and Turkist currents, I will focus on Türkeş’s 
political activities before his involvement in a political party. In the following 
sections, I will deal with changing political strategies and effectiveness of the 
МНР in Turkish political life.
3.1.The Origins of МНР Type Politics
The emergence of nationalism in Turkey happened much later than in 
Europe, and it can be said that the real politicization of Turkish nationalist ideas 
had to wait until the coming to power of the Young Turks in 1908. On this date, 
a constitution and a parliamentary system was set up, though a number of 
important economic and social changes occurred before 1908.'^  After the 
proclamation of a constitutional monarchy, and the assumption of power by the 
Committee of Union and Progress (ITC), many weak and disorganised Turkish 
nationalist ideas were unified under the new regime of the Committee. For 
example, nationalist-Turkist intellectuals in Czarist Russia such as Yusuf 
Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoglu, Ali Huseyinzade fled to the Ottoman Empire and 
influenced the leadership of the ITC with their Turkist views in Turkey.'“
The specificity of Turkist nationalism in The Committee of Union and 
Progress (ITC) was a result of many of the historical conditions present in the 
pre-war period. Under pre-war conditions, the form of nationalism expressed by 
the Turkish bourgeoisie was extremely radical in nature. Following the start of
For a detailed information before and following tlie 1908 Revolution, see, Aykut Kansu, 
V)91Jhe Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey, Leiden Brill
10 Melmiet Ali Agaogullari, “The Ultranationalist Right”, .. .p: 182
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World War I, the nationalism expressed by the Committee of Union and Progress 
was transformed into an imperial Turanism, as various parts of the Empire in the 
Middle East and the Balkan were partitioned by competing European countries.
These conditions, combined with the belated character of Turkish 
nationalism, created fertile ground for the growth of an imperialist and 
reactionary form of nationalism during this period. While Turkism and Turanism 
were limited to the cultural sphere in late 1890s, they managed to gain support 
within the political spheres of power especially after the start of WWI." 
However, the Turanist ideals of the Young Turks ended with the defeat of Enver 
Pasha by the Red Army in 1922. Later, Kemalist nationalism, which is not 
imperial or irredentist but a territory-based model, became dominant in the 
newly created state of Turkey. The new nationalism of Kemalism was Turkey- 
centred instead of possessing an imperialistic or expansionistic vision. In the 
words of Mustafa Kemal: “Neither Islamism nor Turanism may constitute a 
doctrine or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of the new 
Turkey is to consist of living independently, relying on Turkey’s own 
sovereignty within its national frontiers.” '^
The conjuncture after the ITC period was not supportive for Turanist 
policies. Apart from the defeat of Enver Pasha in the Türkistan region, Turkey 
had to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, which had provided 
material support for Turkey during the Turkish War of Independence.'^ 
Therefore, Atatürk and other members of the Kemalist leadership aimed at
ibid p: 184
'“Quoted in Jacob Landau, 1981, Pan Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism, Hurst & Co.. 
London, p: 72
Mehmet Ali Agaogullari, “The UlUcinationalist Right”, .. .p: 186
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unifying the National Pact (Misak-i Milli)''* instead of utilising pan-Turkist 
policies.
In the eve of World War II, racist and fascist forms of nationalism 
intensified around the world. At the same time, a large number of racist 
magazines began to be published'^ and some widely read newspapers such as 
Cumhuriyet and Tasvir-i Efkar openly espoused a pro-Nazi discourse in 
Turkey.'^ By the end of the war, the racist magazines such as Bozkurt, Turk 
Yurdu, Tanr ıdağ, Millet, Dogu, Gökbörü, Orhun, Kopuz were being published. 
Most of the names of these magazines derived from the Central Asian (the 
original land of Turks) mythology. Between 1938 and 1943, militant fascist 
thinkers such as Reha Oguz Turkkan and Nihal Atsız tried to expand their 
influence over upper-level bureaucrats and government members who supported 
fascist policies. By the end of 1943, the Turkish government had become 
extremely tolerant, if not outright supportive, of this form of nationalism.’" In 
addition, German government directly involved in a strong Turanist campaign in 
this period.
During the Şükrü Saraçoğlu government, the policy of the Turkish 
government was fully supportive of racist-nationalism. As one Turkist-racist, I. 
Darendelioglu, stated, the 5* of August 1942 [the date of the beginning of 
Şükrü Saracoğlu’s cabinet] was one of the happiest days for Turkish
'' National Pact was consisted of some part of Iraq territory and the boundary of Turkey at 
present.
For more information about tliese magazines, see: Ilhan Darendelioglu, 1968, Türkiye 'de 
Milliyetçilik Hareketleri, ÎstanbukToker Yay. p: 202-212
''' Suat Parlar, 1996, Osmani ıdan Günümüze Gizli Devlet, İstanbul:Spartaküs yay. p: 168 
” Nuri Pasha, tlıe brother of Enver Pasha, was Üıe leader of Turkish pro-Nazi groups in the 
military. See, ibid p;172
Mehmet Ali Agaogullari, “The Ultranaüonalist Right”, ...p: 187 
Suat Parlar, Osmaniıdan Günümüze Gizli Devlet, ... p:168
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nationalism .T he maiden speech of Şükrü Saraçoğlu in the parliament 
demonstrated why the Turkists were satisfied: “We are the Turks, the Turkists 
and we will always remain as Turkists. For us, Turkism is a matter of conscience 
and culture as well as a matter of blood.
However, the contentment of the Turkists lasted until 19 May 1944. 
When the military position of Germany declined vis-à-vis the Allies, the 
government changed its position and moved away from supporting the views of 
them. The Turkists were already upset because of German defeats in WWII, and 
they began to attack strongly to the newly emerging Left in Turkey. Nihal 
Atsız, a prominent figure of Turkish racism, wrote open letters to the prime 
minister Saraçoğlu and called for harsh measures to combat to the 
‘communists’. The government closed the magazine of Ats iz in response to 
his critical letters. The Turkists organised demonstrations to protest against 
communism on May 3 1944 in Ankara and in Istanbul. These rallies led to the 
trial and arrest of many Turkists including Nihal Atsız, Zeki Velidi Togan, 
Necdet Sancar (the brother of Atsız) and Alparslan T ü r k e The President, 
İsm et İnönü, in his 9 May 1949 speech, declared that Turanism contradicted 
the nationalism of the Republic of Turkey.
Ilhan Darendelioglu, Türkiye 'deMilliyetçilik... p: 96 
Quoted in Ilhan Darendelioglu, Türkiye 'de Milliyetçilik... p: 97 
■■ ibid pp:99-l 14
The Racisin-Turanism trial was tlie first time appearance of Alparslan Türke ş in publics. The 
Fulirer’ of МНР wrote a book about tliis trial called 1944 Milliyetçilik Olaylari (The 1944 
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Following the transition to a multi-party democratic system, and the re- 
emergence of the ‘Russian threat’ in 1945, the government’s attitude towards 
ultra-nationalism softened '^*. During the Cold War, the Turkists were able to 
continue their activities by emphasising an anticommunist stand. Throughout the 
late 1940s and 1950s, the stance of the Turkish government towards leftist 
movements was generally one of intolerance. Therefore, ultra-nationalist 
movements were seen as a useful tool for combating socialists and Leftists by the 
Turkish government of the period.
Nevertheless, Turkists were unable to form a strong and coherent 
political body until the 1970s. Apart from the disunity within the ultra-nationalist 
organisations, the socio-economic and political conditions did not allow for an 
autonomous fascist movement to properly establish itself in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The ultra-nationalist intelligentsia could not connect with and mobilise the 
masses because of their elitist and anti-religious character. Furthermore, the anti­
communist and nationalist strategies used by the ruling parties of that period 
were so effective that Turkist nationalism was not really necessary. The 
bourgeoisie was against the foundation of a fascist party with etatist-socialist 
tendencies, as this could then constitute an adversary for their own type of 
nationalism, which is moderate and Westernist.^^ Within certain limitations, the 
Turkish government allowed ultra-nationalist organisations to engage in political 
activity. However, the Democrat Party (DP) was not always tolerant to all 
Turkist organisations. For instance, the DP government shut down the Turkish
■' Melunel Ali Agaogullari, “Ultra-nationalism...p: 188 
ibidp: 189
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Nationalists’ Association (Turk Milliyetçiler Derneği) in 1953 because of the
26extreme nature of this association’s views.
To sum up, ultra-nationalism was unable to exist as an independent and 
influential political force during the 1950s. Kemal Karpat claimed in 1959 that.
“The developments of the past ten years -the relative democratization, 
the increase in economic activity, and the new general atmosphere in 
favour of tolerance- have deprived the racialists of suitable grounds for 
success and have isolated them as a small group lacking relationship with 
reality.”
Though Karpat was correct in his analysis, the other factors mentioned 
above (the disunity of the Turkists, their elitism and anti-religious ideology, and 
above all the power of the ruling parties and dominant classes) were more 
decisive in causing the isolation of the Turkists from mainstream politics, and 
their failure to develop themselves into a prominent political force.
Despite its weak points, during the emergence and development of ultra­
nationalist thought a МНР type politics was already in formation. The strategies 
of ultranationalist currents of thoughts will become prominent in the following 
years. The participation of Alparslan Türke §, a significant figure of second 
generation Turkists, into the 27 May 1960 coup implies a turning point in the 
history of ultra-nationalism in Turkey. In the following section, I will deal with 
the political life of Alparslan Türke § before the emergence of МНР.
Ilhan Darendelioglu, Türkiye 'de Milliyetçilik... p: 256. Ilhan Darendelioglu labels the 195.1 as 
another bad year like 1944. In 1953, not only their organization was closed down, but also 
Menderes claimed tliat there is no need for the ultra-nationalist organisations to deal with 
communism..See, ibid, p: 258
Kemal Karpat, 1959, Turkey's Politics: the Transition to a Multi-Party System., 
Princeton:Princcton University Press, p:270
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3.2. Türke§ before МНР; Coup d’etat strategy; the fall of 
‘powerful colonel’
Türke§’s first strategy to realise his ultra-nationalist vision was to 
infiltrate the military and to gain power by a military coup. Consequently, 
Tiirke§ tried to capture political power in the 27 May 1960 coup. However, he 
himself and thirteen other officers in MBK were removed and exiled to India by 
the other members of MBK. Although he was not successful to achieve his aims. 
May 27 remained for him and for his followers as a day of special importance. 
When his later writings on May 27 coup are read, one may see his ambitious 
feelings about the coup.^^ In order to understand how the 27 May coup was 
realised and why Tiirke § and other ultra-nationalists failed, one should consider 
the historical developments in 1950s and 1960s.
One of the most important developments of the 1950s was the increasing 
urbanisation process that was combined with the improved integration of the 
countryside into the national economy. For some writers, the real changes in 
Turkish society began with the effects from these structural changes following 
1950. For instance, contrary to mainstream views, Poultan argues that the 
modernist ideology of Kemalism was not able to penetrate deeply into the 
Turkish society. ·^  ^Therefore, the nationalist ideas of Kemalism did not influence 
the rural Anatolian people as much as it influenced the urban population. Only
Alparslan Tiirke ş ’s Speeches’ in Cemal Anadol, 1995, 'Alparslan Tiirke ş, МНР ve 
Bozkıırtlar, IsUmbul: Kamer yay.,pp: 92-130 and various pages, Irfmı Ulku, 1995,72 Eylül'de 
Alparslan Turkey, Kamer yay. pp; 45-87.
Hugh Poulton, Top Hal, ... p: 123
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after 1950, following the beginning of urbanisation, the traditional mode of 
thought in the country underwent a change.
Following the fifties and especially in the sixties, Turkish economic and 
social life transformed dramatically. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation 
shook traditional modes of thought, such as the feudalist, the religious and the 
pre-capitalist. Large numbers of rural people moved to the cities and settled in 
gecekondus (shant34owns). The workers in the industrial sector, and their 
families, did not exceed 5% of the national population in 1950. However, by 
1965 the number of industrial workers and their families made up over 20% of 
the population. In addition, the number of wage earners increased from 400.000 
to 2.000.000 during this period.
These social and economic changes have created the condition of 
dramatic differentiation in Turkish political arena. In the last years of the 1950s, 
the popular discontent with the DP government became acute. Bureaucrats, 
intellectuals and the urban bourgeoisie became increasingly opposed to the DP's 
anti-democratic and aggressive policies in the late 1950s. '^ Finally, the DP 
declared martial law in response to the intense demonstrations of university 
students in 1960. Following the declaration of martial law, Turkey’s first military 
coup, openly supported by the urban intelligentsia, was staged on 27 May 1960.
The political views of the military coup’s leaders conformed with the 
etatist and authoritarian line of the Committee of Union and Progress or that of
K. Karpat. 1966, Turkish Left, Jurnal o f Contemporary History vol. 1, no.2, pp. 169-170 
” Cağlar Keyder, May-June 1979, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy ”.jVeu^  Left
Review, No;l 13, p: 25
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Republican People's Party of the single party period.Following the coup, the 
officers founded the Committee of National Unity (MBK). Although all the 
members were united against the DP government, the structure of the Committee 
was heterogeneous. There were a number of conflicting political views held by 
the members of the MBK.
The 27 May 1960 coup saw the emergence of Alparslan Türke? as an 
actor in the Turkish political scene. His ideas about the function and role of the 
MBK were quite different than that of the senior members of the MBK. 
According to him, there were three kinds of groups in the Committee. In the first 
group, there were the “constructivists”, who wanted to stay in power so as to 
assist in the development the nation. The second group of the MBK consisted of 
pro-CHP members. According to Türke?, “the pro-CHP members do not have 
any idea about governing the state and the historical development of the Turkish 
Nation. . . Finally, the third group of the MBK consisted of those who were 
content to stay neutral as to the conflict surrounding them. Because of their 
indifference to events they were subjected to the ebb and flow of the political 
forces surrounding them.^‘‘
Needless to say, Türke ? saw himself in the first category. He and other 
radical militarists who sought dynamic authoritarian rule shared the view that the 
MBK should be an extra-political government of national unity that should stay
T he main power of the coup was the younger middle-ranking anny officiers who had become 
impatient with tlie ‘elected dictatorship’ of Adnan Menderes and the DP. They praised for the 
authoritarian politics and identified tlie state autliority with the military. These characters of the 
military leadership look like the Committee of Union and Progress. See, Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, 
...p: 136,
AlparslanTürkeş, 1995, MBK’de Uc Kategori., in Cemal Anadol, Alparslan Turke.·}, МИР ve 
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in power for several years.^^ Alparslan Türke § tried various strategies so as to 
remain in power. For example, he proposed the creation of a new party to be 
called the National Unity Party, which would be composed of the members of 
the MBK.^^ In his view, this new party could attract the voters of the old DP.
The fourteen soldiers, who act with Türke §, had a quite powerful 
position within the MBK in the earlier period of the coup.^^ However, soon after 
the military takeover, the majority group, composed of the officers who wanted 
new political elections to take place, eliminated the militarist groupé* in the 
MBK. The major group in the MBK preferred to delegate the power and 
relinquish responsibility to an elected government. As Keyder states, the view of 
the major group, “supported by the RPP [CHP] leaders, was reinforced as the 
Istanbul bourgeoisie gradually succeeded in imparting a technocratic character to 
the provisional governments established under military rule.”^^  Several 
confidential managers became ministers and the fourteen officers within the 
MBK were eliminated one year later.'*® Alparslan Türke §, as an influential 
member of the militarist group, was exiled to India until the mid-1960s.
Following his return to Turkey, Türke § attempted to gain power in 
various political platforms. He and nine other members of the ‘fourteen’'** joined 
with the CKMP in Junel965. At a special congress held on August 1965, he
Hugh Poullon, Top Hat, ... p: 137 
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became leader of the party. The rival of Türke ş was Ahmet Tahtakil ıç. The 
words of Osman Bölükba ş i , earlier leader of the party reflect the new change 
in the party: ‘the party has become a Military Office. One cannot enter the party 
because of creak of soldier boots and clack of swords.’ CKMP was mainly 
depending on the agrarian votes in the Central and Eastern Anatolian. For 
example, while the vote rates of the party did not exceed 2.2% in the 1965 
elections, CKMP was able to gain 10% in Mus, Agri, Ad iyaman and Niğde 
with the votes of the landowner class and their collaborators.'*^ Following 
Türkeş ’s entrance into the CKMP, the political ideology of the party was 
transformed from that of conservatism to that of radical nationalism.'*'* As early 
as 1967, the CKMP started to educate young partisans in commando camps in 
order to struggle against the Leftists.'*  ^ In accordance with the radicalisation of 
the party, it took the name of Nationalist Action Party at its 1969 Adana 
Congress. However, the votes of the party were so few that it was not able to 
escape its marginal impact on Turkish politics until the middle of 1970s.
As a result, Türke ş ’s first attempt for gaining power can be seen as an 
extension of earlier strategies of ultra-nationalism in Turkey. Türke ş ’s first 
period of political life as the prominent promoter of ultra-nationalist strategy 
shared same weaknesses. The disunity of the Turkists, their elitism and anti- 
religious ideology were some of the inconveniences of their initial strategy. 
Furthermore, the power of the ruling parties and power bloc was obstacle for a 
development of an influential ultra-nationalism in those years. In this sense,
'■ Hulusi Turgut, Türkeş 'in An llar i .. . p:390 
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Türke ş ’ s first period can be seen as a transition period in the history of ultra­
nationalism in Turkey. In the following section, I will focus on the second period 
of Türke Ş, which corresponds to the fascist period of ultra-nationalism in 
Turkey.
3.3. МНР in 1970s; Civil War strategy; loss of reliability
The Idealist or Ülkücü Movement was able to form an effective social 
and political organisation that complied with a fascist power model in the second 
half of the 1970$.''  ^ In 1974, various democratic and socialist movements began 
to develop, especially in the universities. When the support for anti-systemic 
Leftist movements grew, the ülkücü reaction emerged as a counter-movement, 
which allegedly aimed at protecting the state and the nation. The first strategy of 
the МНР was to search for possibilities in gaining power within the state 
institutions. However, from the МНР point of view capturing and dominating the 
state organisations was politically and practically quite ‘unfeasible’ since the 
Turkish military and bureaucracy did not support this strategy of the МНР.
Although the МНР did not abandon its strategy of gaining power through 
capturing the state organisations, it added other strategies to it."*^  These new 
strategies depended on provoking the already existing divisions between 
different ethnic and religious identities, and often using terrorist methods to 
achieve this. In the Central Eastern and South Eastern parts of Anatolia a
Ümit K ıvanç, Preface, in Ümit Sezgin, 1987, 'Aydınlanmam ı .>· Cinayetler', İstanbul: 
i leti şim  yay ınlar 1 , p:10
” Murat Belge (ed.) Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedesi, İstanbul: İleti şim  
yay ınlar 1 . pp: 2336
48
significant number of Sunnies, (those comprising the more conservative, and 
mainstream sect of Islam) were influenced by the anti-Westernist discourse of 
the МНР. The idealist movement encouraged the hostile feelings of the Sunni 
Muslims in those regions against Alevis, who tend to be culturally more “open- 
minded” and “modern”. In metropolitan areas, yet another strategy was followed. 
Here, the party and the ülkücü movement tried to prove their power through the 
employment of terrorist acts. As Ağaoğullar i wrote, ‘Numerous documents in 
the МНР indictments drawn up after the 12 September 1980 coup d’etat show 
that the idealist youths involved in bomb-throwing and armed activities were 
directed and protected by the party leadership.
Before 1980, in the public opinion, the most important feature of the 
МНР was its violent acts. For the supporter of the party, such kind of activities 
of the МНР was a legitimate and compulsory strategy to protect the nation 
against communists and other foes, who aim to divide the country. МНР, in 
those years, tried to legitimise its terrorist activities by constantly recalling “the 
threat of communism’. Furthermore, Türkeş presented the instruments of 
violence as the fundamental traits of Turkish culture. For instance, according to 
Türke ş: “There may well be guns in the hands of youngsters. We are a nation 
that loves weaponry. Which one of us does not own one? If the idealist thinks it
necessary, he can use his national weapon. ,49
Melmet Ali A ğ a o ğu llar ı, "The Ultranationalist Right", ...p:205. МНР and idealist youth 
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In fact, in this period, not only the leftist politicians but also members of 
leftist organisations such as the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker’s Union 
(DISK) and the Teachers’ Association of Turkey (TOB-DER), journalists such 
as Abdi ipekçi, university faculty such as Bedrettin Cömert, and even the 
policemen who aimed at putting an end to the terrorism such as Cevat Kurdakul 
were assassinated by the idealist guns. Lastly, MHP-based terrorism and 
violence took a mass character in the religious-reactionary circles of the Middle 
and Eastern Anatolia after 1978. In those regions, Sunni conservative and ultra­
nationalists, who react against Alevis and leftists, were led by МНР. 
Consequently, ultra-nationalists in Corum, K. Maras, Sivas, and Malatya killed 
hundreds of Alevis and Leftist.
As the confessions of idealist militants and the words of their leader 
show, the politics of violence was also valid within the party relations. These are 
the words of Türke ş: “ I have embraced this cause which has been entrusted to 
me. I am going ahead and heading nothing. Follow me. If I should turn back, 
shoot me. Shoot anyone who joins the cause and then turns back.” °^
As Ümit Cizre Sakall loğlu puts it, the obsession of the Justice Party 
with communism in the 1970s was a product of both a reality and a refracted 
perception, while the communist obsession of the МНР was related with its 
opportunist intention for deepening their political support within the 
community.^' In 1978, both the МНР and AP argued for the need for declaring a 
martial law. However, the martial law demand of the МНР had different reasons 
than that of the AP. For the МНР, the declaration of a martial law would have
ibid p: 191
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helped their political aims, i.e. gaining power by activating their sympathisers in 
the military. However, the МНР changed its view about the necessity of 
martial law in 1979. The new argument of the party was that instituting martial 
law in 1979 would cause the army to lose its vigour. The first basis of this new 
argument was the party’s idea that the CHP’s ‘smiling and democratic martial 
law’ prevented the army struggling efficiently against the Left throughout the 
country and separatism in the Eastern region. Another basis for the МНР 
opposing martial law at the time was that some commanders like Nihat Özer 
(Ankara’s martial law commander) had fought not only against leftists but also 
against the street gangs of the MHP.^  ^ Although Özer has been removed from 
office following Demirel’s demand in August 1980, MHP’s hope for gaining 
power by using the military was already lessened. Although the МНР was able 
to organise a quite effective display of street power, it was not so successful in 
winning elections. I think, examining the historical conditions of that period will 
be helpful to understand why and how Turkish fascism emerged but failed to 
gain power.
The huge economic growth that Turkey experienced under the import 
substituting industrialisation (ISI)^ "* of the 1960s provided the public with an 
optimistic view about the future of the country. However, even before the 1973 
oil crisis, the problems and inner contradictions of the import-substitution model
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had already lessened the levels of optimism of the 1960s.^  ^ In fact, the ISI 
experience of Turkey was comparatively successful until the early 1970s.^  ^
However, this economic success led to more conflict in political and social life 
by accelerating forces of differentiation within social classes.^’ While the 
subaltern group of the marginally employed working class emerged in the urban 
areas, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie felt the encroachment of rapid 
industrialisation especially in the provinces.
One of the most important economic features of 1970s is the increase in 
the number of less but bigger firms. In this period, while the number of plants 
in which 10-19 and 20-49 people worked decreased, the number of plants in 
which 200-499 and more people worked increased. Small capitalists in Anatolia 
saw that this new development threatened their future and the AP ignored their
demands 59
Another side effect of the capitalist development was the increase in the 
differentiation and uneven position of certain regions (Central, Eastern and South 
Eastern Anatolia) vis-à-vis other further relatively developed regions (Marmara, 
Aegean and Mediterranean) in Turkey. The result of this dramatic social 
differentiation between traditional upper classes and the newly developed
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capitalist classes was an increase in the demands of the former groups for 
support from the state.
The traditional classes tried to restrict their losses by using political 
instruments to control the economic sphere, as the existence of a free market 
economy would have wiped them out economically. Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
the main strategy of МНР, as a representative of a weakining petty bourgeoisie 
was to have a share in the government. The praises of Türke ş for the coalition 
governments were a part of this strategy. Also, the Nationalist Front (MC) 
experiences give some clues about the political strategy of МНР. In fact, the 
incorporation of МНР into the coalition government of 1974 and 1977 were not 
the results of great increases in its votes. Rather, the conjunctural factors led the 
National Front governments and МНР was able to gain more power than its real 
strenght in elections. For example, the two deputies of the party out of three 
became ministers in 1974. Alparslan Türke ş explains this situation as a political 
success of МНР. At the end of the MC experiences, apart from МНР, none of 
the parties and bourgeoisie fractions were content. The expectation of МНР was 
to capture the privileges of this state during the period of coalitions.*"'
The first elections following the 1971 coup were held in 1973. Apart 
from the Justice Party (AP), three other right parties entered the 1973 elections. 
Basically, the Democratic Party (DP) represented agrarian capitalism, whereas 
Nationalist Salvation Party (MSP) represented the Islamic radicalism of the
Alparslan Türke ş, “Gençlik ve Kad ın Kollar ı Çal ı ş malar ı ” in Cemal Anadol, 1995. 
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small town petty bourgeoisie.^^ The state-interventionist economic model of the 
MSP was aimed at protecting small business against the destructive effects of 
rapid industrialisation.
In essence, the power base of МНР was the same as that of the MSP. 
However, its grassroots were composed of younger and lumpen sections of the 
petty-bourgeoisie. The youth were aware of the possibilities of the newly 
emerging capitalism, but most of them were not a part of the sy s tem.As  
Keyder put it, "The NMP [МНР] transformed their bitterness into aggressive 
mobilisation through a rhetoric based on militarism, racist-elitism, anti­
communism and the cult of a strong state."*'''
In the 1973 elections, the votes of the reactionary petty bourgeoisie were 
divided between the МНР and the MSP. While the MSP took 12% of the votes, 
the МНР were able to attract only 3.4% of the votes. A large number of votes 
shifted from the AP to those smaller radical right parties. The votes of the AP 
decreased from 46.5% to 29.8%. The biggest party following the 1973 elections 
was the CHP, which attracted the votes of organised and the marginal working 
classes of the developed urban areas via its slogan of the 'left of the centre'.*'^
In the 1977 elections, the percentage of votes of the МНР increased from 
3.4% to 6.4%. The main cause of this increase was the MHP's exploitation of the 
ethnic divisions between the Turks and the Kurds and the religious difference 
between the Sunnies and the Alevis. The party was able to increase its votes only
ibidp: .35
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in the Central and Eastern Anatolian regions, that is where those sorts of ethnic 
or religious conflict existed. Moreover, the MSP lost votes in those regions as a 
result of the increasing prominence of the MHP.*'  ^ The subsequent terrorist 
activities of the МНР in those regions were in conformity with the earlier 
political strategy of the МНР that depended on provoking and exploiting 
religious and ethnic differences for its own electoral benefit .Until  the 1980 
coup d'etat, the strategy of the МНР to gain political power was to create a state 
of effective civil war situation within Turkey and inspire a right-wing coup that 
would be to their benefi t . In fact, Turkish society was almost living in a state of 
civil war until the 12 September 1980 coup.
3.4. МНР in 1980s and 1990s; Election-based Strategy; from
Margin to Center
The 12 September 1980 Coup d’etat was a turning point in the history of 
Turkish political life as well as that of ülkücü movement. The party was 
suspended and then closed by the military regime. Moreover, its leadership 
including Türke Ş was tried and sentenced by a military court. Additionally, 
some idealists were tortured and sentenced to death penalty. For a community 
that exalts the state and the military, the conditions imposed on the МНР by the 
leaders of the 1980 coup were perceived as quite harsh.
All Yasar Saribay, Türkiye 'de Modernleşme: ... p: 165 
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The military leaders of the coup presented their aim as a legitimate 
reaction to combat terrorism and anarchy throughout the country.The influence 
of the 1980 coup was incomparable with that of the previous coup in 1971. There 
happened deeper and more tragic changes after the 1980 military takeover. Trade 
unions, associations, and publication houses were closed down. From the human 
rights perspective, consequences of this coup were more tragic than 
consequences of the earlier coups. During this military regime, many people 
were imprisoned, tortured, sentenced to capital punishment and even executed.
The military regime shut down all the political parties and banned the 
leaders of those parties from engaging further political activities. The attitude of 
the military leadership of the time was quite different from those of the 1960 and 
1971 coups’. In the first years of the coup, people were unsure about whether 
multi-party rule would ever return.™ The military regime of 1980-1983 was 
determined to put an end to all sources of anarchy, especially those emanating
71from communist and extreme nationalist fringe groups.
After the military rule, the Motherland Party (ANAP) became the most 
powerful party, and there were old MHP-based politicians within the cadres of 
this party. In 1983, the Nationalist Work Party (MCP) was founded as a 
successor to the MFDP. Although Türke § was not the leader, due to the ban, the 
party’s programme and ideology were similar to that of the МНР. However,
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many previous МНР activists and politicians had already joined the ANAP, 
which came first in the 1983 elections.
Following the 1980 coup, in late 1980s and in 1990s, МНР had to 
abandon its older strategies and employ an election-based strategy. The first 
election results for the new party, which represented the ulkiiciis (Nationalist 
Work Party-MCP) was almost a shock. In 1987, it could receive only the 2.9 
percent of all vote casts. The previous election results for the party before 1980 
was 6.4 percent. Therefore, the beginnings of the idealist movement following 
the coup were not very promising. The electoral results of this party were as 
follows:
1965 2.2 11
1969 3.0 1
1973 3.4 3
1977 6.4 16
1983*
1987 2.9
1987* 4.1
1991* 16.9 16
1994* 7.9
1995 8.18
1999 18.4 130
*not entered
*local election 
*allied with RP and IDP
*local election
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As we can infer from these results, although its unpromising start, the 
МНР votes has been increasing in later elections: in 1989 4.1%and in 1994 
7.9%. In 1995 general elections, МНР could not achieve such a big leap and its 
8.18% rate was not enough to pass the national threshold. The MCP was not able 
to enter the parliament until 1991 because of the national threshold of 10%. In 
the 1991 election, the MCP made an electoral alliance with the Welfare Party 
(RP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP), and was thus able to overcome 
the national threshold. In July of 1992, six deputies of the МНР left the party and 
founded the Great Unity Party (BBP) under the leadership of Muhsin 
Yaz 1C loğlu.  This splinter party has attempted to represent a more idealistic 
form of Islam that is it opposed to the statist and military nationalism of the 
MCP. In July 1993, the MCP took the name of the МНР after the lifting of the 
ban on the use of pre-1980 political party names.Despi te some internal 
problems, Türke ş eventually was able to control the party. Moreover, the 
increasing tension within Turkey over the Kurdish issue opened a fertile ground 
for the MHP-type politics. After the death of Türke ş. Devlet Bahçeli was 
elected as the president of the party in 1997.
In the 1999 elections, МНР proved that it is no longer a marginal party. 
The result was the biggest success in the history of МНР. МНР attracted 18.4% 
of the votes and with 130 parliamentarians, it has become the key party in the 
parliament. For the first time in its history, the party could escape from being 
characterised as being a marginal party within Turkish politics. In the elections, a
This event caused another split in tlie parly. Wliile Türke § reopened the МНР in 23 July, Sadi 
Soinuncuoglu, a former МНР vice-president and cabinet minister, opened anotlier МНР in tlie 
same days. In fact, all these splits in tlie МНР line indicate a temporary power decrease of 
Türke 5 in those years. See, Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, ... ,p: 142
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great number of votes destined for the center right (ANAP-DYP) and the 
Islamist right (FP) were shifted to the МНР. Moreover, the МНР was able to 
attract a great number of the votes of first time voters. One pollster-columnist 
proposed that 1.100.000 central right voters, 700.000 Islamist voters and 
1.500.000 new young voters (40% of all new voters) gave their votes to the МНР 
in the 1999 election.^^
According to these results, the МНР has become a part of the political 
center, which attracts all rightists, both Islamists and liberals. Apart from these 
sections of the community, the party was able to gain the support of a significant 
proportion of first time voters. All of these phenomena indicate that the МНР 
will probably be more powerful in the following elections. For the moment, it 
seems that МНР is on the way to becoming a hegemonic power not only in the 
elections but also in everyday life, media and popular culture. In fact, in 
everyday life, the МНР and its ultra-nationalist ideology has already played an 
important role in the nineties. According to Can Kozanoglu, two phenomena, 
which give the identity o f ‘pop era culture’ of Turkey, were the pop music and 
the MHP-idealist movement. Kozanoglu gives various examples about the 
influence of МНР identity over the popular culture.One can argue that 
mainstream media interpreted the several issues from the point of ultra­
nationalist views in recent years. For example, when Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), took refuge behind Italy, it was impossible to 
see any distinguishing point between the interpretations of mainstream media
”  Tarhan Erdem, 19 April 1999, Secim Sonuclari, Radikal 
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about the issue and those of fascistic media such as Ortadoğu, Kurultay and 
Gunduz. The titles and sub-titles of mainstream media exemplify some very 
typical features of fascism. For example, one of the main bases of fascistic 
discourse was its fear of ‘communist threat’. This title of Sabah is a symbol of 
their intellectual performance which implies far beyond the imagination o f ‘real’ 
ultra-nationalist printed media: “ Red Stick: Communist-Green alliance receive 
PKK terror with open arms.”
Today, naturally, most of the writers discuss about causes of the big and 
unexpected success of МНР in the recent elections. In my view, the first 
dimension of the rise of the МНР is related with a crisis in dominant ideologies 
in 1980s and especially in 1990s. I will focus on these dominant ideologies and 
their relations with the МНР ideology in the fourth chapter. Apart from the crisis 
of the dominant ideologies, the election-based strategy of the МНР was also 
influential in the rise of the party. What was the election strategy, which led to 
the great success of МНР? As other neo-fascist parties seeking electoral success, 
the МНР did not obviously embrace and participate in physical violence and thus 
jeopardise its success, but its rhetoric justifies such action. Because of its 
pragmatist character, the means are subordinate to the goals in the МНР. 
Accordingly, the new leader and cadre of МНР tried to give a more liberal vision 
to the public opinion. An attempt of changing the party image was not new to 
МНР type politics. A liberalization policy in МНР has already been started in 
Türke Ş period. However, some aspects of Bahçeli and his cadres helped a better 
presentation of this new image of МНР. For example, many journalists
Sabah. 21 November 1998
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interpreted the non-charismatic character of Bahçeli as a moderate vision of the 
party. Again, the academic background of Bahçeli and foundation of party 
school and AR-GE (research center) were seen as a proof of the new positive 
image of the party. Constituting a think tank and party school as a new-look 
strategy is common feature of other neo-fascist parties. Moreover, Flood’s 
observation about Le Pen also reveals Bahçeli’s features:
“Le Pen himself is not merely a crude demagogue with a line in 
brutalistic charisma. He does, after all have a degree in law and a 
postgraduate diploma in Political Science. He is no political philosopher; 
but he is certainly capable of making a sophisticated argument .”
It is a fact that the other new strategies of the МНР have some 
paralellisms with those of neo-fascist parties in Europe. For example, the new 
strategy of fascist parties and other organizations in Europe is opposing 
multiculturalism, immigration, and cosmopolitanism not from the biological but 
cultural racist perspectives. They have employed a rhetoric that emphasises some 
more popular and legitimate terms such as ‘difference’, ‘cultural rights’ et 
cetera. For example, in order to legitimate his parliementary ethnic cleansing 
program,’  ^Le Pen argues that ‘people cannot be summarily qualified as superior 
or inferior, they are different, and one must keep in mind these physical or 
cultural differences.’^ * Furthermore, in accordance with the new strategy, Alain 
Benoist, the most important representative of Nouvelle Droite (the New Right), 
propose arguments, which sounds like (in Wolin’s term) a ‘liberal’s liberal’:
See, Clirislopher Flood, Organizing Fear and Indignation’ in Richard Golsan.(ed.) 1998. 
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“anti-racism itself is a form of racism, a witch-hunt used against individuals and 
intended to extinguish ‘French’ France to the benefit of a ‘non-cosmopolitan’ 
so c i e ty .S u c h  kind of ‘anti-racist’ rethoric has been defended by the МНР 
leadership in several occasions.
One of the most common features of fascist parties is their double 
discourse. As Flood puts forward about the Le Pen movement, “what is said in 
private may differ from what is said in public, and what is said in public will be 
affected by the nature of the intended audience.”** In France, magazines and 
newspapers that are allegedly independent of FN but in reality serve the party 
have a more extremist tone than the official organs.*^ That statement is also true 
for other neo-fascist parties. For example, the leader of Austrian neo-fascist 
party, Jörg Haider made several secret pro-Nazi speeches, which led to public 
scandal.*^ Such kind of differences between official speeches and informal 
speeches is also true for the МНР.*'* For example, as an Islamist nationalist, 
Muhsin Yaz ic lo glu*^ declares that ‘we firmly believe in the theory of superior 
race.. Turkishness is an essence comprised of religion and race. . .The Turkish 
race is more precious than all others.’*^  A МНР pamphlet prepared for Turkish 
immigrants is more openly racist:
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“Those who destroyed [the Ottoman Empire] were Greek-Armenian- 
Jewish converts, Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, and Albanians. As a Turk, 
how much longer will you tolerate these dirty minorities? Throw out the 
Circassian, that he may go to Caucasia, throw out the Armenian, throw 
out and kill the Kurd, purge from your midst the enemy of all 
Turkdom.”*^
Officially, МНР declares that the Kurdish problem should be solved 
within the boundaries of legality. However, even in their official speeches, it 
seems that the demand for legality is just rhetoric, which must be employed for 
pragmatic purposes. I think, the following words of Türke § demonstrate this 
tendency:
“We are declaring now. We can solve this problem [the Kurdish problem] 
at most in one year. Nationalist Action Party will crush the PKK terror 
organisation in a radical way. Everyone should know this. However, 
everyone should also know that МНР does not think of abandoning the 
legality when it destroys this evil. Within the legality, it will crush the 
evil, [my translation]”^^
In fact, the official ideology has converged with that of the MHP’s and 
that of Islamic-idealism on the issue of Kurdish identity. As Türke §'s words 
prove, the official ideology and the МНР take the 'absence of Kurdish identity' 
for granted: "we are Kurds as much as they are Kurds, and they are Turks as 
much as we are Turks.
Although it was not the part of parliamentary politics, ideological 
elements of МНР have been extremely effective in Turkish politics in the 1990s. 
The government, media and ordinary people often employ nationalist arguments 
in several critical aspects of political life, such as when addressing the Kurdish
87 ■
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question, human rights violation and foreign policy. It is not exaggerated to 
argue that the MHP’s stance on the Kurdish issue has been more or less accepted 
by the mainstream parties, hegemonic, especially in the last ten years. It has 
always been against the idea of Kurdish identity. For the party, Turkey is the 
nation of the Turks: there may be some other cultures, but they are no more than 
sub-cultures that receive their definition by the presence of Turkish identity 
itself In this sense, any form of identity politics that leads to the idea that Turkey 
is composed of different cultures like a mosaic, is considered by the МНР as to 
help undermine the “indivisibility” of Turkey. For Türke ş: “We are not a 
mosaic. We are the Turkish nation. There is no mosaic as such. These are things 
invented by defective ideas or those enemies who want to destroy us 
internally.” *^^
As Sakall lo ğlu observed, nationalism has been mobilised as a defensive 
and unifying ideology against the destructive effects of economic liberalism and 
against the Welfare Party, which arose espousing solutions to the destructive 
effects and new right politics.^' With centre right and left parties supporting a 
nationalistic vision of politics at present, the МНР has been able to present itself 
as a more moderate party than the earlier МНР. In this sense, a two-sided 
process has happened: the ultra-nationalisation of centre parties and a movement 
towards the political centre by the neo-fascist party, the МНР. This neo-fascist 
party has articulated itself to the centre politics, for this its image had to be 
change since in the seventies the reputation of the МНР as violence oriented
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party was still a living memory. In fact, the mainstream media has begun to 
present the МНР and its old leader, Türke?, in newly defined term. The МНР is 
no more characterised as being an extreme party, but a centrist party sensitive to 
the integrity of Turkish State and the nation. Türke? himself has become a 
‘moderate’ and ‘responsible’ statesman.
To sum up, in recent years, nationalism (or even ultra-nationalism) has 
become the popular religion of Turkish society. The line between the political 
discourse of МНР and those termed centre parties is gradually disappearing. This 
is also true for the line between the “fascistic” printed media and the mainstream 
media. In other words, the ideology of ultra-nationalism has been centralised and 
normalised in the media and in popular culture.
In this chapter, I have tried to periodise the history of the МНР in terms 
of its changing strategies and their influences within Turkish political life. It 
should be mentioned that the ideological manifestations of the МНР have also 
taken different shapes during this process. In the following chapter, I will focus 
on the question how to define the МНР and how its ideology has taken different 
appearances throughout its history.
The most famous example is Ertugrul Özkök, ‘15 May is l9 9 3 , Türkeşi Öveceğim e Hiç 
i nanmazd ım .’ Hürriyet.
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Chapter 4
The Ideology of МНР: A Turkish Version of Neo-
Fascism?
In this chapter, I will deal with the question of defining the МНР. In the 
academic literature, the ideology of the party is defined with various concepts 
such as nationalism, ultra-nationalism, radical right, extreme right, or as fascism. 
For example, Jacob Landau, who deals with the МНР in a detailed manner, 
defines it and its predecessor party (Republican Peasant Nation Party-CKMP) as 
a version of radical right party. ^  For him, both radical Right parties and radical 
Left parties share the same ground: they are both extreme parties. According to 
Landau, there are important similarities between these two wings of radical 
parties because of their extremism.^ Like Landau, Hugh Poulton uses term of 
radical right to define the МНР ideology. However, he equates the pre-1980 
Turkish radical right with fascism. For him, while the МНР was fascist in 1970s, 
one can not label it so after 1980. In his words:
“On almost all counts, the МНР of the 1970s, with its paramilitary 
organizations and other manifastations, would appear to fit this definition 
[fascism]. The only exception is perhaps the anti-clerical, or at least non- *
* Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in...p:205-232 
 ^ ibid p:287
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clerical aspect...Since the 1980s coup, the radical rights activities have 
been severely curtailed and perhaps can no longer be truly fascist.”^
On the other hand, Mehmet Ali AgaoguUari prefers the term of ultra­
nationalism to define the МНР ideology.'* *According to Ağaoğullan, this broad 
term has taken various forms including ‘Turkism’  ^ (Türkçülük), ‘Turanism’ 
(Turancılık), ‘nationalism’ (milliyetçilik) and ‘idealism’ (ülkücülük).^ However, 
he also states that there are not only terminological but also ideological 
similarities between fascist movements and the ultra-nationalist ideology of the 
МНР.’
Çağlar Keyder claims that Turkish ultra-nationalism can be defined as 
fascism. He uses the concept as a sociological term in order to emphasise the 
similarity of features and demands of social bases of the ultra-nationalist political 
movements with those of other fascist movements in the world.^ According to 
Keyder, the МНР was able to create a fascist movement in Turkey under the 
“convenient conditions” of 1970s.
In my opinion, defining the МНР as a radical or extremist party may be 
quite problematic. One of the most important deficiencies of such definitions is 
the tendency to evaluate socialist and fascist parties in the same category as 
Landau did. However, the power base, political goals and strategies of the
 ^ See, Hugh Poulton, Top H at,... p: 164-5 
M. All Agaogullan, ‘The Ultranationalist Right...
 ^Turkism or Pan-Turkism originally referred to a narrower meaning than Turanism. While it 
signified the unification of all Turkic peoples, Turanism referred to all peoples including Finns, 
Hungarians and Estonians. Nevertheless, by the 1920s both terms were used to indicate only the 
unity of Turks and Turkic peoples. See Jacob Landau, 1974, Pan-Turkism in Turkey... p: 1 
M. Ali Ağaoğullan, "The Ultranationalist R ight... p: 177 
’ ibid p:196
* Cağlar Keyder, 1995, Türkiye’de Devlet ve Siniflar, Istanbul; iletişim yay., p: 284
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socialist and fascist parties are different.^ In other words, the concepts of 
extremism and of radicalism are too broad to explain the differences between the 
histories, political goals, strategies, organisational structure, and ideologies of 
these parties. Therefore, in my analyses, I propose that defining the МНР as a 
fascist party may properly explain the specific features of the party. While its 
strategies and politics were similar with those of classical or ‘historical’ 
fascism before 1980, the concept of ‘neo-fascism’ suits to the new-look of the 
party. Therefore, the present ideology of the МНР can be defined as neo-fascism. 
However, this is not to say that it is not a nationalist, ultra-nationalist or extreme 
right party. Rather, I propose that defining the МНР as nationalist, ultra­
nationalist or extreme right party is not wrong but insufficient since there are 
also other parties or movements which are nationalist, ultra-nationalist and 
extreme right but not fascist. Therefore, one can argue that all fascist parties are 
nationalist, ultra-nationalist and extreme right but not vice versa. Fascism has 
some specific features, not peculiar to nationalism, ultra-nationalism and 
extreme-right. In the following sections, I will try to explain in what sense the 
concepts of fascism and neo-fascism can explain the nature of the МНР 
ideology. However, before dealing with these concepts, I will briefly focus on 
other concepts [nationalism, ultra-nationalism, and right wing extremism], that 
may help for revealing various dimensions of the МНР. After presenting a 
theoretical guideline that composed of nationalism, radical right, fascism and
For a critique of such a ‘symmetrical analyses’ of extremism, See; Klaus von Beyme, Right- 
Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe, in Klaus von Beyme (Eds.) 1988, Rihgt Wing Extremism 
in Post-War Europe London: K.B. Frank Cass, p:2
Richard Wolin proposes the term of ‘historical fascism’ instead of classical fascism. Richard 
Wolin, ‘Designer Fascism’, in (Eds.) Richard J. Golsan 1998, Fascism Return: Scandal, 
Revision, and Ideology since 1980 Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, p: 48
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neo-fascism, I will try to explore some revealing characteristics of fascist 
ideologies and that of the МНР.
4.1. Theoretical Guidelines and Concepts
4.1.1 Nationalism:
The leaders and other members of the МНР overwhelmingly define 
themselves as nationalists. Many of the supporters of the party do not accept the 
term of fascism as a definition of the “idealism” or “ülkücülük”. МНР leaders 
have declared that the argument of the similarity between fascism and ülkücülük 
is an invention of communists and separatists in Turkey. In the words of Türkeş 
“They [communists and separatists] rebel in any occasion. They cry by saying, 
“let’s organise against the fascism”, or “racists separate the country”...In reality, 
fascism is morally ‘catholic’ and Nazism is anti-clerical. These orders belong to 
other nations not to us.”“ Can we really perceive the “idealism” of МНР as 
nationalism?
The literature on nationalism is much broader than those of fascism and 
radical right parties. There are numerous definitions of nationalism and debates 
over different dimension of this concept. However, for us, the problem is 
whether these definitions and debates can clearly explain the МНР case or not.
" Alparslan Türkeş. 1995. “Nazizm, Faşizm Uydurması” in Alparslan Türkeş Yeni Ufuklara 
Doğru İstanbul: Kmner yayınlan p; 106
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In fact, some definitions of nationalism can seemingly fit into the case of the 
МНР.
For example, John Breauly’s definition apparently clarify the ideology of 
the МНР. According to John Breauly, nationalism is not only a set of doctrines, 
ideas and sentiments but also a form of politics. For him, nationalism is not an 
expression of structure (class, economy, culture and so on) but as a form of 
politics.*^ Thus, he defines nationalism as ‘a political movement seeking state 
power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.’
If the definition of Breuilly is true, then, the МНР is a nationalist party. 
However, this definition is not enough to see the specifity of the МНР and ''the 
UlkiicU’ movement. For example, Kemalism was also a political movement, 
however not a mass movement, Kemalism sought state power and justified its 
actions with nationalist arguments. However, as I focus on in the next chapter, 
there are crucial differences between the Kemalist nationalism and the МНР type 
nationalism.
Historically, nationalism has revealed much more variety than fascism. In 
fact, many writers tends to see fascism, racism and right wing extremism under 
the term of nationalism. In their view, nationalism may take the shape of fascism 
under certain circumstances. For example, according to Mark Neocleous, first 
step of being fascist is being nationalist. For him, “however one characterises 
the distinctive feature of the kind of nationalism found in fascism -  ‘integral’ 
nationalism, ‘radical’ nationalism, and ‘ultra’-nationalism are all fairly common 
-  it is the logic of nationalism and the logic of racism which share fundamental
John Breauly, 1994, Nationalism and the State, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p: 1 
Mark Neocleous, Fascism, Open University Press, Birmingham, 1997, pp; 19-37
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features; nationalism is necessarily xeonophobic -  that is, xeonophobia is part of 
the logic of nationalism -  and that always remain an invitiation to anti-Semitism 
and racism.” ''^  In the same line, Tom Nairn believes that Italian fascism and 
German National Socialism were the logical consequences of nationalist 
ideology. For him, fascist period uncovers the real nature of nationalism.'^
Furthermore, Montserrat Guibernau sees some differences between 
nationalism and racism or fascism whereas he accepts the existence of strong 
relations between them. It is true that ‘nationalism may be invoked by those 
displaying racist, xenophobic and fascist attitudes and frequently involves the 
use of several forms of violence.’'  ^ Furthermore, for him, there are basic 
similarities between racism and the so-called nationalism. For example, both 
racism and this type of nationalism depend on the distinction between ‘we’ and 
‘us’ in the construction of national identity.
However, Guibernau argues that nationalism and racism exhibit fundamental 
oppositions and ‘offer radically different messages’ . For him, “the specifity of 
racism lies in its constant invocation of a difference that attributes superiority to 
one group to the detriment of another, and favours the growth of hostile feelings 
towards those who have been defined as ‘different’.”'  ^ In his view, while 
nationalism proposes a common project that aims at building a better future for 
its people, ‘racism does not attempt to construct anything.’^ "
ibid p:32
Tom Nairn, 1981, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London: Verso, p:347 
Montserrat Guibernau, 1996, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth 
Century, Cambridge; Polity Press, p:85 
ibid p:90 
ibid p:89 
ibid pp;86-7 
ibid p:90
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Guibernau sees more similarities between nationalism and fascism than 
between nationalism and racism. He defines fascism as the dark side of 
nationalist ideology. In his view, while nationalism contributed to liberation and 
emancipation movements in the nineteenth century, nationalism took the shape 
of fascism in the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
‘fascism, above all a nationalist movement, provided many millions of people a 
meaningful involvement’ within conditions created by severe crises.
Fascism, as a political movement and then, as a political regime emerged 
in the 1920s. If we remember that other ideologies or regimes such as liberalism 
and socialism entered into political arena much earlier than fascism, we may 
understand some specific characteristics of fascism which derives from this fact. 
Many writers mention that the emergence of fascism was a surprise for 
especially those liberal and socialist political commentators and academics. 
Philosophical ground of this surprise can be inferred from Griffin’s statement: 
‘by 1914 most liberals and Marxists were enscorned in philosophies of history 
which convinced them they were in the vanguard of history, and moving 
ineluctably towards the realisation of their myth of p r o g r e s s . T o  put it 
differently, ‘these movements [fascist movements] were latecomers on the 
political scene, at a time when, in most countries, the party system has already 
crystallized.’^  ^Therefore, when fascism appeared in the political arena, different 
parts of society had already identified themselves with a certain party, a trade- 
union, an association, or other types of political organizations.
ibid p: 98
Roger Griffin, “Introduction to Reactions to Fascism,” in Roger Griffin (eds.), 1995, Fascism, 
Oxford:Oxford University Press, p: 247
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According to Linz, this fact proves that the successes of those fascist 
movements’ or/and parties were largely pre-emptied. '^* For him, the fact that 
fascism is a latecomer explain its essentially “anti” character of its ideology and 
appeal. In my view, although Linz is right to stress on the “anti” character of 
fascism, the “anti” character of fascism is not a net effect of its latecomer feature. 
That is to say, there is an indirect relation between these two phenomena since 
any ideology including fascism can not be purely reactionary ideology. Though 
their reactionary aspects may be dominant, these reactionary elements can not be 
activated and thus, politicized without a set of ideas or beliefs. Therefore, fascist 
movements had to put a positive political program, which transcends its 
reactionary character so as to activate the masses for a long time. In other words, 
as all successful political movements, in order to construct and then, to protect 
ideological hegemony, each fascist movement or regime has to propose a 
political project which appeal the reactionary masses. Later on, I will focus on 
reactionary dimension of fascism in a detailed manner. For now, it should be 
mentioned that the statement of Lizt is also quite important to uncover the 
relation between nationalism and fascism. Generally the doctrines of nationalism 
have to make a specific emphasis on nation building process in order to explain 
the emergence of nationalist ideologies and movements.
Historically, fascist movements or regimes did not emerge during nation 
building processes. Historical conditions in which fascism emerge is different. 
The structural bases of fascism derive from stressful conditions (crisis, 
recessions...) of capitalism. Furthermore, fascist movements emerged not in the
Linz, Juan., Introduction., in (ed.) Walter Laqueur, 1978, Fascism Carolina; University of 
Carolina Press, p: 4
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initial period of capitalism but in a relatively developed period of capitalism. To 
put it in a different way, at power bases of the first phases of fascism, there are 
not members and elites of dominant bloc as in the case of nationalism, but losers 
and outsiders of modernisation process.^^
Within the Turkish context, to define the МНР as a nationalist party may 
mislead us since there are many competing nationalisms in Turkish political life. 
In fact, not only Kemalism as the ideology of nation-building actors in Turkey, 
but also other ideologies such as Islamism^^ and Kurdish nationalism can not be 
accounted for without considering nationalism. In a sense, Turkish poUtical 
arena has been experiencing a competition of various kinds of nationalisms. 
Thus, the term nationalism does not cover the specific nationalism of the МНР 
since it is too broad to define its ideology.
However, that does not mean that literature of nationalism is not useful in 
understanding the politics and ideology of the МНР. Above, I mentioned some 
views that stress on the close relation and similarities between nationalism and 
fascism. Above all, despite its eclectic nature and different forms, nationalist 
ideology has been a sine quo non for all fascist movements. Therefore, in my 
view, an analysis of the МНР should also have a recourse to theories of 
nationalism.
24 ibid p:4
Wolin. Richard. 1998. ‘Designer Fascism’, in (Eds.) Richard J. Golsan Fascism Return: 
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4.1.2.Ultra-nationalism and right-wing extremism
If the МНР is not solely a nationalist party, then can we define it as an 
ultra-nationalist, extreme rightist or far rightist party? According to Michi Ebata
“Right wing extremism is identified foremost by the fundamental 
expression of hatred, bigotry, or prejudices rooted in an ideology of 
inequality. This hatred is an expression of a worldview that divides 
society into those who belong and those who do not. It is specifically 
manifested as racism, xenophobia, homophobia, misogyny, and religious 
intolerance”.^ ^
Ebata’s definition of right wing extremism can easily be employed for a 
manifestation of various dimensions of politics and ideology of the МНР. In 
Ebata’s understanding, “hate is an integral value that infuses the ideology, 
motivates the actions and serves as a source of solidarity for right wing 
extremism” and it is possible to argue that the reactionary ground of the МНР 
ideology depends on hate. Apart from hate, other features of right wing 
extremism mentioned by Ebata like its ultra-nationalism, ethnic nationalism, 
charismatic leadership, its male and youth dominated base comply with the 
politics of the МНР.
Ebata emphasises same points of similarity between classical fascism and 
right wing extremism. In fact, he considers classical fascism as an ancestor of
For many, the Islamic ideologies do not share same ground with nationalism. Debates between 
МНР line media and Islamists. However, the represantative party of Islamic world view presents 
their ideology as “Milli Görüş” (National View)
Michi Ebata “Right-Wing Extremism: In Search of Definition” in Aurel Braun and Stephen 
Scheinberg, (Eds.), 1997, The Extreme Right:Freedom and Security at Risk, Oxford: Westview 
Press, p: 13-4 
ibid p:14
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right wing extremism and far rightist movements.^^ However, he argues that 
‘fascism is too narrow a definition for right wing extremism especially given that 
fascism and Nazism themselves are differentiated.’ ®^ I do not agree with Ebata in 
two respects.
My first objection to Ebata is that Italian fascism and German Nazism 
have so many similar features that one can define them under one concept. In a 
sense, the usage of the term fascism may be compared with the usage of ‘term 
capitalism.’ Since its emergence as a certain mode of production, the capitalist 
system has taken numerous forms. There may be different names of specific 
forms of capitalism such as industrial capitalism, colonial capitalism, national 
capitalism or global capitalism. Although it is important to emphasise differences 
among various societies, labelling all of them under a single term reveals the 
general framework. That is also the case for fascist movements: one should be 
sensitive to differences among various forms of fascism but without ignoring the 
common axis that cut across all of them. Thus, one can define not only German 
National Socialism but also French Front National, Italian Movimento Sociale 
Italiano or Allezionne Nazionella and other neo-fascist movements under the 
term fascism since they share the same ideological and political ground in 
different geographical and historical contexts.
My second disagreement with Ebata concerns the concept of right wing 
extremism. Contrary to fascism, right wing extremism is ‘too broad’ to be used 
as a valuable concept to define different forms of fascism. For example, within 
the Turkish context, it is a widespread tendency to identify Islamist movement
ibid p:21 
ibid p:21
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and parties as right wing extremisms. However, Islamist movement and ülkücü 
movement can not be equated since there are wide differences between them in 
terms of organisations, world views, goals, and aspirations. Therefore, I believe 
that fascism is more explanotary than right-wing extremism in the case of the 
МНР.
Klaus von Beyme, another writer who sees the term of fascism and neo- 
fascism as too narrow, argues that ‘the term right wing extremism has certain 
virtues which make its use preferable to the competing concepts of radicalism or 
fascism and neo-fascism.’ '^ However, he does not explain why fascism and neo- 
fascism are too narrow terms and why right wing extremism should be prefered 
to define political movements such as the FN in France, the MSI and the AN in 
Italy, the RP in Germany or the МНР in Turkey. Again, although he criticises 
several interpretations of right wing extremism,^^ he does not give a definition of 
right wing extremism.
In my view, although the relative connotations of these terms (ultra, far 
and extreme) may be meaningful on the ideological ground, the direct translation 
of the ideology of ultra-nationalism to the political sphere may create problems. 
If ultra-nationalism or far rightism signifies the marginality and the very distance 
from the center of the political power, then it is impossible to locate the МНР 
into the margin of the political power of the country especially after 18 April
Klaus von Beyme, “Right wing Extremism ... p:2
For example, he criticises psychological and neo-psychoanalytical approaches,(p: 12) social 
structural approach (p: 13),Lipset’s hypothesis of middle class extremism (p: 14), left wing 
equation of radicalism and right wing extremism (p;2). His main argument is that researchers 
have focused on demand side of politics (the side effects of capitalist or modern society, 
authoritarian culture and so on) and neglegted supply side of politics (strategies of other political 
parties, especially those of central right parties) in their examination of right wing extremism. 
However, a whole examination of right wing extremism requires considering both sides of the 
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1999 election. Today, the МНР is the second strongest party of the Turkish 
parliament and more importantly as the leader of the party. Devlet Bahçeli, 
declares that the МНР is at the very centre of the pohtical power. He points to 
the fact that МНР is now a mass party and no more marginal party with little 
political appeal among the people at large. In fact, from the emergence of the 
party onwards (even in the CKMP period), the leadership repeatedly claimed that 
it was a centrist party.^ "* Since many writers connote the term of extremity with 
marginality, their conception of the МНР has changed following its electoral 
success. While they were accustomed to label it as an extreme right party, today 
they tend to believe that the МНР is a party of centre. In my opinion, such a 
rapid change in the conception and definiation of the МНР reveals the 
problematic side of the term of ‘extremity’ or ‘ultra-nationalism’.
In the previous chapter, I attempted to define ultra-nationalism in three 
steps. First of all, ultra-nationalist ideology sees the history as the struggle 
among the nations. Secondly, ultra-nationalists identify the nation with state. 
And finally, they see themselves as the real reprasantative of the nation. Only if 
the terms of ultra-nationalism and right-wing extremism indicate its ideology, 
which includes the exaltation of the hierarchy, the military, the nation, the state, 
the traditional values, and the territoriality defining the МНР as an extreme or 
ultra-nationalist party may be useful. It is very clear that the ideological center of 
the МНР is the ultra-nationalism that exalts the existence and greatness of the 
nation. As Türkeş espoused, the pro-MHP people believe that history is, in fact a
Yavuz Donat. 19. 5. 1999. Demokrasiyi Kim Taşıyacak? Sabah 
J. Landau, Radical Politics ...p:291
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struggle of nations. In the following sections of this chapter, I will delineate 
such elements of the party, which exalt the notion of the nation, the state and the 
race.
However, the term fascism indicates some more specific features than the 
term ultra-nationalism. Unlike ultra-nationalism, fascism is not only an ideology 
but also a movement. The most important distinguishing feature of the fascism is 
that it requires a mass movement. While ultra-nationalism and racism can 
emerge without a mass movement, this is not the case for fascism. For example, 
the first generation of Turkists (Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu...) 
may be defined as ultra-nationalists but not fascists since their ultra-nationalist 
views did not mobilise the masses. Having said so, I will now try to explain why 
fascism and its new forms (neo-fascism and post-fascism) as explanatory 
concepts best suit for understanding and analysing the ülkücü movement.
4.1.3.Fascism
As I mentioned above, the literature, on fascism is much broader than that 
on right wing extremism. There are of course different interpretations and 
definitions of fascism in the literature. S. Payne classifies the interpretations of 
fascism into twelve categories:
“LA violent and dictatorial agent of bourgeois capitalism, 2. A twentieth- 
century form of ‘Bonapartism’ 3. The expression of a unique radicalism 
of the middle classes 4. The consequence of a unique national histories, 
5. The product of a cultural and a moral breakdown, 6. A unique
3.·! iİrfan Ülkü, 1995,12 Eylülde Ülkücüler, İstanbul: Kaıner Yayınlan, p:18
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metapolitical phenomenon, 7. The result of extreme neurotic or 
pathological psycho-social impulses 8. The product of the rise of 
amorphous masses, 9. A typical manifestation of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism, 10. A revolt against ‘modernisation’ 11. The consequence 
of a certain stage of socio-economic growth or a phase in the 
development sequence 12. The denial that any such general phenomenon 
as generic fascism can be defined.”^^
Although this is a quite large classification, it should be mentioned that 
these interpretations are not always mutually exclusive or opposite. Furthermore, 
because of fascism’s dynamic and changing character, these various 
interpretations may be true (or false) for a specific space and time. In my view, 
one can, broadly speaking, divide these approaches into two categories. In the 
first category, the scholars emphasise the ideological and psychological 
dimension of fascism and tend to treat it as a set of features, ideas and beliefs. 
Generally, these scholars emphasise the ideological manifestations or 
appearances of fascism. The most typical example of this category is “check-list 
approach”. Many non-Marxist scholars adopted this approach, which depends on 
certain typology of fascism.^’
The second category focuses on the historical and sociological dimension 
of the phenomenon by emphasising the social context, in which fascism emerged 
and developed. In this category, scholars generally attempt to contextualise those 
ideological appearances of fascisms by emphasising on the material conditions. 
Most of the Marxist scholars perceive fascism from this perspective and locate it
Stanley Payne, 1980, Fascism: Comparison and Definition,, Madison: Wisconsin Press, p:178. 
See, Juan Linz, Some Notes toward aComparative Stugy of Fascism in Sociological Historical 
Perspective’, in W. Laqueur (ed.), \979Fascism: A Reader’s Guide , Harmondsworth: Penguin; 
Renzo De Felice, 1977, Interpretations of Fascism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; and 
Stanley Payne, 1980, Fascism: Comparision and Definition, Madison: Wisconsin Press.
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at the framework of capitalist development. In this section, I will discuss both 
approach and then focus on new forms of fascism in contemporary world.
In the first category, many of the scholars see fascism as a generic 
phenomenon. Griffin compares ‘generic definitions’ with Weber’s term of ideal 
type. As the Weberian term, “definitions of generic terms can never be ‘true’ in 
reality, but they can be more or less useful in investigating it (heuristically 
useful) when applied as conceptual tools of analysis.’’ Other represantatives of 
this view are the works of Juan Linz, Renzo De Felice and Stanley Payne.
According to Roger Griffin fascism is “a genus of political ideology 
whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palangenetic form of populist 
ultra-nationalism.” The term of palangenetic étimo logically derives from the 
Greek words palin (again, anew) and genesis (creation, birth). Thus, the term 
of palangenesis refers both to past and to future. Cults and myths of past, in 
essence, point not backwards but forwards. Looking at past in a mytic style 
preserve an irony in itself. Exaltation of history of nation is in fact emphasising 
history in a ahistorical way. An understanding of pure and mytic history is one of 
the most important features of Turkish fascism. In racist brand of fascism, 
history of Turkish race in Central Asia is mystified. Some mytologies such as 
Ergenekon, Bozkurt and Asena are famous, which I will focus on later.
The second premise of Griffin is that a fascist minimum can be defined 
not in terms of a common ideological component, but in terms of a common 
mythic core."" In his view, the term myth does not draw attention to irrationalism
Roger Griffin, “General Introduction...p: 2. 
’^ ibid pp; 4-9.
'“Mark Neocleous, Fascism, ...pp:72 
Roger Griffin, “General Introduction, ...p:2
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and madness but to the power to unleash energies through an appealing image 
for those susceptible to it.'^  ^ This generic mythic image may have different 
ideological manifestations according to the historical context. He mentions ten 
features of fascism minimum (check-list of fascism): “anti-liberalism; anti­
conservatism; tendency for a charismatic form of politics; socialistic elements; 
totalitarian links; the heterogeneity of social support; racism; internationalism; 
eclecticism.”"*^
In my view, the statements of Griffin uncover many dimensions of 
fascism. For example, his statement that the generic mythic image may have 
different ideological manifestations according to historical context is useful to 
see pragmatist and eclectic character of fascism. However, the main problem in 
his analysis is that he reduces fascism to a kind of black energy fostered by 
mytical images and gives the historical and social context in which it emerges a 
trivial role. In other words, while he mentions the importance of historical 
conditions, he does not propose any criterion or tool for examining the historical 
conditions. He mainly emphasises on the ideological criteria of fascism that 
seem quite static. Hence, in Griffin’s analysis, one can not grasp why such 
mytical images are appealing for some people and why not for others. Again, 
since he sees socialistic elements as a necessary ingredient of fascism, his list of 
fascist minimum can not explain the emergenece neo-fascist movements and 
parties, which espouse neo-liberal arguments that oppose socialistic elements 
and aspirations.
42 
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Lastly, two of his fascist minimums (anti-conservatism and heterogenity 
of bases) are also problematic. Fascism is not necessarily anti-conservative and 
historically, many conservative parties or associations have given support for the 
fascist parties and movements.'*'* Robert Soucy and some other scholars'*  ^oppose 
the view of mainstream school and argue that “most French fascists had much in 
common with with French conservatism, that what they advocated was in fact an 
authoritarian brand of French conservatism, and that only a small minority of 
leftists went over to fascism during the interwar period.”'*^ Moreover, the neo- 
fascist form of fascism adopts an idea of the necessity for an intellectual 
hegemony of conservative organisations to achive political power. As Beyme put 
it, ‘both the Nouvelle Droite in France and its Italian equivelant the Nouva 
Destra sometimes call themselves ‘gramscista di destra.’'*^ Indeed, not only in 
France and in Italy but also in Turkey, there are close relationships between 
conservative associations and fascist parties.'**
Another point that I disagree with Griffin is his belief about the power bases of 
fascism. According to him.
Some writers consider conservative intellectuals’ legitimation attempts of fascist ideologies 
more dangerous than rise of fascist movements. For example, according to Klaus von Beyme ‘the 
fact that a book like Alain de Benoist’s Vu de droite received literary prizes in France is 
parobably more alarming than one of the electoral success of the Front National.’ See, Klaus von 
Beyme, “Right Wing Extremism...p: 12
Robert Soucy defines them as anticonsensus scholars. See, Robert Soucy, “The Debate over 
French Fasci sm... p: 13 3
ibid
ibid p: 11, Here, the term “gramscista di destra’’ indicates extreme Rightist parties and 
movements’ consideration of Gramsci’s views on hegemony as the way of gaining political 
power.
Some important conservative organisations like the Club of tlte Enlightened (Aydınlar 
Kulübü) and tlie Heartli of Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocağı) supported fascist forces against a 
growth of radical left wing ideologies. For more information, see Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay 
Şayian, İllıan Tekeli <md Şerafettin Turan, \99\,Tîlrk-İslam Sentezi Dosyası, İstanbul: Sarmal 
Yayınları and Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, ... pp; 138-145
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“there is nothing in principle which precludes an employed or 
unemployed member of the working classes or an aristocrat, a city 
dweller or a peasant, a graduate, or someone ‘educationally challenged’ 
from being susceptible to fascist myth. Nor is the fascist mentahty 
exclusively the domain of men or of young..
It is of course possible that a certain movement could be supported by 
different parts of a society. There is no natural law that a member of a certain 
social group has to support a certain ideology. It is also quite possible that a 
businessman can support a socialist ideology.^® However, general tendencies of 
social groups are more explanatory than choices of a few individuals. As I will 
focus on in the following section, fascist parties and the МНР relies on a more or 
less similar, but not totally homogeneous power base composed of petty 
bourgeoisie, male, and young people.
Some other scholars stress on the psychological side of fascism. For 
instance, for Wilhelm Reich, fascism is "the basic emotional attitude of the 
suppressed man of our authoritarian machine civilization and its mechanistic- 
mystical conception of life."^' Like Reich, who aims at combining psycho­
analysis and Marxism, Erich Fromm studies the psychological grounds of 
fascism. In his view, normal people’s (unlike neurotic people’s) sado­
masochistic character constitute the human basis of fascism. He labels this 
sado-masochistic character of fascism as the ‘authoritarian character’.^ ^
Unlike Erich Fromm, other members of Frankfurt school deal with not 
only the ‘authoritarian personality’ aspect of fascism but also with the
Roger Griffin, “General Introduction, ...p;7 
A well-known fact is that Frederich Engels was a factory-owner.
51 Wilhelm Reich, 1970, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New York: Simon & Schuster; p: xiii. 
Eric Fromm, 1942, Fear o f Freedom, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p:141 
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capitalism, in which fascism emerged. They make distinction between emotional 
sources of fascism (fear and destructiveness) and those of democracy (eros). '^  ^
However, they add that psychological ground of fascism must be located within 
the historical context. For them ‘the modification of the potantially fascist 
structure cannot be achieved by psychological means only.’^  ^ In my view, as 
members of Frankfurt School propose, when historical context is taken into 
account, focusing on the psychological dimension of fascism provide us a better 
understanding of it.
In the second category, many of the Marxist scholars think that the 
general historical context of fascism is the capitalist system itself: despite their 
differences, Marxist scholars generally agree that fascism is a product of 
capitahsm. The famous dictum of Max Horkheimer (a member of Frankfurt 
School) exemplifies the Marxist understanding of fascism: "whoever is not 
prepared to talk about capitalism should remain silent about fascism. 
However, another Marxist scholar, Nicos Poulantzas believes that Horkheimer is 
completely wrong: According to him, ‘whoever is not prepared to talk about 
imperialism should remain silent about f a s c i s m . I n  his analyses of fascism, 
Poulantzas stresses on a supra-national context (uneven international relations) 
of fascism as well as capitalist crises in a country or in a nation state. The 
objection of Poulantzas depicts that among Marxist theoreticians there are very 
different conceptualisation of the relation between capitalism and fascism.
Theoder Adorno,, et all., 1950 The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper and Row, 
p:970 
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In the first chapter, I have mentioned the views of two Marxists scholars, 
Nicos Poulantzas’ and Ernesto Laclau’ whose works are crucial in understanding 
fascism. Poulantzas defines “fascism as a special regime form of exceptional 
state forms.”^^  He argues that in an analysis of fascism, one should consider 
“imperialist chain” and the uneven development of this imperialist chain. 
However, he also states that an economistic vision, which reduces the 
phenomenon of fascism into the economic relations among the international 
capitalist system cannot explain the specificity of fascism.According to him, 
the phenomenon of fascism is also related with certain political relations among 
the society. For example, in the process of fascist period, there emerges a 
representation crisis between the power bloc and traditional centrist parties. 
Furthermore, working class cannot impose its ideology over the society in that 
period. Although Laclau criticises the views of Poulantzas because of his class 
reductionism, both of them emphasised the importance of social context without 
employing an economistic vision. Furthermore, like Poulantzas, Laclau criticises 
those scholars who deal with the psychological side of fascism such as Fronun, 
Reich and Adorno.^’ And finally, both of them mainly depend on Gramsci’s 
analysis of fascism and hegemony.
Thus, Gramsci's analysis of fascism that combines both ideological and 
social sides of fascism may be useful in examining the МНР movement in 
Turkey. Gramsci defines fascism in quite diverse ways; sometimes it is labelled 
simply as an extreme form of a reaction of the bourgeoisie, other times as a
ibid p:8 
ibid p: 18
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E. Laclau, Ideoloji ve Politika...^^'. 89-93
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phenomenon peculiar to “backwardness of Italian culture”, still other times, as a 
petite bourgeois movement.^^ But, these different definitions of fascism in 
Gramsci do not refer to a theoretical inconsistency. Rather, it is generally related 
with the complex (and sometimes contradictory) character of fascism, especially 
in its earlier phase.
At first, he identified fascism “as the last show offered to the urban-petty 
bourgeoisie in the theatre of national life.”^^  However, a few months later, he 
saw the rural bourgeoisie as the backbone of fascism. For him, fascism firstly 
appeared in rural areas and then spread to the urban centres. In one of his 
articles, ‘The Two Fascisms’, written in 1921, he stresses the contradictory 
elements in the Fascist party that stem from the tension between the reactionary 
agrarian fascism and the reformist nationalism of urban fascism. "^* Earlier, he 
proposed that fascist reaction was just a form of capitalist violence for solving 
the crisis of “Bourgeois State". For restoration of the State, capitalism had to 
show its violent face, which was composed of legal repression and the illegal 
oppression of fascists. But, then he realised that fascism was more than a 
manifestation of state power. Both of these changes (fascism as a rural-oriented 
and extra-state phenomenon) indicate that the fascist movement could attract the 
mass support of rural and urban exploited classes. In other words, fascism could 
aspire to become a hegemonic ideology in the society.
The idea that fascism has started from rural areas led him to think that 
fascism has a deep root in the history of Italian society. In his writings, he
Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schester, l993,Gramsci and Italian State, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p:60
Alastair Davidson, 1977, Antonio Gramsci, Merlin Press & Humanities Press, p: 161
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stressed the violent and barbarous way of living and habit in the daily life of 
Italian people, in general. For example, he mentions that Italy has the highest 
number of homicides and a lower level of education. Thus, the violence, the 
arbitrariness and the destructiveness of the fascist movement have already been a 
part of cultural life of the Italian society. His analysis of fascism gives 
importance to both the irrational and the rationalist character of fascism.
In order to illustrate this, Gramsci argues that;
“Fascism is the name of the far-reaching decomposition of the state, and 
which today can only be explained by reference to the low level of 
civilisation, which the Italian nation has been able to attain in these last 
sixty years of unitary administration”.®^
Here, we can see two key aspects of fascism: backwardness of Italian 
culture and the weakness of the bourgeois state. In his analysis of the first source 
of fascism, he focuses on the mass psychology and common sense of the society 
as a part of Italian history.®® For the second source of fascism, he talks about the 
failure of Italian bourgeoisie in the construction of a strong bourgeois state. As a 
result of this fact, the Italian bourgeoisie can not control the violent activities of 
fascists.
Within the context of Turkish fascism, Keyder's definition is sensitive to 
the psychological and social side of fascism. According to Keyder, fascism is a 
reaction to social change that bears a threat for existing status structures and 
balances in this structure. It promises reversing this change and protecting old
Antonio Gramsci, ‘The Two Fascisms’ in Pre-Prison Writings, 1994, Cambridge:Cambridge 
University Press, p: 229
Paul Ransome, 1992, Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Press, p:95
Alastair Davidson, Antonio Gramsci, Merlin Press & Humanities Press, 1977, p:188
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values and symbols that are embodied within the social and cultural structure.^’ 
Therefore, fascism requires a certain degree of development of capitalism that 
involves political and social differentiation. In my view, fascism can also be 
defined as a socio-poMtical phenomenon that implies the phase or the situation of 
capitalist crisis in which the ultra-nationalist ideology becomes widespread and 
mobilises the masses. In this sense, the concept can be used for defining МНР 
movement since it signifies the mobilisation of ultra-nationalist ideology in a 
relatively developed capitalist country. However, hke other ultra-nationalist 
parties in Europe, within the context of post-cold war era, MHP’s discourse and 
political strategies has been redefined and redeployed so that one may use 
another concept, which implies similarities and differences with fascism. I think, 
the concept of neo-fascism is suitable to define the new outlook of МНР.
4.1.4. Neo Fascism
The rise of neo-fascist parties in Western context was widely reported for 
over fifteen years. Unexpected vote increase of Front National in France in 1983 
was the first alarm for the revival of neo-fascism in Europe.^^ Le Pen movement 
has been a kind of model for other neo-fascist parties in Western Europe. 
Following the French case, Italian and Austrian neo-fascist parties have 
increased sharply with the help of new strategies similar to those of Front
Çağlar Keyder, Türkiye'de Devlet...
As Davis Matas put it ‘the Front National was founded in 1972 but took off electorally in 
September 1983. Prior to its sudden electoral success, it was a splinter right-wing group, 
indistinguable from the others, with a membership in the neighbourhood of 500.’ David Matas, 
‘The Extreme Right in The United Kingdom and France’, in (Eds.) Aurel Braun and Stephen
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National. Although they could not achive such a big leap in elections, the neo- 
fascist parties of other European countries have been getting stronger in recent 
years. The rise of neo-fascist ideology is not confined to Western Europe. Not 
only in Eastern Europe and in Russia^^, but also in North America’“ neo-fascist 
ideologies have attracted considerable amount of people. In this sense, the rise of 
neo-fascism seems to be a global phenomenon.
Commentators of neo-fascism or right wing extremism tend to compare 
the situation of contemporary era with that of pre-fascist period. There are 
certain paralellisms between these two periods and groups of movements. In 
most of the countries, a resurgence of nationalism and ethnic hatred have 
coupled with economic difficulties (especially unemployment has become 
chronic even in Western European countries). In France, many writers including 
Jacques Juliard (title of his book was ‘This Fascism that is Coming’), Bernard-
Scheinberg, 1998, The Extreme Righ:Freedom and Security at Risk Oxford: Westview Press. 
p:91
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Henri Levy and Alain FinkieUcraut see close similarities between the situation of 
contemporary France and that of Weimar Republic.^’ For example, Levi writes 
that
“When I look through history for an analogue to this malaise, when I 
seek a precedent for the disarray that is descending on the democracies, I 
can think of one example: the Weimarian moment which Germany 
preceded the triumph of Nazism.”’^
However, according to Richard Wolin, there are important differences 
that preclude direct connotations between them, although neo-fascism has 
important ideological affinities with historical fascism.’  ^ First of all, none of the 
neo-fascist parties in the contemporary world has gained complete political 
power as old fascisms did. In other words, there are no neo-fascist regimes as 
these used to be fascist regimes. The neo-fascist parties have no electoral support 
as their ancestors and so, the new fascisms at best can be compared with proto­
fascist period of classical fascist movements.
Secondly, although the neo-fascist parties attach externe importance to 
extra-parliamentary organisations, today’s neo-fascist movements do not have 
mass para-military organisations.^"* On programmatic level, the neo-fascist 
parties have a shared tendency to emphasize parliamentary politics and plural 
democracy. Finally, the new fascist parties are laissez-faire oriented in terms of
Canada: Right Wing Extremism in a Peaceable Kingdom, (Eds.) Aurel Braun and Stephen 
Scheinberg, The Extreme Right:Freedom and Security at Risk Oxford: Westview Press. 
Richard Golsan, Introduction, (Eds.) Richard Golsan, Return of Fascism...^\\-2 
ibid p:2
Richard Wolin, “Designer Fascism...p: 48 
ibid p:48
91
their economic programmes, which sharply differs from the corporatist 
orientations of old fascisms.^^
Jill Irvine argues that one of the important differences between neo- 
fascism and historical fascism is the expansionist policy of the latter.
“Current neo-fascism and the extreme right have eschewed ... 
expansionist perspective [of historical fascism] in favour of what might 
be called the doctrine of ‘fascism in one country’ and their main 
preoccupation has been to achieve a ‘pure’ nation-state based on national 
exclusivity.’’^ ^
However, the democratic discourse and non-expansionist politics of neo- 
fascist parties do not constitute qualitative and clear distinctions between neo- 
fascism and old fascism. In essence, there were critical differences between 
earlier period of historical fascism (proto-fascism) and later periods of it 
(capturing political power, constituting fascist regime and the stabilisation 
period). For example, Renzo de Felice states that Mussolini government initially 
focused on internal politics and presented its external politics as a peace policy in 
international affairs.Expansionist policies of fascism were not clear in the 
proto-fascist period so as in today’s neo-fascist parties.
Moreover, expansionist desires are not very hidden in some neo-fascist 
movements. For example, the Italian neo-fascist party, the old MSI (and new 
AN) talks about Italy’s historical rights over certain lands of former
”  ibid p:49
Jill Irvine, “Nationalism and the Extreme Right in Former Yugoslavia”, in (Eds.) Luciano 
Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michelina Vaughan, 1995 The Far Right in Western and Eastern 
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Yugoslavia.’  ^Within Turkish context, the МНР has espoused imperial demands 
over Turkic republics and Musul Kerkuk region of Iraq in certain conjunctures. 
For example, during Gulf War, the МНР politicians talked about the National 
Pact boundaries, which includes Musul and Kerkuk. When the МНР members 
and politicians oppose Turanist view, they stress on the necessities on realpolitic. 
From the Turkish ultra-nationalist point of view, the long-term ideal of 
Türkçülük is a Turan state.’  ^As earlier ultra-nationalists, many ülkücüs mention 
that there are certain steps for reaching Turan state. For example, Baran Dural, a 
pro-MHP writer states that “Our nationalism, in the first step, depends on the 
indeependence of our slave lineages [Turkic Republics] and on the dominance of 
nationalist powers in Turkey and other Turkish Republics. We want to see 
Turkish nation as a morally and technically developed country. In reality, all 
Turkish nationalists are also Turanists.” °^ Since it is suggested as a long-term 
project, in Turkish political life the ultra-nationalist party do not emphasise on 
the Turan ideal but the target of being a developed country in the region.*'
Both expansionist policies and totalitarian politics of fascist regimes were 
not clear before they totally gained power. Not only Mussolini but also Hitler 
was quite ‘moderate’ throughout the proto-fascistic period. Robert Soucy points 
out that:
As an electoral politician between 1930 and 1933, Hitler promised to 
defend Christians, not to persecute them; to liberate workers, not to
Tanil Bora, Ekim 1994, “Avrupa’da Neo-faşizm”, Birikim, p: 34
Ziya Gökalp. “Türkçülük ve Turancılık” in Baran Dural. 1992. Milliyetçiliğe Parklı Bir Bakıç 
ve Turan İdealinin Doğuşu. İstanbul; Kamer yayınlan, p: 158
Baran Dural. 1992. Milliyetçiliğe Farklı Bir Bakış ve Turan İdealinin Doğuşu. İstanbul: Kamer 
yayınlan. Preface
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exploit them; to avoid war, not to start a war; to curtail Jews, not to 
exterminate them (in 1935 some Germans even regarded Hitler as 
“moderate” on the Jewish question).®^
Another popular definition for the newly emerging fascisms is post­
fascism. In recent years, readers have accustomed to read a statement such as 
Veith makes: “Today, modernism has become old-fashioned. We are in the post­
modern age.”^^  One the other hand, according to Dasenbrock, “we live in a 
culture that can be described more accurately as post-fascist than post-anything 
else.”*^"* Dasenbrock opposes those writers who celebrate post-modernism and 
identify it as an absence of totality and as a source of resistance to imperialism 
and fascism located in modernism. He writes
“For de Man, for Lyotard, for Jameson, today, the post-modern, the post­
structuralist safely removed from any association with fascism because 
we have developed a firm critique of modernism/fascism that clearly 
positions us on the far side. Unfortunately, as events of the last decade 
have revealed, it is not so easy.”®^
Furthermore, he adds that the term “post” implies a kinship rather than a 
break from the past**^  and argues that there may also be close connections 
between post-modernism and fascism. The words of Fini, the leader of Italian 
neo-fascist movement seems to support the argument of Dasenbrock:
“The social and economic model advanced by the fascist regime was 
everything but a liberal democratic model, but if today the Right defines
Robert J. Soucy, ‘The Debate Over French Fascism”... p; 138-9 
Gene Edward Veith, Modern Fascism...p: 126
Read Way Dasenbrock, Slouching toward Berlin: Life in a Postfascist Culture, in (Eds.) 
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London: University of Nebraska Press. p:255
ibid p:250 
“  ibid p:244 
ibid p:255
94
itself and is, as we defined ourselves and are, post-fascist, and if it fights 
not only for civil but also economic freedoms, it is self evident that the
·' o o
liberal democratic model is perfectly compatible.”
Schnapp identifies the metamorphosis of the MSI into the AUeanza 
Nazionale in 1994 as fascism’s ghostly afterlife.Thus, from Dasenbrock’s and 
Schnapp’s point of view, the rise of post-fascism is fascism’s return in a new 
form.^ "^
Tanil Bora defines this new phenomenon as “a fascism which exists with 
mediatic instruments, loose discourses in anonymous circles, and with 
provisional meetings rather than tight organisations.” The classical epoch of 
fascism was a period of disengagement in which problems of the emergence of a 
‘mass society’ has been experienced. In this chaotic environment, many people 
(especially the members of the lower classes) and their life domains had been 
sharply atomised. Nowadays, we are living in a period that is quite similar with 
that epoch. Binding elements of social identities and of communities that provide 
a state of belonging to the people are exhausting. The activities in post-fascist 
form of fascism (provisional meetings, loose discourses, new entertainment and 
media culture) do not tire the ‘little man’ whose life world is extremely 
fragmented. The main motor of classical fascism was the organisational 
apparatus, and the ordinary fascism of little man was just a ‘mass support.’
The collapse of the Soviet Union has led many to believe that capitalism 
and globalisation, at its present phase is the only possible way of living. *
** quated in Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Fascism after Fascism, in (Eds.) Richard Golsan, Fascism's 
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However, even those who support for the new phase of capitalism accept that it 
generates important problems. As McGrew puts it “globalisation tends on the 
whole to reinforce (if not to increase) inequalities of power and wealth, both 
between nation-states and across them, so reproducing global hierarchies of 
privilege, control and exclusion.”^^  The rise of global hierarchies of privilege, 
control and exclusion has provided a fertile ground for the rise of reactionary 
movements.
On the other hand, with the collapse of the communist system, like other 
fascist parties, МНР lost its main scapegoat. After this development, it was no 
more persuasive or ‘feasible’ to foUow an anti-communist political line. 
Therefore, at first sight, the collapse of communism and the break down of the 
socialist movement would seem to contribute to the weakening of the ülkücü 
movement. However, it seems that the disappearance of “communist threat” and 
marginalisation of revolutionary Leftist movement opened a way of articulating 
dominant ideologies under the Ifamework of its “positive” and non-reactionary 
political project.
In the following parts, I will try to exemplify in what sense the МНР is 
still a fascist party. The ideology and political strategies of this party has been 
constantly taking new forms throughout its political life. However, if a broad 
périodisation is necessary, one can divide the history of МНР ideology into two 
periods. Before 1980, its political strategies and ideology resembled to those of 
classical fascism, whereas considering the changes in its ideology and political 
strategy, the МНР deserves the adjective of neo-fascist in the 1990s. In the
Tanil Bora, ‘Sıradan Faşizm’:Yurttan Sesler, Birikim, 1995, p:79 
A. McGrew, A Global Society? p:76
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previous chapter, I focused on the transformation of the political strategies of the 
МНР in accordance with the politics of neo-fascism. In the following parts of 
this chapter, in order to reveal the fascist as well as neo-fascistic nature of iilkiicii 
movement, I will deal with the orientation of its followers, its exaltation of the 
nation and the state, its mobilisation of the masses, and its cult of the leader.
4. 2. Some Revealing Characteristics of fascistic 
ideologies and that of МНР
4.2.1. МНР and Its Followers:
Any fascistic movement and regime other than Italian fascism has not 
defined itself as fascism. Neither Germany’s Nazism nor Turkey’s ülkücülük 
accept their ideological and structural similarities with fascism. However, 
when we compare the Turkish case with the Italian case as an example of 
classical fascism, Gramsci’s analyses of fascism may help us to explain the 
pohtics of МНР. First, as in the case of Italian fascism, we can see the rural basis 
of МНР grassroots. Middle and Eastern parts of the country, where traditional 
economic, social and cultural relations are still prevailing, are the most important 
centre of МНР supporters. Secondly, the ideology of the МНР reflects and 
reformulates the fears, prejudices and the demands of the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie, who has lost their secure and stable economic position as a result of 
dramatic side effects of the penetration of capitalist relations into the traditional 
areas.
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In several volumes of the "'Birikim” before 1980, the Turkish Left
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intellectuals attempted to explain the class character of Turkish fascism. 
According to these analyses, the fascist movement in Turkey have been 
strengthening within the context of the reaction of Sunni’s to the Alevi 
immigrations to Sunni-based towns. This reaction is considered to be a response 
to the observable increase in Alevi’s economic and social welfare within the 
triangle of Erzurum, Gaziantep and Çorum. In 1980s and in 1990s, Kurdish 
(compulsory or voluntary) immigrations to the Mediterranean and the Aegean 
regions have led to similar reactions. The tradesmen, artisans, small-scale retailer 
or other components of the petty bourgeoisie of these regions have also engaged 
in a reactionary nationalism. Furthermore, the negative effects of globalisation 
process such as the increases in the economic differentiation, marginalisation and 
unemployment, on the discontentment of the lower and excluded classes feed the 
МНР ideology.
It is commonly argued that the nature of fascism can be understood with 
its reactionary (the politics of anti) character. It is not a coincidence that the 
politics of fascism relies on the destruction of the enemy or enemies rather than 
construction of a new order. Needless to say, the emphasis on the nation and the 
state may appear as a positive or non-reactionary element of the politics of 
fascism. However, even in its emphasis on the state and the nation, the feeling of 
protection against a threat is much more dominant in fascism than a vision of 
positive, constitutive political project. Therefore, for the МНР, the understanding 
of nationalism is a matter of being existent or non-existent since it mainly
’’ As an example, see Ömer Laçiner, Mayıs 1978, “Malatya Olayı-Turkiye’deki Faşist Hareketin 
Yapısı ve Gelişimi’ Birikim, and the special issues on ‘Maraş’tan Sonra’, Birikim December
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depends on protecting the nation and state against the external and internal 
enemies.
Throughout the historical development of fascism, we can observe that 
the main threat or enemy in fascist discourse was communism and the 
communists. In the politicization and activation of the reactionary masses into 
fascism, the rise of communist movements indicates a turning point. Before 
communist movements, there were also fascistic ideas or feelings, which 
sometimes had affected the political mentality of the society. Nevertheless, their 
political position was not more than an ideological current. With the rise of 
communist movement, fascistic ideas became much more effective in the 
political life, and their political position became more than a current; they 
became movements.
This was the case for the historical development of Turkish ultra­
nationalism, too. In the early Republican period, the activities of fascist currents 
(not movements) were limited to founding cultural organisations that would 
shape or influence the official ideology "^^ . Unlike fascist movements, these 
currents of thoughts tried to create a ‘trans-political’ image. Their ideologies 
were depending not only on a solidarist and corporatist but also on a Turkist and 
racist understanding. Because of their elitism, their political projects did not meet 
the expectations of Turkish masses; rather, those projects depended mainly on 
the campaigns or conspiracies at the level of state.^^
With the rise of communism as a political movement, fascism emerged as 
a counter-movement for protecting the totality of the nation and the state.
1978/January 1979.
Tanil Bora, Devlet,Ocak..., p:52
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Türkeş, in his memoirs, explain the place of the rise of Marxism at the 
foundation of the ülkücü movement:
‘Following 1968, an extremely active Marxist and separatist youth 
movement has begun. In our evaluation meeting in the party, we talked 
that only a more attractive ideology could overcome this separatist 
movement. Then, we discussed about which ideology could we use. We 
decided that Turkish nationalism could be the counter-ideology and that 
we should meet around this ideology, [my translation]
A recent empirical research by Mustafa Çalık performed in the less 
developed areas of Turkey states that the rise of fascist movement was mainly 
related with the rise of ‘communist threat’, which was then equated with atheism 
and immorality. In this survey, a great majority (% 81.5) of the ülkücüs stated 
that the danger of communism had strongly affected their joining the ülkücü 
movement. The extreme reactionary character of the followers of the МНР 
implies that they came from the traditional parts of Turkey that have been 
undergoing dramatic changes. Furthermore, most of the participants stated that 
the masculine discourse of the party and the manly image of Türkeş positively 
affected their opinion about the party.^^
The petty bourgeois, the unemployed, the young and the male social base 
is not a feature that is specific to МНР, other fascistic parties and movements 
have similar supporters. Many scholars mention these features of fascistic 
movements as crucial in their specific analyses. For example, in his essay on 
Front National, Christopher Flood states that “Polling more strongly men than
ibid p: 43
Hulusi Turgut, ‘Türkeş’in Anıları’...p: 400-1 
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women, the FN gets its most substantial support from owners of small business, 
self-employed artisans and other traders, clerical workers, manual workers and 
unemployed.”^^
On the other hand, Richard Wolin, in his comparison of historical fascism 
and neo-fascism argues that the social bases of classical fascism and neo-fascism 
are not the same. According to Wolin, “ Historical fascism was able to draw 
upon a fairly large middle-class electoral base: farmers and residents of small 
towns, proprietors of small business, the lower middle classes, and white-collar 
workers.” However, in contemporary age.
“The post-industrial society assumes an increasingly technocratic cast, in 
which positions of power and influence are occupied by elite possessing 
specialised knowledge or training. Correspondingly, it appears that, in 
major cases, those attracted to parties of the extreme Right are young 
men of lower -or lower-middle-class background whose prospects for 
upward social mobility appear bleak owing to lack of either education or 
suitable training. They are potential losers of post-industrial society.”*^
Although there is a difference, Wolin states that the social bases of both 
kinds of fascism composed of those whom he refers as the potential ‘losers of the 
modernisation process’ The followers of fascist parties tend to support 
patriarchal and traditional values. As Guibernau puts it: “The role conferred on 
women within fascist society was restricted to the production and rearing the 
children. Women were mothers and wives who had to look after the purity of the 
race.”''^  ^ The idea of Turkish ultra-nationalists about the role of women
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103completely complies with the claim of Guibernau: “Above all, Turkish asenas 
should be grew up as the mother’s of tomorrow. She must be calm, dignified, 
simple and devoted to her works. This fatherland do not require the girls who 
dance, dress or cook a cake well, but those say ‘my first duty is to grow up 
honourable sons and virtuous daughters for this fatherland.’’*®'* As a result of its 
masculine-based ideology, like other fascist movements*®  ^ the social base of the 
МНР is mainly composed of males. In a survey about the recent elections of 
April 18 1999, it is claimed that the 75% of all voters of the МНР consist of 
males and almost half of the first time voters who voted for the МНР were
males. 106
4.2.2 Myths of the Nation and the State
One of the most significant characteristic features of fascism is its 
dependence on certain myths, symbols and rituals. About myths, symbols, and 
rituals, fascism shares the same ground with nationalism. In his convincing 
study, Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined community.*®  ^
For the nationalists, nations are imagined since they can not know or meet their 
fellow members. A ‘national spirit’ or nation as a cultural artefact binds all 
members of nation. Therefore, myths, symbols and rituals play important role in
Female wolfs in the Central Asian Turkish mytology.
Nihal Atsız. Soğukkanlı, Vakur ve Vazifeşinas in Dilek Zaptçıoğlu. 14 May 1999. Asenanın 
Kızları-3. Yeni Yüzyıl.
In the German neo-fascist case, Kagedan states that “BfV statistics published in 1994 
characterize the militant right extremist category as consisting overwhelmingly o'" males (96% 
male vs. 4% female)” See, Ian Kagedan, “Extreme Right...p: 117
Tarhan Erdem, 19 April 1999, Radikal
Benedict Anderson, 1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Ongin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso
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this imagination process. From the point of fascism, not only the nation, but also 
the race and the state are loci of imagination.
In Turkish fascism, there are also some popular mytologies such as 
Bozkurt (Gray Wolf), Ergenekon, Asena, Kızıl Elma (Red Apple), Nizam-i Alem 
(The Order of the Universe) et cetera. Most of these myths comes from the so- 
called experiences of Turks in the Central Asia that is assumed as the original 
home of Turkish race. İn the words of a first generation ultra-nationalist. Zeki 
Velidi Togan, one can see the place of Gray Wolfs in ultra-nationalist ideology:
“Gray Wolf is the totem of the Turkish nation. Totem is a social symbol. 
The totem of Gray Wolf was understood differently in various Turkish 
societies. In the Göktürk society, the ancestor is the female wolf whereas 
it is male wollf for Uygurs. For the Oğuz society, the male wolf is a
national guide who leads the society in the great wars, [my translation]”
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The leaders of МНР and pro-MHP writers have always suggested that the 
Gray Wolf is the national symbol of the Turks. According to Türkeş, “Being an 
enemy of Gray Wolf is also being an enemy of Turkish nation. If being against 
Gray Wolf is because of being against the Turkish nation, then it must openly be 
declared and everyone has to state his position.”'®^ In his “Handbook of the 
Ülkücülük",^^^ Enver Yaşarbaş claims that Turkish people has strongly 
influenced by the way of life of the Gray Wolfs. In his view, Turks adopted not 
only the military tactics of Gray Wolfs, but also the family relations of them. In
Zeki Velidi Togan. 1996. “Bozkurt Efsanesi” in Cemal Anadol. Alparslan Türkeş, МНР ve 
BozJcurtlar. Istanbul: Kamer yayınlan p:32-39
Alparslan Türkeş. 1996. “Bozkurt Düşmam Olmak Türk Düşmam Olmaktır” in Cemal 
Anadol. Alparslan Türkeş, MHP ve Bozkurtlar. İstanbul: Kamer yayınları. p:40 
Enver Yaşarbaş. 1996.. İstanbul: Kamer yayınlan pp: 105-8
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his words, “Turks have strongly influenced by the family structure of this 
animal. For example, Gray Wolf live together with his child until its death. So do 
Turks. On the other hand, Cristians who eat pig meat and influence by the 
features of this animal expel their children when they are eighten.”" ‘
In ultra-nationalist mytology, while Asena is the female wolf that is the 
mother of Gdktiirks, a Turkish clan,**  ^Ergenekon is the heaven that is pursued 
by the Central AsianTurks** .^ Like these myths, the myth Red Apple derives 
from the experiences of Central Asian Turks. “An old Central Asian Turkish clan 
defeated by an enemy clan. The commander of the enemy clan was living in a 
silk tent that had a gold red apple on the top. Turks aimed at capturing that tent 
and determined this aim as the ideal of the clan. After this ideal had been 
achieved, Turks pursued other ideals... So, the ideal of red apple is the target that 
Turks want to achive.”**'' For many МНР nationalists, the gaining of political 
power is the Red Apple of Turkish people. Following its electoral success in 
1999, a pro-MHP columnist declares that '"Ergenekon is the salvated place and 
the tent of Red Apple of Turks. In the 18 April elections. Gray Wolfs reached 
Ergenekon again.”"^
While above mentioned myths originated from Central Asian Turks, the 
Nizam-i Alem derives from the religious ideas. In the view of ultra-nationalists, 
“Following the domination of Holy Koran and implementation of its principles 
in the whole world, the happiness will be spread all over the world. The idea
ibidp: 107
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Nizam-1 Alem must be the ideal of all iilkiicus."'^^  ^ As we can infer, all these 
ideals and myths depend on imperial feelings and racist visions.
In classical forms of fascism, the myth of race was founded on a 
biological ground. On the other side, new forms of fascism do not stress on a 
biological exaltation of their race. In several occasions, the leadership of the 
МНР claimed that their ideology is completely different than that racist 
ideologies. For example, these are the words of Turke§: ‘...we were born as 
Turkish, we are the sons of Turks, our nationalist mentality depends on the love, 
it denies racism. We are against racism” However, even in this speech that 
deny racism, one can find traces of an imagination of a common race (we are the 
sons of Turks...). Furthermore, biological racism is neither the only nor the 
worst form of racism. In neo-fascist parties, cultural racism has become 
dominant instead of biological racism. One appearence of cultural racism can be 
found in the concentric understanding of the world, which can also be found in 
Mussolini: ‘before I love the French, the English, the Hottentots, I love Italians. 
That is to say I love those of my own race, those that speak my language, that 
share my customs, that share with me the same history.’“ * Le Pen’s words 
perfectly fits Mussolini’s understanding: ‘I like my daughters better than my 
cousins, my cousins better than my neighbours, my neighbours better than 
strangers, and strangers better than foes.’**^Apart from race and nation, another 
sacred symbol and myth of fascism is the state. All fascist parties attach the state 
and the nation and their imagined unity almost a religious meaning and
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importance. In fact, such an exaltation of nation and state in fascism is closely 
related to its undersanding of politics. Neocleous defines the fascist emphasis on 
politics in the following words:
“For fascism, the crucial feature of modern order is political, the very 
sphere which Marxism and liberals are said to denigrate. For fascism, 
Marxism treats the political as an epiphenomenon of the economic, while 
liberalism treats it as mere night-watchman, overseeing a self-regulating 
civil society. The fascist response is to emphasise the political over the 
economic, to work, in effect, with a strong concept of the political, 
collapsing the state-civil society distinction and subsuming civil society 
under the state -nothing outside the state.”*^ °
This totalitarian view of fascism and ülkücülük sees the nation as a 
superior entity that unites the people and directs the individuals toward certain 
targets. These words of an ülkücü exemplify the understanding of the relation 
between the individual and the nation:
“ It is the nation that endows the individual with his true personality, his 
essence and character. Since it is the nation that gives the individual 
everything, and since the individual can not live outside of national 
society, it follows that the beginning, basis and foundation of everything 
is the nation.”’^ *
As it is clearly seen, individual is supposed to be assimilated into an 
organic totality that is to say into the concept of the nation. The totalitarian view 
of МНР had anti-capitalist discourse in its 1970s period. Its principle of 
toplumculuk (social-mindedness) had anti-capitalist connotations in those years. 
Alparslan Türkeş announced that the idea of ülkücülük contradicts with 
capitalism: “We defend the property. However, our view is different than
120 Mark Neocleous, Fascism.. .p:53
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capitalism” and “Nine Light refuses the National Socialism and fascism as 
well as Marxist socialism and capitalism. Fascism and National Socialism, as a
1 9^form of degenerate capitalism, are the reactionary dictatorships.”
Today, there are still some iilkiiciis who directly refuse the capitahst 
system.. Some pro-MHP writers such as Ahmet Ş a f a k and Ahmet Arslan 
argue that the most important enemy of the nationalism is the liberal capitalism 
in 1990s. However, all the speeches and publications of the МНР attempted to 
persuade the people that they completely support the ffee-market economy and 
capitalist system. At the beginning of 1990s, Türkeş openly declares that “Our 
economic understanding is hberal economy model that is called free-market 
economy and also implemented by all developed and developing countries... We
regard the foreign capital as one of the most important sources of technology,
1capital and foreign market in a rapidly globalised world.”
It can also be argued that the term social mindedness gained a new 
connotation throughout the 1980s and 19 9 0 s .L ik e  other neo-fascist parties, 
МНР has changed some of its ideological elements along the line of central right 
wing parties. Although the leaders of the party mention the previously accepted 
views about the importance of the social-mindedness, throughout the 80s and 
90s, this term is generally used in order to signify moralistic values, not state 
support for social and economic security. For example, the vice president of the
Kurt Karaca, “Milliyetçi Türkiye”, quated in M. Ali Agaoğullan,_"The Ultranationalist 
Right... p:l 17
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party. Rıza Müftüoğlu declares that “Our rulers must have social-mindedness in 
order to overcome moral decays. Therefore, all political parties must be sure that 
their candidates have social-minded views or not and prefer honest and decent 
people.”
Generally, it is accepted that the one of the most important features of 
fascist parties is their exaltation of state power. Although neo-fascist parties also 
exalt the notion of state, they support a small state from the economic point of 
view in accordance with their new laissez faire understanding. МНР claims that 
“Since the МНР emphasises the concepts of ‘strong power’ and ‘national state’, 
some attempt to equate it with fascism. However, according to fascism, state 
creates the nation and everything is for the state, whereas the state exists for the 
nation from the point of view of the MHP.” '^  ^Nevertheless, such a vision still 
exalts the state by putting the nation into the centre of its ideology. Therefore, 
this approach seems to comply with the neo-fascist vision.
Furthermore, one should take into account the double discourse of the 
neo-fascist parties. While the party espouses a more liberal and pluralist vision in 
its political appearance, its members support racist views in their so-called 
autonomous publications. The difference between the МНР web site and other 
web sites that support МНР is a good example of the double discourse within the 
ülkücü movement. While the party site argues that “Since Turkish nationalism is 
a cultural movement it refuses the racism”, the autonomous ülkücü site declares 
that “We have to be careful about our genetic structure! Look out the low
See, Ahmet Şafak. 1994. Yükselen Milliyetçilik ve Liberal İhanet. İstanbul; Kamer yayınlan. 
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peoples whom thirsty for blood! Armenians do not leave us in peace, and Moskof 
bluffs. Where are those who talk about the European Union? They are so foohsh 
that they cannot understand the necessity of the Union of Turks’’*^®
As a result, although the party has abandoned its Statist and corporatist 
views and adopted a neo-liberal position from the economic point of view, it still 
exalts the notion of the state and nation. It can be argued that other parties in 
parliamentary system give the state and nation great importance, too. However, 
under normal circumstances, Uberals or leftists do not adhere to the idea of 
sacred state that absorbs all the individuality of the members of society. On the 
other hand, in a fascistic discourse, the state and the nation are assumed to be a 
totahty that combines all the elements of the society in one circle. Furthermore, 
for fascist movements or parties, they are the real representatives of the nation. 
As a consequence of this view, the devotion of the nationalists for the greatness 
and protection of the nation is seen as a natural duty of them. Such a vision is 
also adopted by the МНР. In his defence in the МНР trial following the 1980 
coup, Mehmet Doğan, the vice president of the party declares that “A property 
owner pursues peace, silence, integrity and fraternity within the boundaries of his 
property. Since we regard ourselves as the real owner of this property of Turkish 
nation, we are against all sorts of terror and separatism. This is our natural 
mission.”'^ * However, following the 12 September 1980 coup, the situation of 
the “real owner of this property of Turkish nation” was not so favourable. Like 
other fascist movements, ülkücülük has mainly legitimised the unfortunate
http// www.mhp.org. МНР Tarihçesi.
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situation of its militants through the discourse of little man that I will focus on 
the following section.
4.2.3 Mobilising Masses throjugh the Discourse o f ‘‘Little Man”
Without a mass support racism remains to be a version of ultra­
nationalism. However, one of the typical features of fascism is its strong appeal 
and the mobilisation of the masses. Nevertheless, another important feature of 
fascism seems to contradict with the former feature: fascism never allows the 
complete embodiment of the energy of its supporters. Fascist movement 
supplies an imagination of native, fair and honest authority instead of the 
existing authority blamed as immoral, hypocritical and alien to the society. With 
this imagination of fair authority, it provokes and organises the ‘blind hatred’ 
(black energies) of the lower, subordinated masses and, thus attracts the ‘httle 
man.’ However, fascism always put limits and boundciries to this ‘little man’. 
This little man is praised for his deficient, weak and oppressed position but is not 
led for a political activity attempting to change this situation.
This term of ‘little man’ is used by Wilhem Reich, to make 
psychoanalysis of the fascistic personality. According to him, fascism attracts 
the little man by stressing on his or her weakness. It does not challenge or talk 
about the conditions, which produce this weakness; rather it normalises and 
naturalises his or her position. The ordinary man remains little and weak. 
Furthermore, his individuality is melted into the state or nation as a huge and
'^ “Tanıl Bora, “Sıradan Faşizm”:.,.p:78
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sacred organism. In this sense, on the one hand, he became a part of a great 
community, and on the other hand, he became more little than earlier vis-a-vis 
the state and the nation. Particularly with the disappointment of the state’s 
oppression on the idealist militants after 12 September 1980 military take-over, 
there emerged a fruitful discourse on Grey Wolfs as ‘little men’ who were 
arrested and punished by the state they adored. They were the real sons of this 
state and nation; but the father slapped the son when the son was trying to kiss
his hands. 134
Especially in the 1980s, many idealists directly attacked the existing 
Turkish State. In these years, many novels or memoirs that express the harsh 
treatments and tortures of the military regime were published. Remzi Çayır, as an 
ülkücü militant, express that the harsh treatment of Turkish state over the ülkücü 
community began even before 1980 coup. “We are tortured, crushed while we 
want to serve. There is no state. People are continuously dying. Our community 
whose parents are Muslims has been used as a tool.”*^  ^ However, this 
disappointment and friction with the state did not led ülkücü community a radical 
interrogation of state authority. Exaltation of little man by equating him with the 
state has been the dominant solution of this paradox of ülkücüs with the state. In 
the novel of Çayır, when the ülkücüs in the prison discuss, one of them declares 
that “ State and us are not distinct. We know that the state is the same with our
For more information about the disappointment and contradictory feelings of idealist writers 
after 1980 coup d’etat, see, Tanil Bora, Devlet, Ocak,... pp: 101-146
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existence. Nation is state; state is nation. One cannot exist without the other. The
1founder of the state is the nation. And nation is we.”
A recent writing of Beçir Ayvazoglu is a good example of the exaltation 
of the oppressed little (but, in reality, they are big men because of their little 
position, according to him) idealist men after the ‘unjust behaviour’ of the 12 
September 1980 regime and state towards them. He idealises and mystifies 
disappointed idealists in such a way:
‘They were all pure, young men. They were not Just lovers of the country 
but rather melancholic lovers of their country. If you could persuade 
them that they are the enemies of the Turks and the Turkishness, they 
would defy even against the mountains. At last, they were beaten by the 
State for which they fight. It was natural, the state could both love and 
beat; both its kindness and unjust treatment were nice. They (Grey wolfs) 
were crushed, they were oppressed, and they were despised. Despite 
these facts, when the state appoints them for a duty, they would forget 
everything and devote themselves for that duty again... [my 
translation]”*^ ’
As it is clearly seen, Ayvazoğlu exalts the oppressed ülkücüs because of 
their weak position and their blind engagement with the state. While the ülkücü 
masses are seen as an active part of politics (make your duties for the protection 
of state), it is proposed that the energy of little men must be limited for the sake 
of the state (forget everything including the oppression of the state!).
How can the state control and limit the demands of the ülkücüs? I think, 
Yeal Tamir’s diagnosis about the psychology of nationalists is quite meaningful 
to understand the process. According to Tamir, nationalists identify interests of
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individual with that of the s t a t e . I n  the nationalistic vision, state represents the 
conununity of the fate. It seems that Tamir’s diagnosis for nationalists is also 
true for ‘the iilkUciis’. As the words of Ayvazoglu implicitly imply, when the 
state and dominant bloc could persuade the iilkiicus that it is necessary for the 
fate of the state and the nation, they would even deny themselves. In this sense, 
an idea of the homogeneous interests of the state and the nation lead iilkiicUs to 
identify themselves with the state and the dominant ideologies.
4.2,4 The Cult of the leader
Fascist parties lack organicity between upper cadres and their power 
base. In other words, they have a gap or an angle between the cultivated fascism 
of the leadership and the pure reactionary radicalism of the base.*^  ^Whilst fascist 
parties seek to activate the blind hatred and reactionary feelings of the lower 
classes, they have to limit the activities of these members since they need to have 
organic relations with the upper classes, too. One of the most distinguishing 
features of fascist parties is their strict and hierarchical organisational structure. 
In Turkish public opinion or imagination, МНР has also a tough and strong 
image. Moreover, in various speeches of its leader and other members of МНР, 
we may find an exaltation and even obsession about military discipline. The 
triple of leader-organisation-doctrine is a famous formula of the party. In 
Tiirke§’s words: “ A political party, first of all, is a big organisation. We call
Yeal Tamir. 1993. “Pro Patria Mori! Death and the State”,in Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: 
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leader-organisation-doctrine. We have to obtain a discipline and maturity, which 
the formula require.”*'^ *^
However, Bora and Can oppose the view of the strict and strong 
organisation of МНР. According to them, specificity of МНР among other 
fascist parties is their inorganic and extremely reactionary s t r uc tur e . I n  their 
view, in spite of disciplinary obsession of its leadership, the structure of the party 
is quite weak. Because of this organisational weakness and large gap between 
leadership and its base, the state and the dominant bloc of Turkey could easily 
direct the party, especially before 1980. Another implication of this 
organisational inorganicity was the more remorseless and violent nature of its 
reactionary pohtics in comparison to other fascist movements. Yet another result 
was its marginalisation in parliamentary politics. Centre-right parties could 
attract the votes of nationalist-conservative people with their stronger political 
organisation.
In the analysis of Can and Bora, the real nature of leader-organisation- 
doctrine corresponds to the triple of “devlet-ocak-dergah."^‘^~ Almost all-fascist 
movements have a tension between the mature fascistic discourse and politics of 
leadership and reactionary radicalism of the grassroots. However, in other fascist 
movements, there were some political-ideological mechanisms that can articulate 
these different elements. The specificity of ülkücü movement lies, the argument
Alparslan Türkeş. “Teskilatli Calismamizin Esaslari,... p; 196 
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where they organise; Dergah: building or place where a dervish group meets and receives the 
doctrine.
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goes, in its inability to constitute such kind of mechanisms because of their mass 
dynamics and the structure of the leadership.
I have some doubts about the argument that the МНР is not a well- 
organised and strict party. If we follow Gramsci’s concept of organicity, any 
fascist party is not inunune from the problem of inorganicity because of 
contradictory interests of the leadership and its bases. In their proto-fascist 
period, German and Italian fascism also had a problem of heterogeneous power 
base. In both historical cases, during the stabilisation process of fascist regimes, 
there emerged bloody confrontations.The cult of leader is a solution or a 
necessity for congenital inorganicity of fascist parties. In the “Handbook of the 
Ülkücü”, Enver Yaşarbaş describes the ülkücü leader; “Whatever the number of 
the members in his control, a leader must be contact with a relatively small group 
personally, intensively and regularly. He should trust in only this small group for 
the realisation of his intentions.”
In fact, the hierarchical relations between the leader and the rest existed 
in all fascist parties as well as in МИР.'“*^ In 1969 congress, the party accepted a 
new regulation, which was to enlarge the authority of Türkeş over the 
organisation and institutionalise a strict hierarchical structure in the party. МНР 
members and ülkücüs define Türkeş as a charismatic leader. In their view, “In 
the ülkücü movement, the devotion and faithfulness to Başbuğ Alparslan Türkeş
As Poulantzas puts it, poor peasants and rural and new petty bourgeoisie were victims of 
fascist regimes. N. Poulantzas, Faşizm ve Diktatörlük....p:266
Poulantzas states that fascism eliminates its power bases in stabilization period by using force. 
Ibid p:66-7
Enver Yaşiubaş. Ülkücünün Elkitabi...p\16
Neocleous connotes the leadership cult of fascist party with its common ground with religious 
understanding. When he analyses Italian case, he states that ‘the leadership cult.. .assumes the air 
of religious devotion-the fascist leader being analogous to the Pope in the Catholic Church- and
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who is our natural leader derives from his militaristic origin and nationalist spirit
and consciousness. ,147 Türkeş also compares the party relations with the
military structure and sees himself as the commander of the idealists. He claims 
that he is the only founder and owner of the idealism. For example, when he 
attacked the Islamist-idealists, he said:
‘They publish some magazines. There, they attempt to define and 
interpret ‘ülkücülük’. How could you define and interpret ‘ülkücülük’I 
The man, who plans the honourable movement called ‘ülkücülük’, writes 
its book, determines its targets has not die yet. He is living, [my 
translation]
As other fascist parties, МНР mainly relied on repression, military 
discipline and fear. Because of this feature, quitting fascist parties is much 
difficult than quitting other parties. The words (or the order) of Türkeş exemplify 
and reveal how and why it is a problem to leave the party: “Shoot anyone who 
turns from the cause. Shoot me if I turn from the cause”.
In fascist parties, the leaders have their special titles. For instance, Türkeş 
was identified as “Başbuğ' (leader), the new leader of the party. Devlet Bahçeli 
is now called “îlteber Devlet" (Chief of the state). Furthermore, the 
inorganicity between the party basis and the leadership still exist. The members 
of the party believe that the decisions about the future of the party totally depend 
on Bahçeli. The words of a pro-MHP writer about the future orientations of the 
party after the 18 April elections prove this fact: “What will the МНР do after
expulsion from the public life and thus the equivalent of excommunication.’ Mark Neocleous, 
Fascism,...p: 15
Enver Yaşarbaş. Ülkücünün El Kitabi...p:S5
Alparslan Türkeş. 1995. in Cemal Anadol, Alparslan Türkeş, МНР ve Bozkurtlar, Istanbul: 
Kamer Yayinlari p: 197
quoted in Suat Parlar. Osmanlıdan Günümüze... p:297
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this success. Only and merely the new Leader of the МНР and ülkücü 
movement, Dr. Devlet BAHÇELİ DECİDES'^^ about this.”*^^
Although the cult of the leader still exists, the new leader of the МНР, 
Devlet Bahçeli is presented in a more democratic manner. In the publications of 
the party, it is written that: “As an outcome of the development of pluralist and 
participatory democracies, principals, who are open to dialogue, conciliationist 
replaced the charismatic leader type in the political life.”*^  ^The political strategy 
of МНР have been changing even before the death of Türkeş, and this change 
has continued after election of Bahçeli as the leader of the party. The words of a 
pro-MHP colunmist openly signify the new conciliationist strategy of the МНР: 
“МНР will attract the Turkish nation by its sober, tolerant and conciliationist 
attitude as it has done before. After this election [1999 election], I understood 
why Türkeş, as a great specialist of strategy, behave as such in the 1995 
election.”*^'* This kind of change in discourse is in fact in accordance with the 
new-look of other neo-fascist parties.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the distinguishing points between fascism 
and neo-fascism was that the latter mainly does not depend on para-military 
organisations. Appearently, the organic relations of the МНР with ülkü ocakları 
(idealist hearths) invalidate the neo-fascist position of the МНР. However, one 
should also take into account the changing function and situation of the ülkü 
ocakları in 1990s. Until the 1980 coup, the idealist hearths were paramilitary
МНР Ar-Ge Kültür Araştmnalan Grubu. 1999. Kültür Politikaları. Ankara: Sargın Ofset.
p: 16
The capital letters exist in the original text.
Metin Kaplan. July 1999. “18 Nisan 99 Seçim Sonuçları Üzerine Bir Talılil Denemesi” Ülkü 
Ocakları Dergisi p:60
Nevzat Ergin Kumandaş. Şubat 1999. Bilgi Çağında Demokrasi. Çare, p: 55 
Baki Dökme. 20 April 1999. “MHP İktidan”. Ortadoğu
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organisations of the party. From late 1960s to 1980, its function was to educate 
young people in a military manner and provide the means to fight. On the 
other hand, it was impossible to maintain a paramilitary organisation within the 
condition of 1980 military regime. Fruthermore, the MHP’s recent attempt of 
lessening the number of ülkü ocakları and re-arranging the remaining ones’^  ^
implies a break from its classical form. Right now, idealist hearts performs the 
function of political education and recruitment. In this sense, while these 
organisations were at the core of the civil war strategy of the МНР before 1980, 
they lost their central importance in the election-based strategy of the party. As a 
consequence of its election-based strategy, the party mainly employed a 
discourse that depends on plural and liberal democracy. МНР, like other neo- 
fascist parties, is a pragmatist party. So, its discourse on democracy and 
pluralism is not an indispensable part of its ideology, rather a necessity of 
rhetoric, which helps to enlarge its appeal and to advance its ideology with 
regards to hegemonic relations within Turkish society. I will turn to this issue in 
the following chapter.
AP Hükümetinin 1970’de Hazırlattığı МНР Raporu, 1997, Ülkücü Komando Kampları, 
İstanbul: Kaynak yayınlan p: 289 and Ömer Tanlak, 1996. İtiraf: Eski Ülkücü MHP 'yi Anlatıyor. 
İstanbul: Kaynak yayınlan p:78
Faruk Bildirici. 21 April 1999. MHP Tarihi. Hürriyet and Tami Bora. 25 April 1999.
MHP’nin Patlaması. Radikal
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Chapter 5
Situating the МНР: Hegemonic Relations and Struggles
As Poulantzas states, there always exists more than one dominant ideology in 
a social formation.* In other words, there is not a regularly functioning ideological 
framework of dominant ideology, but a combination of ideological sub-sets. 
Following Poulantzas view, it can be argued that there has been more than one 
dominant ideology in Turkish context. In my opinion, Islamism, Kemalism and New 
Right have become important constituents of ideological subsets of Turkish power 
bloc in the 1980s and 1990s. All these ideologies have close yet tense relations with 
the ultra-nationalist ideology, I will focus on in the following sections.
Needless to say, all these ideological sub-sets have quite complex and 
problematic relations among themselves. As a matter of fact, Kemalism has been the 
official ideology of the state throughout the Turkish Republic. Because of its 
Westernist ground, the Islamist ideology that has interrogated the Western values was 
excluded from the state ideology until the 1980s. Following the 12 September 
military regime, Islam and New Right ideology has become other constituents of 
dominant ideology in Turkey. Furthermore, within the context of the process called 
globalisation, Kemalist ideology and its nationalism has been challenged by various
Nicos Poulantzas, Faşizm ve Diktatörlük... p:76
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movements and currents of thoughts. Especially in 1990s, Kurdish movement and 
Islamist movement, which interrogate Kemalist nationalism have gained large bases 
among the society. Furthermore, the liberal writers initiated a debate over the Second 
Republic by criticising “the anti-democratic structure of the Turkish State and 
Kemalist principles.”^
In 1990s, not only Kemalism but also neo-liberalism has been in a crisis. 
Unlike Kemalism case, there has not been any powerful challenge against neo-liberal 
principles during this period. However, it is quite clear that central-right parties 
whose main ideology was neo-liberalism dramatically weakened in 1990s. Although 
there is no influential attack against neo-liberalism, it is not so much credible and 
appealing among the people as in the middle of 1980s because of the intensification 
of negative effects of globalisation such as unemployment, job insecurity, great 
inequality in income distribution et cetera. There are numerous essays, which 
emphasise the negative effects of global capitalism on the rise of neo-fascism in 
European context.“* In this study, I argue that the crisis of neo-liberalism as a result of 
above-mentioned effects of globalisation has influenced the rise of МНР in Turkey. 
Ironically, these neo-fascist parties never challenged the neo-liberal policies. It seems 
that the ambivalent position of neo-liberalism (while there is no powerful opponent, 
it is no more an attractive ideology) has contributed to the progression of neo-fascist 
parties.
In the context of Turkey, Islamist view was able to attract the excluded and 
atomised people by the globalisation process in 1990s. In Fuat Keyman’s words:
 ^Ash Özgür Peker attempts to show tlie links between the crisis of Kemalist nationalist identity in 
contemporary Turkey and globalisation process. See, Ash Özgür Peker, 1997, Situating the Question 
of National Identity, unpublished master thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University.
Mbid p:81
' Some of them, Robert Soucy “The Debates over French Fascism”. ..p: 47-8, Elliot Neaman, “Ernst 
lunger’s Millennium,” p:.238, and Read Way Dasenbrock, “Slouching in the Berlin... p:256-7-8
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“Islamic discourse acted successfully as an articulating principle of resistance to such 
uncertainty by identifying ambivalence with global modernity and certainty with 
community, that is with a turn to religion.”  ^ The Welfare Party (RP) as the 
representative of Islamist movement became the first party in 1995 elections. 
However, the party was closed and successor party, the Virtue Party (FP) has 
modified its radical Islamist discourse. In the 1999 elections, the votes of this party 
lost to a great extent. Its modification of radical discourse and the failure of the 
Virtue party in the last elections demonstrate that Islamist ideology is in a crisis.
However, the decrease of Islamist movement does not signify the end of the 
effect of Islam within the political life of Turkey. In fact, Islamist movement was 
only one part of the politicitation of Islam. As I mentioned earlier, Islam has become 
a part of dominant ideology following the 1980 coup. Although it has never been an 
official ideology of the state, the 1980 military regime promoted the Islamist views in 
1980s. Furthermore, the influential position of Sunni Islam in Turkish political and 
social life has determined the political strategy of most of the political parties. МНР 
also, widely employed Islamist ideology in order to attract the mass support. In the 
following sections, I will examine the relations of МНР type politics with dominant 
ideologies one by one.
5.1. МНР and Islam:
In the process of politicization of ultra-nationalist thoughts (or in a process of 
becoming a fascist movement out of ultra-nationalist currents), the Turkist and racist
 ^Fuat Keyman, “On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of 
Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Tukrey.” New Perspectives on Turkey. Fall 1995, 
p:113
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character of earlier ultra-nationalism was not enough. Furthermore, these pure racist 
elements became an obstacle in the penetration of the ultra-nationalism into the 
masses. For example, in this pure racist ideology, Islam was seen as an importation 
of Arabic culture so that the real Turks should reject. In Turkish society where Islam 
is an important constituent of conimon sense, these kind of anti-Islamic ideas would 
be a real obstacle in the process of the penetration of fascism into large parts of the 
Turkish society.^
From the point of view of Turkish racism, Islam was perceived as an 
expansionist ideology of Arab race as communism was deemed to be a cover for
n
Slavic imperialism. However, during the seventies, the dominant discourse in fascist 
circles represented in the МНР was equating communism with anti-religious ideas. 
1969 Adana Congress of Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) was a turning 
point for the Turkish fascist movement. In this congress, the party has changed its 
name into the Nationalist Action Party. The struggle was between the pure racist 
leader Nihal Atsız who was also against Islam and Alparslan Tiirke^who was closer 
to Islamist nationalism.® After Türkeş became the leader of the party, the discourse of 
the party has changed, so that the МНР could unify the various reactions in an ultra­
nationalist line by stressing on the traditional values of Turkish society.
Islam is still the most important element of “common sense” within Turkish 
culture. In this respect, as a response to the dramatic capitalisation process 
particularly in traditional areas and also to official Kemalist ideology, which is 
secular and modern, Islam has become a radical ideology. However, the МНР was *
 ^Apart from anti-Islamic views, Atsız and other Turkists, were defining Kurdish people as an enemy, 
who must be destroyed. Türkeş states tliat the views o f Atsız constitute on obstacle for penetrating into 
Turkish society (Türkeş also claims that these views were non-scientific). Hulusi Turgut, "Türkeş 'in 
Anıları p:414
 ^M. Ali Agaoğullari, "The Ultranationalist Right", ...p: 211
* Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Ah! O eski ülkücü\er. . .p: 180
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not alone in capturing the Islamic common sense of conservative voters. In fact, 
Islamist parties (before 1980, MNP and MSP; after 1980 RP and FP) have always 
been MHP’s most important adversary, as they shared common pool of potential 
grassroots members. Throughout their history, ultra-nationalist (МНР) and Islamic 
parties (MSP, RP or FP) have competed with each other to attract the votes of 
reactionary groups in Central and Eastern Anatolia. Besides, there is a class 
dimension to these traditional-nationalist groups. In the 1970s, while middle class 
medium-scale entrepreneurs seeking ‘development’ supported the MSP, “older” 
middle class members, which were in the process of becoming proletarian, gave their 
votes to the МНР.  ^ In 1977, during the economic crisis, a significant part of the 
middle and upper classes in Central and Eastern Anatolia, shifted their voting support 
away from the MSP towards the МНР. Because of this process, and of the apparent 
Islamic discourse of the МНР, the MSP lost a large number of votes in the 1977
elections. 10
In the 18 April 1999 election, a similar process has happened. RP/FP 
represents the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie called the 'Anatolian Tigers'. On the other 
hand, the МНР attracts the lower-middle class, proletariat, lumpen-proletariat, 
unemployed and under-class votes of Central and Eastern Anatolia. It mainly reflects 
the reaction and hatred of the 'poor of the provinces' against 'the center', 'the big 
bourgeoisie', the Westernised intellectuals, and the media* ^  According to Bora, in the 
1995 election, the МНР was unable to receive the votes of these newly found 
grassroots because of its overemphasis on liberal values, and therefore de-emphasis
’ Tanil Bora, “Zifiri Karanlık..., p:18
Ali Yasar Saribay also explains the fall of MSP in 1977 elections according the rise of МНР in 
those regions. See, Ali Yasar Saribay, Türkiye'de Modernleşme... p: 165 
" Tanil Bora, Zifiri Karanlık...p; 18
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on Islamic values, by Alparslan Tiirke§. After the election of Bahçeli as the party 
leader, the МНР could begin to attract new grassroots members and consoUdate its 
organisation by emphasising traditional values.
The close relation of the МНР with Islamist-oriented, traditionalist sections of 
the country has been one of the most important tensions between the МНР 
nationalism and Kemalist nationalism. On the other hand, the ideological orientations 
of 1980 military regime opened the way for МНР in articulating Kemalism and 
Islamic views. Changing meaning of Kemalism as a state ideology in 1980s helped 
for transcending an important paradox for the МНР before 1980. After 1980 period, 
the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was put on the agenda as a method of neutralising 
these “separatist” political movements. According to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, 
there was a close connection between the pre-Islamic Turkish way of life and Islamic 
civilisation. Due to the similarities between certain Turkish and Islamic values, such 
as monotheism, emphasis on the family, justice and morality, Turkish people became 
the natural soldiers of Islam .D esp ite  the regime’s identification of itself with 
Kemalism, the military rulers believed in the necessity of the instruction of religious 
values so as to decrease the effects of anti-systemic ideologies over the minds of 
Turkish уотЬ.'"* However, the regime was also opposed to radical Islamism, and 
declared that religious education must not be in the hands of ‘irresponsible people’ 
who are outside the control of the state. The curriculum of all primary and 
secondary schools were made to conform to that of the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.’ 
The Turkish Islamic Synthesis was propagated and supported by the regime. For
'^bid  p;17
Eric J. Zürcher, 1993, Turkey: A Modem History, London:Tauris, p: 303
Hugh Poulton, Top Hat,,... p; 181 
ibid p: 181
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example, many members of the Hearth of the Enlightened (Aydınlar O c a ğ ı ) where 
the synthesis has emanated, were appointed to important positions within the 
institutions of the education and culture- TRT (National Radio and Television 
Broadcasting), YÖK (Board of Higher Education) university rectorships, and the 
ministry of Education. Although Islamism was still seen as a threat to the integrity of 
the state, the penetration of Islam into the political centre of Turkey was a result of 
the above-mentioned political developments.*’
The contradiction between Kemalist nationalism and Islamic traditionalism 
within the МНР was not only an issue of ideological conflict. Such a contradiction 
also had a class dimension. As a matter of fact, most of the parties in a parliamentary 
democracy do not possess a complete and coherent ideological structure that reflects 
the interests of all social groups they claim to represent. In addition, the heterogenous 
structure of political parties is more problematic in fascist parties than in other 
parties. Fascist parties discursively address themselves to the lower classes, but on 
the other hand, no fascist party has been able to break its close connections with the 
upper classes.**
Although some theoreticians see the heterogenous structure of fascist parties 
as a proof of the extra-class character of fascism, *^ as Poulantzas shows in his 
analyses of fascism, there are close relations between phases of fascism and class
The Hearth of Enlightened (AO) was established by a group of rightist academicians in 1970 against 
the growing of leftist ideologies especially in the universities. AO was, in fact, an extension of the 
club of Enlightened (Aydinlar Kulubu) founded in 1962. The aim of both of the organisations were to 
strengthen the right-wing nationalist ideology vis-a-vis leftists. The first chair of the AO, Ibrahim 
Kafesoglu, was the person who formulated the Turkish-Islamist Synthesis. See, Hugh Poulton, Top 
//izi,...p:180 
■’ ibidp: 185
Blinkhorn states that after Mussolini contact with Milanese wealties, Italian fascist party gained 
power in an extremely short period see Martin Blinkhorn, 1984. Mussolini and Fascist Italy, New 
York: Routldge, p;17
As I mentioned in the third chapter, writers who take fascism as a generic phenomenon (Roger 
Griffin, Stanley Payne, Juan Linz...) emphasize this view.
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struggle within the fascist parties.^® According to Poulantzas, fascism in its first 
period of establishment has heterogenous class bases. However, later in the period of 
stabilisation, the process of the elimination of lower class begins.^*
When we look at the MHP’s power base, the heterogeneity of its power base 
is related with its proto-fascist position. In proto-fascist period, while fascist party 
attempts to penetrate into urban and wealthier sections of society, it mainly depends 
on rural or provincial regions. Gramsci explores the contradiction between rural 
fascism and urban fascism in Italy in its rising period.^^ Likewise, Tanil Bora made a 
distinction between the Central Anatolian supporters of the МНР and the Aegean and 
Mediterranean supporters of the MHP.^^ While the former type of supporter 
represents a more traditional, Islamic and rural fascism, the latter implies more racist, 
secular and reactionary fascism. For example, when МНР allied itself with the 
Islamic RP (Welfare Party) in 1991, the traditional and Islamic areas of Central 
Anatolian have supported this alliance. However, the secularist and Pan-Turkist 
sections in the grassroots organisation showed same hesitation about this alliance. In 
his evaluation of the 1994 election results. Bora argued that there are two branches, 
one of which provided an increase of МНР with RP, and the other was unrelated with 
RP.^ '^  The first branch geographically flows from Middle Anatolian and is fed by the 
traditional Islamic and conservative values of Turkish people. In this region, both 
parties' emphasised traditional Islamic values to attract the votes of people who react 
against modernisation and capitalisation. Most of these conservative peoples are 
peasants or tradesmen, artisans, small-scale retailers or other components of the 
petite bourgeoisie in towns.
Nicos Poulantzas, Faşizm ve Diktatörlük...p:65 
ibid p:66
A. Gramsci, Pre-prison Notebooks... pp:227-230
Tanil Bora, 1995, “İki МНР”, in 'Milliyetçiliğin Kara Bahan ’, İstanbul:İletişim yay. p;310-4
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On the other hand, the rise of the МНР in the Aegean and Mediterranean 
regions was a result of a different set of dynamics. In this area, the МНР gains votes 
by using a modern, secular and, at the same time, racist discourse. The МНР accused 
the RP (or now FP) of abusing religion and thus used a similar argumentation as 
those of Kemalist and secularist circles. In recent years, the dominant discourse of 
the МНР was secular and racist face. Following the increase in tension over the 
Kurdish question, the МНР has identified itself with the mission of struggling against 
the terrorist and separatist movements. While it has found many supporters among 
the military members who fought against the PKK in the South East region, the party 
has also attracted people who live in sub-metropolitan provinces like Adana, İçel, 
Antalya, Manisa and Balıkesir. The common feature of these cities is the presence of 
intense Kurdish immigration. Following this war-related immigration, there emerged 
distinctly Kurdish quarters in those regions. In Adana, the proportion of those who 
voted for the МНР in the last three elections has increased considerably: 6.1%, 18%, 
and 24.7%. Similarly in İçel and Antalya too, in the last three elections, increases in 
the votes of the party were also significant, being respectively: 4.7%, 14%, 32% and 
2.8%, 13%, 22.3%^^. In these cities, where the demographic structure is 
cosmopolitan in nature, it is often the struggle over the availability of rental property 
that sets people apart according to their ethnic identities.A part from the petty 
bourgeoisie, the increase in Kurdish immigration and the economic cost of the 
military expenditures in the Southeast region leads wealthier classes to join the 
nationalist wave.
To sum up, from the point of МНР, although Islam has been a tool for 
mobilising the reactionary masses, the employment of Islamist discourse has created
ibid p:293
Radikal, 20 Nisan 1999
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a problem in penetrating into the state ideology. However, the integration of Islam 
into the state ideology in the 1980s has modified the tensions between Kemalism and 
Islam. In 1990s, for the МНР, espousing a modern and an Islamist discourse 
simultaneously has become easier. Still, it is a fact that the party emphasises Islamist 
and traditional views in the provincial regions, whereas it emphasises a laicist and 
modern discourse in the urban areas. Apart from this double discourse, the very loose 
discourse of the party has been another successful strategy to influence the Islamist 
grassroots. In its election brochures, the party calls out to the voter that
“You became pessimistic! Will there be again 28 February’s? Will the 
democracy be again wounded? Is it again humanistic tragedies in the doors of 
universities? Is it again tearing, is it again exploiting the religious feelings? Is 
it again progressive-conservative antagonism? Will they again attack our holy 
things? Will they again market the religion? You think that everything will be 
the same. Its not as you think! In 19 April, the party that will embrace the 
nation with the state and the republic with the democracy will succeed, [my 
translation]” ’^
As it can be seen, the party attempted to attract both Kemalists and Islamists 
by using a very loose discourse. For example, one can not understand why the party 
has a problem with National Security Council’s (MGK) decisions in 28 February 
1997. From the point of Islamists, 28 February MGK decisions represented the 
military oppression over the Islam. On the other hand, Kemalists claimed that those 
decisions were against the exploiting the religion. By the help of its loose discourse, 
the party aimed at influencing both Kemalist and Islamists.
As a result, the party was able to attract Islamist voters as a result of a crisis 
of Islamist party by its loose and double discourse. Following the closure of RP, the 
traditional and anti-Westernist masses supported the МНР in the 1999 elections. In
Bora, “İki МНР” ...p:306
The party brochure of Koray Aydın, (lie general secretary of tlie МНР.
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this sense, it can be argued that the party may represent the Islamist and traditional 
sections of the society without directly opposing the laicism and Kemalism. In the 
following section, I will delineate the changing relations between Kemalist 
nationalism and МНР nationalism.
5.2.Kemalist Nationalism and the МНР Nationalism
In the second chapter, I presented first and second generation of Turkists and 
Turanists as the origin of МНР type politics. Throughout the single party period, the 
ultra-nationalist Turkists had tense relations with the state and Kemalism as its 
ideology. Turanism, Turkism and other forms of ultra-nationalism have never been 
the official ideology of the Kemalist regime. However, the Kemalist regime was not 
completely immune to an extreme form of nationalism. Firstly, the Turanist 
intellectuals of the ITC became incorporated into the new regime. Moreover, some of 
these former Turanists, though now espousing Kemalist ideas, such as Ziya 
Gokalp’s, did not completely abandon their Turanist dreams. In the mind of Gokalp, 
in Turkey, a Turanist State “may he constituted in the far distance”.^ ®
Furthermore, the Turkish Hearth associations (Turk Ocagi), which were 
founded by Turkist intellectuals such as Mehmet Emin, Yusuf Ak9ura, Ahmet Ferit 
and Ahmet Agaoglu in 1912, re-commenced their activities in 1924 . Within a few 
years, the number of branches of the Turkish Hearth increased to 157, while 
possessing 32.000 members. However, the Republican People Party (CHP) closed
Ziya Gokalp, 1970, Türkçülüğün Esasları, İstanbul. Milli Eğitim yay. p: 15 
Ilhan Darendelioglu, Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik ...p: 44
129
these Hearths of Turkish nationalists in 1931.^” In fact, the closure of the Turkish 
Hearths was not a sign of anti-nationalism on the part of the Kemalist regime. Instead 
of the Turkish Hearths, the CHP opened People’s Houses (Halkevleri), inspired in 
part by similar institutions set up by the fascist regime of Italy in that period.^*
Following the 1929 economic crisis, the Kemalist regime became more 
authoritarian and more rigid in its nationalism.^^ Çağlar Keyder in his earlier analyses 
takes the 1929 economic crisis of world capitalism as a turning point both in the 
center and the periphery countries.According to Keyder, unlike 1973 economic 
crisis of capitalism, in 1929 economic crisis, the states of individual countries were 
able to employ their own (and generally authoritarian) policies in their countries. 
Because of the disorganised structure of world capitalism in the 1929 crisis, 
individual states were quite autonomous from the world capitalism. This was also the 
case for the Kemalist regime, which was able to follow an autonomous and 
authoritarian policy after 1930.
However, in spite of its authoritarian ‘etatist’ policies, Kemalism of 1930s 
can not be defined as fa sc ism .W h e n  fascism is taken as a ‘developmentalist 
dictatorship’ that forms an alternative to socialism for reaching certain economic
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goals, then, it becomes impossible to distinguish European fascism from ‘Turkish 
Etatism’, Third World nationalism, or Argentine’s Peronism.^^ As I mentioned 
earlier, Keyder takes fascism as a reaction to social change that bears a threat for 
existing status structures and balances in this structure. Furthermore, according to 
Keyder, fascism requires a certain degree of development of capitalism that involves 
political and social differentiation. From the point of Turkish case, there was no 
strong petty bourgeoisie and peasant reaction towards liberal capitalism in Kemalist 
period. Anti-liberalism in Turkey was confined to an intellectual response of 
bureaucratic-bourgeois power bloc: there was no mass reaction towards capitalism. 
Apart from the low degree of social and political differentiation (and thus, the 
weakness of petty bourgeoisie and the peasant opposition), one another reason of the 
absence of fascism was related to the continuity between Turkish Republic and the 
Ottoman State in terms of the authority of the state as being legitimate and strong. As 
a result of traditional state authority in Turkey, Kemalist movement did not need to 
mobilise the masses as in the case of fascist regimes. Mustafa Kemal never made a 
public meeting similar to these of Mussolini or Hitler. ^ ^Because of the strong 
respectability of the state leaders and legitimacy in the eyes of people, such 
mobilisation of the masses was not a necessity for the Kemalist elite.
To repeat, Kemalist State was not totally immune from ultra-nationalist 
elements, however some of Turkish laws were directly imported from fascist Italy. 
Furthermore, in speeches of some members of the Kemalist leadership, one can 
easily find expression of a number of racist elements. For example, as Justice 
minister, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt declared in 1930 that “I believe that the Turk must be
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the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish 
stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.”“*' 
However, the racist elements in Kemalist nationalism were used as a unifying, not 
dividing element.“*^
The main motive of territory-based nationalism and its emphasis on the ethnic 
superiority of the Turkish people by the Kemalist regime of the time might be to give 
a response to a series of Kurdish and Islamic uprisings that threatened the stability of 
the regime. The separatist struggle of the Kurdish people in the 1920s posed a 
significant threat within the boundaries of Turkey itself. The words of Prime Minister 
İsmet İnönü in 1930 prove the effect of the Kurdish movement on the nature of 
Kemalist nationalism in that time:
" The revolution [Kurdish uprisings], fanned by foreign intrigue in our 
Eastern provinces, has lasted for five years, but today it loses half its strength. 
Only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this 
country. No other elements has such right.
Accordingly, there was an attempt to merge Kurdish identity into that of 
Turkish nationality not only in the political sphere but also in the cultural sphere.“*“* At 
the very beginning of the 1930s, the Turkish History Association (Türk Tarih 
Kurumu-TTK) and the Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu-TDK) were 
set up by the Kemalist regime. Both of these associations became famous for 
contributing the “factual” basis of the assimilationist terminology used by the 
Turkish elite of the period. According to the Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih
Fikret Başkaya, 1991, Paradigmanın İflası, IstanbukDoz yay., p: 170 
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Tezi) and Sun Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi), almost all races and languages 
(including those of the Kurdish race and language) stem from the Turkish race and 
the Turkish language. The task of these institutions was to “prove” these facts 
through employment of various types of “scientific” methodology.'*^
Fikret Başkaya argues that the Sun Language Theory and Turkish History 
Thesis prove the racism of Kemalist ideology.'*® However, the unifying theories of 
Kemalism at that time, must be distinguished from separatist racism. If we consider 
Guibernia’s way of distinction between racism and nationalism (Nationalism is about 
building. ... Racism does not attempt to construct anything),'*  ^ then Kemalist 
ideology resembles nationalism rather than racism because Kemalist ideology 
followed a positive hne by creating a nation state. The cultural unification and 
homogenisation project of Kemalism is also common in other nation building 
ideologies and processes.
To sum up, in spite of it’s distancing itself from Turanism or Pan-Turkism, 
nationalist ideology was one of the most important traits of the Kemalist regime in 
the 1930s. As one of the most prominent figures in the regime, Recep Peker, put it in 
1931,
“From our conception, nationalism has no connection with the masses whose 
political destinies are separated from ours. We preserve a warm affectionate 
interest for outside our frontiers, as an independent state, as belonging to 
other states...In this context we consider as our fellow citizens who live 
among us, who politically and socially belong to the Turkish Nation.”'**
For a variety of examples of the 'scientific products' of TTK and TDK. See Gayri-Resmi Tarih, 
Birikim (2), Haziran 1989, pp:56-6l, Birikim (3) Temmuz 1989, pp;66-69,and Birikim (\3),  Mayis 
1990 pp;65-69
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It is not to exaggerate to argue that some policies of late Kemalist period were 
assimilationist such as the Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş (Citizen, Speak Turkish) 
campaign and the Varlık Vergisi (Property Tax) were two examples of these policies, 
in which required different taxation for different ethnic and religious groups.'’^  In this 
period, despite its assimilationist and romantic ethnic constituent elements, Kemalist 
nationalism did not involve itself in irredentist claims. It did not possess an 
imperialistic but a territory-based vision of nationalism. According to this territorial 
model of nationalism, all citizens within the territory of Turkey were considered to be 
ethnic Turks.
In fact, not only in one party period, but also later periods of the Turkish 
Repubhc, Kemalism has been the official ideology of the state. However, Kemalism 
has taken different forms according to historical conditions. First, if we roughly 
divide the history of Turkish democracy into two parts as single and multi-party 
periods, we can argue that Kemalism has two different discourses during the single 
party and multi-party periods. In the single party period, Kemalist ideology was 
strongly against any form of sectarianism, religion and class-based politics. However, 
during the multi-party period, “the society-centred characteristics of this new era 
helped the rise of new ideologies and movements challenging Kemalist assumptions. 
Together with the radical left, the МНР joined the chorus of dissent and rejected 
some of the central aspects of Kemalism nationalism which stood as obstacles to its 
rise to power” *^ Especially in the 1960s, the old Kemalist discourse of the single 
party period was greatly weakened. Although during the military takeovers of 1960, 
1971 and 1980 Kemalism was the most important ideological component in the 
legitimisation of these coups, none of these military leaderships advocated a return to
Suat Parlar, Osmanlidan Günümüze Gizli Devlet,... pp:202-4
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single-party style of a regime. They had to declare that their aim was to restructure 
pluraUst democracy. However, Kemalism remained a dominant ideology, which has 
continued to provide a basis of legitimacy for other ideologies. Even radical left 
militants in 1960s and 1970s referred to Kemalism so as to justify their politics.
МНР as a nationalist party did not directly attack the Kemalist ideology. 
However, party leaders' preference of the term of 'Turkish nationalism' instead of 
Kemalist nationalism signifies the tense relation between these two nationaUsms. 
Tiirke§ claimed several times that the term of Kemalist nationalism is meaningless 
and unscientific:
“There is nothing such as Atatürk nationalism ifom scientific point of view. 
For Atatürk is a prominent representative of the continuity of Turkish 
nationalist current...Atatürk himself in his all speeches declared that ‘we 
were nationalist or even ultra-nationalist.’ Atatürk adopted that the Turkish 
nationalism was the only solution and never used or let others used the terms 
such as Kemalism and Atatürk nationalism [my translation]”.^ ^
The preference of the term of Turkish nationalism instead of Kemalist 
nationalism shows the MHP’s aim to attract Islamist and anti-Westernist elements by 
emphasising the homogeneous interests of all Turks whereas Kemalism implies 
Westernism, secularism and modernisni. In a recent interview, Mustafa Çalık, as a 
deputy candidate of the party openly claims that the nationalism of the МНР is 
different than Kemalist nationalism, the latter being is elitist and statist.^^ Çalık 
argues that, unlike Kemalist nationalism, МНР nationalism, that is Turkish 
nationalism, is sensitive to the values of Turkish people.
Especially before 1980, MHP’s Turkish nationalism involved a number of 
aspects that contradicted with those of Kemalist nationalism. Sakallıoğlu, in her
Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “The Ideology and Politics... p: 144 
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analysis of the МНР, states five conflicting points between МНР nationalism and 
Kemalist nationalism. First of all the party’s anti-communism was mediated by an 
anti-Western discourse since ‘МНР was against all foreign ideologies such as 
communism, capitahsm and fascism.’ '^* МНР has always emphasised the aUen 
character of communism. The pan-Turkism and Islamic dimension of МНР has led 
the way in rejecting communism via opposing Westernisation. On the other side, one 
of the most peculiar traits of Kemalism is its Westernisation project. For the 
Kemalism of single-party period, the problem of communism was not about its 
foreign basis.
What is the new position of МНР after 12 September coup? With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s, from the МНР point of view, the threat of 
communism can not be a fruitful space of political struggle. However, the Islamic 
tendencies of its grassroots do not allow it to adopt a fully-fledged Westernisation 
discourse. Moreover, the decreasing relations with European countries and their 
concerns about human right violations in Turkey have paved the way for anti-Europe 
politics.
The second difference of the MHP-type nationalism from Kemalist 
nationalism was a result of the rising influence of Islam within the party. In the 
1970s, the МНР could spread its ideology by connecting with the Islamic common 
sense of conservative rural people, particularly in Central and Eastern Anatolia. As I 
mentioned in the previous section, in 1990s, the МНР was able to attract Islamist and 
reactionary sections of the society by emphasising traditional and religious values.
The success of the party lies in employing such a discourse without challenging the 
laicist ideology. The most prominent Kemalist and laisist newspaper Cumhuriyet
”  Mustafa Çalık, Milliyet, 15 July 1999
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made an interview with Devlet Bahçeli before the 1999 elections. Bahçeli repeated 
their devotion to laisism. And, more interestingly, the newspaper praised Bahçeli 
because of his words. After the elections, Kemalists like İlhan Selçuk claimed that
“The most important mistake would be supposing the МНР votes as religious, 
fascist and racist. In its emergence, Turkism was secular; during the II. 
Constitutional Monarchy, it was against the Ottomanist and Islamist currents. 
In reality, a nationalist cannot be an Islamist. Since Turkist take into account 
the Turkish history before meeting Islam, it cannot support the Arapçı 
mürteci (Arabist reactionary): religiousity and nationalism are two opposite 
currents [my translation].”^^
The third difference between МНР nationalism and Kemalist nationalism 
stemmed from the power base of the party and its record of sectarian political 
violence. While Kemalism was a project of capitalisation and Westernisation, the 
pro-MHP social base was mainly reacting against these processes. In short, while 
Kemalism represented a coalition of different classes including state bureaucrats and 
the bourgeoisie, the МНР was representative of the petty bourgeoisie. Because of its 
reactionary and weak politics, unlike Kemalism, the МНР put sectarian pohtical 
violence into the centre of its politics. Nevertheless, in 1990s, its attempt to articulate 
the New Right ideology proves its desire to expand its social base.
The fourth difference was between the centre-right versions of Kemalism and 
МНР nationalism, which lies in their respective conceptualisation of democracy.^** 
МНР sees nationalism as the basis of democracy by using the concept of national 
democracy, which aims at a new society according to pure fascistic principles. It is 
still a fact that the МНР puts ultra-nationalism into the center of its conception of 
democracy. However, the MHP’s politics in 1990s can not be equated with its earlier
”  Cumhuriyet. 29 Mart 1999
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period. In accordance with a neo-fascistic change, the discourse of plural and liberal 
democracy is widely employed by the party.
According to Sakallıoğlu, the last distinguishing point of МНР nationalism 
from Kemalist nationalism was its identification with the military.^^ Before 1980, one 
of the indispensable political strategies of the МНР was the gaining of power by 
allying with the leaders of the military takeovers. In this context, the institutions of 
representative democracy such as electoral politics, were pseudo-mechanisms. As I 
focused on the second chapter, the other strategy of the МНР before 1980 period was 
creating a civil war condition. However, the party mainly adopts an electoral-based 
strategy in 1980s. In this sense, the last point that distinguishes the МНР from the 
Kemalist nationalism was modified.
One may claim that, in the 1990s, an ideological and organisational symbiosis 
between МНР and Turkish state has occurred.^® From the organisational point of 
view, a significant number of МНР members have already spread throughout the 
bureaucracy and various positions of power and status. Also, a large amount of 
idealists were employed in police institutions and in the özel tim (special team),^’ 
which specifically dealt with terrorism. More importantly, ideologically, ultra­
nationalist discourse of ‘idealist’ nationalism has blended with the official nationalist 
discourse of the state.
Muharrem Tünay writes in 1993 that ‘none of the ideological elements, such 
as nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism or productivism, seem to have sufficient 
power to be a cementing ideology to secure moral and intellectual leadership of at
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least one faction of the dominant c lass.H ow ever, it is not to exaggerate to argue 
that nationahsm has become the cementing ideology for almost five years. It can be 
argued that especially two developments have strongly influenced the rise of 
nationalism as a unifying ideology: the rise of Kurdish movement and the broken 
relations with Europe. After the 1980 coup d'etat, the military regime was able to 
repress most of the leftist revolutionary movements within Turkey. Until today, 
socialist movements or ideologies have not been able to regain their earher status in 
society. The promise of the military regime’s leadership was to put an end to 
terrorism. However, the harsh treatment of the military regime gives rise to an 
increase in the terrorist activities of Kurdish independence movements in the 
Southeast of Turkey. Before 1980, there was no strong terrorist organisation 
arguing for the independence of the Kurdish people. However, the PKK (Kurdistan 
Worker Party) as a terrorist organisation was the most prepared group for 
underground activities '^* and it began its terrorist activities in 1983.
At the very beginning of the 1990s, the PKK was more than a marginal 
underground opposition movement. The organisation was able to find a great number 
of supporters among the Kurdish people. In effect, it became the only representative 
of Kurdish identity after the military coup. In 1992, as a result of an uprising 
strategy, 80 people died in Newroz celebrations. Even before, people believed that 
the PKK is not only a small group against the state authority but a really powerful 
terrorist organisation. I think, words of one columnist represent the rising hatred and 
indignation among many people:
Muharrem Tiinay, “Hegemonic Attempt of New Right.., p:26
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“Everyone should admit that the PKK is no more a child who steals plum. 
People of the South East supports this terrorist organisation...So, either 
military solution as Turkey and Ecevit propose, or let’s talk about all things 
including federation as Ozal said...Either give and solve, or shoot and solve 
[my translation]”^^
Some theoreticians talk about war conditions as an important source of 
fascism .F or Turkish case Murat Beige states that ‘rules and logic of war led to the 
spread of nationalism virus in Turkey.Throughout the nineties, there emerged a 
polarisation between Kurdish terrorism and the state's anti-democratic policies to 
repress Kurdish nationalism in the Southeast region of Turkey. Any other poUtical 
organisation that has attempted to demand the acceptance of democratic rules, human 
rights and cultural rights for different identities within Turkey have been accused by 
the Turkish state of supporting pro-PKK policies, such as HADEP (People’s 
Democracy Party) , Human Rights Association of Turkey.
The second development that led to rise of nationalist ideology is the break­
up relations with the European Union. During the 1980s, the relationship between 
Turkey and Europe was looking quite promising. In 1987, Turkey officially applied 
for entrance to the European Community. However, throughout the nineties, 
Turkey’s hopes of entering into the European Community have decreased. 
Furthermore, European countries have placed obstacles in the way of Turkey’s 
membership of the EU due to its problems in respecting human rights. Most of the 
European governments and several European-based non-governmental organisations
Necati Doğru, 27 December 1991, Milliyet. About Özal’s view, Türkeş claims tliat ‘Discussing 
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have reacted against the human rights violations in Turkey, especially those 
committed in the Southeast region of Turkey. Furthermore, the attitude of the 
European Community towards the Turkish application became uncertain. In the 1991 
and 1995 elections, the central-right and the central-left parties in Turkey could use 
the argument of possible admission to the European Union as a tool for gaining 
electoral support, or as an excuse to provide for policies of economic restructuring. 
However, in the last election, no party could use such arguments. Turkey’s position 
vis-à-vis Europe was not as strong any more. In many respects, the European 
Community has almost excluded Turkey.
With the influence of these developments, not only the parties, but also the 
masses have been mobilised under the control of various sorts of nationalist 
ideologies. In other words, nationalism has become a cementing ideology of a new 
expansive hegemony. Apart from the МНР nationalism, also Atatürkist nationalism 
was able to mobilise the masses. The changing mode of celebration of national days 
can be seen as an example of its attempt to be hegemonic ideology. The year of 1994 
was a turning point in celebrations of Republican Day (29 October). As Navaro- 
Yashin states, ‘Republic Day was about a disciplined school ceremony, an annual 
ritual of the military, a boring old program on the state TV, an obligatory ceremony 
organised by municipalities and attended by state em ployees.W hile it was mainly 
perceived as a holiday, this perception has changed following the 1994 Republic 
Day. For five years, it has been celebrated as a national integrity day against the 
Islamist threat and the PKK.^° To sum up, in recent years, Turkey has experienced 
integration of state and society as different sorts of nationalisms (sometimes in a 
mixed, sometimes in a competing form) activate the masses.
Yael Navaro-Yashin, “Uses and Abuses of ‘State... .p:17-8 
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5.3. Neo-fascist МНР and the New Right
In 1980s and 1990s, New Right ideology has been hegemonic almost all over 
the world. Especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, under the New 
World order capitalism has been presented as the only viable economic system. 
Turkey was not immune from such a development. Following the 1980 coup, new 
right politicians have strongly influenced the political climate of the country. The 
Turkish version of New Right, Ozalism was a composition of neo-liberalism and 
neo-conservatism like other versions of new right.A ccordingly, as Muharrem 
Tunay puts it.
“The new right in Turkey certainly maintains various traditional elements in 
its ideological appeal, but at the same time it incorporates into its national 
popular agenda several new assets such as anti-statism, privatization, the two 
nations project, a liberal competitive individualism, and apparently 
contradictory Islamic capitalist enterprise.
In his analyses of Turkish New Right, Tiinay argues that Ozalist hegemonic 
project was not able to create a hegemonic ideology. ANAP intend to engage in an 
expansive hegemony following its 1983 election victory. The party openly claimed 
that its success in the elections was a result of its all-inclusive ideology, which 
encompassed four different political positions (liberalism, ultra-nationalism, 
Islamism, and social democracy).However, following a decrease in its votes and 
popularity since 1987,^ *^ ‘the new right has made a significant change in its strategy
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towards a transition from an expansive hegemony to a passive revolution.’^^  
Moreover, according to Tiinay, the Turkish Right has failed to maintain a passive 
revolution. The critical reason for this failure was its inability to form a large and 
united “first nation” that mostly composed of satisfied middle class like other New 
Right projects.
The specific situation of Turkish power bloc (its weak and disorganised base) 
may be a factor for gaining power of the neo fascist party. Tiinay was mentioning 
that researchers should also take into account specific conditions of Turkey in 
examining Turkish new right experiences. For him, although there are significant 
parallelisms between Western New Right projects and the Turkish one, there are also 
differences that stem from ‘different social structure, degree of capitalist 
development and national histories.’^ ’ Furthermore, he remarks the peripheral 
position of Turkey vis-à-vis the Western countries. I agree with Tünay that Turkey’s 
specific features and weak position within the capitalist world order affected the form 
of New Right in Turkey. Accordingly, specificities that Tünay mentioned influence 
the form of neo-fascism and its way of articulation with New Right in Turkey. Such a 
comparative and relational analyses between Western and Turkish neo-fascisms is an 
important task. Still, I believe that, like European cases, establishing a link between 
the New Right and neo-fascism is quite explanatory in order to understand the rise of 
the МНР.
In 1990s, the МНР sort of nationalism completely abandons its anti-capitalist 
discourse. With its new strategy, it aims at being a part of Turkish power bloc by
following a very extensive labour movement in 1988, the government had to give enormous 
concessions to the working class. For example, the salaries of public sector labourers increased 142 % 
in 1988. See, Korkut Boratav, May 1999, 2000’e Doğru Türkiyede Popülizm, Mürekkep, p; 11 
Muharrem Tünay, New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony ... p:25 
ibid p:27
77 ibid
143
articulating its nationalism with new right ideology. If we compare the economic and 
social programs of the МНР in the 1970s and that of the 1990s, the differences will 
indicate that the hegemonic power of neo-liberalism is in increase. In the 1970s, 
MHP's program was much more corporatist and statist. The anti-capitalist demagogy 
of classical fascist parties was also a feature of the МНР. However, there is rarely an 
anti-capitalist discourse in neo-fascist movements or parties. In this sense, while the 
program of МНР in the 1970s was similar to that of classical fascisms, in the 1990s, 
its discourse has changed in parallel with that of neo-fascism. When we read the 
publications of the МНР, we can see its demand for recognition as a mainstream 
political party. In a number of booklets the party declares their belief in free-market 
economy. The party declares that
The concepts such as competitive free market economy, démocratisation in 
the Western sense, and the rule of law have been accepted as the common 
values of the humanity. As a result of these developments, it is understood 
that any society can not develop by isolating herself from the outer world and 
international market since the solidarity and dependence among the countries 
has been increasing. The basic requirement for being successful is becoming a 
society that can compete in every sphere including economic, cultural and 
social spheres [my translation].”’*
Furthermore, the МНР and Türke§ many times declared that they are not 
against privatization of the State banks or other economic institutions of the State. 
Rather, they strongly supported such kinds of economic operations, which are seen as 
necessary for a free market order.
As I proposed earlier, the adoption of neo-liberal argumentation should not be 
seen as a simple shift of the МНР. In fact, some ideological elements of МНР 
became hegemonic in the political center of the society (both in the center right wing 
and he center left-wing parties). In this sense, Turkish political life has been
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experiencing a two-sided process in recent years: on the one hand, there exist a 
liberalization of ultra-nationalist party in economic sphere, on the other hand, we see 
ultra-nationalisation of centre parties in the ideological sphere.
The convergence between the discourse of the МНР and that of neo­
liberalism and the claim of being at the very center of the political order as well as 
the spectrum reveals the intention of the party. In my opinion, discussing the centrist 
position of the МНР proves more than the declared intention of the МНР. For the 
party was claiming its centrist position from its very beginning, even in the CKMP 
period.^^ In this sense, the main target of the МНР has always been to merge with the 
state, and also to unite the masses through a hegemonic ideology. However, 
mainstream media’s and business organisations’ discussions about the centrist 
position of the МНР are really a new phenomenon that, in my opinion, shows the 
progression of its attempt and struggle for hegemony.
The concluding words of Hugh Poultan’s book, which was published in 1997, 
stated that: “Turkey today exhibits a form of nationalist schizophrenia with a number 
of competing nationalisms vying for hegemony over possession of the whole or paits 
of the population...and the struggle for hegemony continues.’’**^ Today, it should be 
added that neo-fascist form of nationalism has been advanced among competing 
nationalisms.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
At least for the five years, nationalism has become the popular religion and 
cementing ideology of the Turkish society. In recent years, many scholars reported 
the revival of various forms of nationalism. Kemahst, liberal, Islamist and even the 
Leftist ideologies intensively employed nationalist arguments in their political 
projects. Furthermore, today, it is not overstatement to argue that neo-fascist form of 
nationalism has been rising and becoming hegemonic. Neo-fascism has been diffused 
and increased its influence not only in the state policies but also in different spheres 
of daily life (in the popular culture, in the mainstream media, in the streets...)
The hegemonic march of neo-fascism does not only mean an increase in the 
votes of ultra-nationalist parties. More importantly, the ultra-nationalist views, 
questions, and answers have been extremely influential in setting the political agenda 
of many societies. Sometimes, as in the case of Germany and England, the spread of 
ultra-nationalist and racist discourse in the centrist parties may lead to the 
marginalisation of ultra-nationalist parties. However, even those countries are not 
immune to the hegemonisation of neo-fascism in their country since their political 
agenda is mainly determined by the ultra-nationalist vision. Furthermore, in Turkey, 
like in France and in Austria, apart from the ultra-nationalism of political agenda, the 
huge increase in the votes of the МНР as an ultra-nationalist party indicates the 
progression of the hegemony of neo-fascism.
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In Turkey, the electoral success of the МНР has been interpreted in various 
ways. In the mainstream media, most of the columnists explained the unexpected 
victory of МНР with respect to the intensification of PKK terrorism and the ongoing 
war situation in the Southeast region. In fact, as I suggested earlier, there is an 
explicit relation between- the war conditions and the rise of ultra-nationalist parties. 
However, the main problem in this sort of interpretation derives from its endeavour 
to explain this phenomenon according to a single factor. It should be mentioned that 
there are also other material factors, which create a fertile soil for the rise of МНР. 
Apart from war situation in Southeast region, the crises within the Turkish power 
bloc and that of dominant ideologies have been important factors in its rise. 
Kemalism as the official ideology of Turkish State has been challenged by various 
ideologies in 1990s. Islamism was one of the most important ideologies that 
interrogate the supreme position of Kemalism in this period. However, following the 
closure of Islamist party and the modification in the discourse of its successor party, 
Islamist movement has been confronted with a crisis. Finally, while neo-liberalism 
had attempted an expansive hegemony strategy during 1980s, due to rising level of 
corruptionary economic and political crisis throughout the 1990s, the credibility of 
centrist parties in power has been severely shaken. As a result, the political sponsors 
of New Right in Turkey gradually demonstrated that they are no more able to provide 
a cementing ideology for the power bloc.
The crisis of dominant ideologies has its roots in the globalisation process, 
too. As I tried to display in this study, the rise of neo-fascism is not peculiar to the 
Turkish society. In other words, it is a global phenomenon. At the present phase of 
capitalism, the uneven relations among countries and social classes, unemployment, 
and the job insecurity are widespread. These have produced a fertile ground for rise
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of the neo-fascism. My contention is that a comparative analysis of different neo- 
fascisms within the context of current phases of capitahsm may help one to explain 
the МНР movement in a larger context.
Although all these material conditions (the war situation, a crisis within 
Turkish power bloc and of dominant ideologies and global economic conditions) may 
help to explain the advance of МНР, the crucial factor that explains the success of 
МНР type politics is its formation of new strategies. The party’s ability to adapt and 
operationalise a successful strategy, which embraces a complex articulation of 
Kemalism, New Right and Islam, has been vital in its electoral as well as popular 
success.
Explaining the rise of Turkish ultra-nationalism solely as a reaction to the 
material conditions without taking into account of the political strategies of the МНР 
confirms the hegemonic power of nationalism. For the most substantial trait of 
hegemonic ideology is its capability to delineate political events or developments as 
being both natural and normal. It can be argued that such taken for grantedness do 
not render one to imagine other possibilities and solutions, then it means that ultra­
nationalism is becoming hegemonic.
In my account, the success of the МНР as a neo-fascist movement has also 
been due to its hegemonic attempt that depends on an articulation of dominant 
ideologies. During this articulation process, the party has been able to absorb 
reactionary and Islamic sections of the society without disturbing the official 
ideology and the Turkish power bloc. Furthermore, while the reactionary and ultra­
nationalist character attracts the popular classes, its adoption of neo-liberal principles 
enhances its respectability in the eyes of Turkish bourgeoisie. The absence of any 
powerful political force that challenges the neo-liberal principles led to an increase in
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the appeal of reactionary movements for the people who are exploited or excluded 
within the present phase of capitalism.
In order to achieve its hegemonic attempt that depends on an articulation of 
dominant ideologies, the МНР employed an election-based strategy like other neo- 
fascist parties in Europe. As a result of this new strategy, it has dropped its civil 
strategy that depended on paramilitary organisations. Furthermore, the party has 
engaged to a double discourse of pluralistic democracy and ultra-nationalism. It has 
intensively emphasised the values of “peace”, “consensus”, “pluralism”, and “liberal 
democracy” in recent years. These were utilised to gain credibility among the masses. 
In other words, the party has attempted to champion a discourse of pluralistic 
democracy without abandoning ultra-nationalist views. Prompting a more refined 
ultra-nationalism, like other neo-fascist parties, the МНР used a cultural racism 
instead of biological racism. While it did not directly advocate using violence and 
terrorism, its new discourse justifies the violent means. Another change in its politics 
has been its adoption of the neo-liberal arguments instead of statist-corporatist view. 
Within the context of a crisis of the dominant ideologies and of the centrist parties, 
the МНР was able to become a respectable party with the help of its new outlook.
Throughout this study, I have proposed that the influence of neo-fascism and 
the МНР as its political agent have increased in recent times. Yet, any conclusion and 
future prediction must be provisional and speculative since the history of the МНР is 
still in the making. My aim has been to contextualize the rise of the МНР type 
politics in Turkish political life. As a conclusion, one can assert that the future of the 
МНР and neo-fascist movement depends on the material conditions (the future 
orientations of global capitalism, the unity or disunity of Turkish power bloc...) and 
the potencies of the political subjects to impose their hegemonic projects over the
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society. In this sense, not only the strategies of МНР but also the political activities 
of anti-fascist forces will determine the future of the party. Finally, a counter- 
hegemonic project that aims to challenge the hegemonic attempt of the МНР must 
disarticulate the ideological components of the neo-fascism by showing the 
possibility of other ways of living and by offering other solutions to the social and 
political problems.
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